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Essays in International Finance
Anh Quoc Pham
This dissertation studies the implications of financial intermediaries on international
financial markets and bank lending.
Chapter 1 explores the relevance of financial intermediaries for the pricing of foreign ex-
change. Recent theoretical work has highlighted the importance of financial intermediaries
in rationalizing exchange rate movements and I empirically assess whether the theoretical
predictions hold true in the data. I show that financial intermediary capital, a proxy for
their health and/or risk-bearing capacity, provides an economic source of risk that helps
explain both the carry trade and the cross-section of currency returns across a variety
of strategies. Currencies that more positively co-move with intermediary capital provide
high excess returns as intermediaries must be compensated for currency depreciation and
losses at times when their capital erodes and their marginal utility is high. I demonstrate
the dominance of intermediary-based asset pricing theories over consumption-based asset
pricing theories, thus rationalizing theoretical models with a central role for financial inter-
mediaries in asset markets. I then show that intermediary capital provides one economic
source of risk embedded within the more dominant carry factor and serves as an orthog-
onal source of risk to the global risk embedded within the dollar factor. This paper thus
serves as motivation for the further development of open economy models with financial
intermediaries and a deeper understanding of the underlying economic sources of risks that
underlie the factor structure of exchange rates.
Chapter 2 studies the impact of US monetary policy shocks on international bank lending
at the aggregate level. I ask whether country-banking systems that are more exposed
to dollar funding decrease their cross-border lending by more than less exposed countries
following contractionary US monetary policy announcements. For a given country borrower,
I show that this is indeed the case as a 25 basis point increase in the previous quarter
decreases cross-border lending supply growth by 4% more from a country-banking system
that is 10% more reliant on dollar funding. This is mainly driven by decreases in cross-
border lending to banks and the non-bank private sector, highlighting potential channels
for the international transmission of US monetary policy.
Chapter 3 assesses the effects of the US money market fund reform of October 2016 on
syndicated bank lending and more broadly examines the relevance of dollar funding from US
money market funds. I exploit the heterogeneity in foreign banks’ reliance on US money
market funds to uncover whether the decline in dollar funding attributed to the reform
affected their lending. I find that although larger exposure to US money market dollar
funding is attributed with larger declines following the reform, this did not pass through to
dollar denominated lending, contrary to conventional wisdom. I find that banks substituted
for some of the loss in dollar funding by increasing borrowing from US government money
market funds, but this was not sufficient to offset the loss in funding. My results thus
suggest that global banks have access to substitute sources of dollar funding that smoothed
the loss in dollar funding on lending.
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and the Cross-Sections of
Exchange Rate Returns
1.1 Introduction
Exchange rates have been a long-standing puzzle for researchers in international macroe-
conomics and finance. Early work by Meese and Rogoff (1983) identified the exchange
rate disconnect, namely the failure of empirical models utilizing monetary and macroeco-
nomic fundamentals as regressors to out-perform a random walk in out-of-sample forecasts
of exchange rates despite the use of ex-post realized values that theory suggests should be
relevant in exchange rate determination. The uncovered interest parity (UIP), one of the
main tenets of international finance that dictates exchange rates must adjust in expectation
to equate returns across countries with differing interest rates, has also failed as Hansen
and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984) show that currencies with higher interest rates tend
1
to appreciate rather depreciate, contradicting this basic relationship and giving rise to the
forward premium puzzle and the profitable carry trade strategy. Since the advent of these
studies, scholars have been in search of a cohesive explanation and mechanism to address
these empirical irregularities that contradict the seemingly well-founded theory.
Recent progress has been made on the theoretical front, introducing the notion of fi-
nancial intermediaries and shocks into open economy models that help alleviate some of
the inconsistencies between the models and data (Gabaix and Maggiori 2015, Itskhoki and
Mukhin 2017). At the core of these models is the notion that empirically consistent exchange
rate movements require the presence of constrained agents who intermediate and partici-
pate in foreign exchange markets. Their role as the marginal investors in these markets
causes fluctuations in their risk-bearing capacities to influence exchange rate movements
and consequently serve a central role in exchange rate determination. The risk-based in-
terpretation suggests that if currencies pay off poorly when these intermediaries are more
constrained, precisely when they have lower wealth and highly value an additional unit of
wealth, these currencies are deemed as risky and should provide higher expected returns to
compensate for this downside risk. From a general equilibrium perspective, risky curren-
cies depreciate upon the realization of negative shocks that erode financial intermediaries’
risk-bearing capacity in order to set up a future appreciation that yields higher expected
returns in order to incentivize agents to hold these currencies.
Figure 1.1 displays the composition of foreign exchange volume from the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements Triennial FX survey (2016) over the past decade and a half. The de-
composition shows that an overwhelming portion of exchange rate turnover is attributed to
financial institutions, with the latest survey in 2016 displaying financial institution turnover
of over 90% of the total. The turnover data demonstrates the outsize importance and rele-
2
Figure 1.1: Daily Foreign Exchange Turnover Breakdown
Notes: Data comes from the Bank for International Settlements’ Triennial FX Survey (2016). Turnover
includes all foreign exchange instruments on a net-net basis from all countries to all other countries.
vance of financial intermediaries as holders and traders of foreign exchange, as opposed to
households which have historically been of focus in the asset pricing literature.
Motivated by the recent theory and the outsize contribution of financial intermediaries
to foreign exchange turnover, I formally ask whether financial intermediaries matter for
the pricing of foreign exchange. If the open economy macro-finance theory holds true and
financial intermediaries matter, I expect fluctuations in their risk-bearing capacity to be a
significantly priced risk factor in the cross-section of exchange rate returns. Furthermore,
the theory predicts a positive price of risk as currencies whose returns more positively co-
vary with intermediary capital should yield the highest excess returns as compensation for
the risk of depreciation and losses when intermediary capital erodes.
I confirm both of these predictions, finding that fluctuations in intermediary capital, a
proxy for their risk-bearing capacity, commands a significantly positive risk price for the
carry trade and the joint cross-section of a variety of currency portfolios. The significance
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of intermediary capital risk for the carry trade indicates that the existence of constrained
intermediaries at the center of foreign exchange markets may provide one explanation for
the failure of the uncovered interest parity as currencies with high interest rates may not
depreciate enough and in fact appreciate due to compensation for the risk of larger depre-
ciations and losses when intermediary capital erodes and agents become more constrained.
The relevance of intermediary capital for the wider joint cross-section suggests that inter-
mediary capital risk underlies a wide range of exchange rate risk premia and thus serves
as a systematic source of global risk. My evidence thus validates open economy models
with a central role for financial intermediaries in foreign exchange markets as I confirm
the risk-based interpretation of exchange rate risk premia through the lens of financial
intermediaries.
Following my confirmation of intermediary-based asset pricing models for exchange
rates, I assess their performance in comparison to a traditional consumption-based asset
pricing model. This exercise serves to elucidate whether financial intermediaries or house-
holds are the most relevant marginal investors, revealing whether models actually require
financial intermediaries. I find that intermediary capital risk remains significant for both
the carry trade and joint cross-section upon inclusion of consumption growth, consistent
with intermediary-based asset pricing as it is intermediary capital risk rather than house-
hold consumption risk that prices foreign exchange, in line with intermediaries’ roles as the
marginal investors.
I also compare fluctuations in intermediary capital to previously identified exchange
rate factors, namely the high-minus-low (HML) carry and dollar and global dollar factors
of Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011, 2014) and Verdelhan (2018), in order to deter-
mine whether the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries serves as one economic
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explanation for the risk contained within these factors. While factors constructed through
portfolio-based methods provide an appealing proxy for underlying and generally unobserv-
able risk factors, the economic sources of these risks are not clearly identified. I seek to
fill this void by delineating whether intermediary capital serves as an independent source
or one of the many sources of risk contained within these factors, shedding light upon the
economic content of the HML carry and global dollar factors. I find that the HML carry
factor serves as the most robust pricing factor for exchange rates, subsuming the previously
significant intermediary capital risk, thus providing evidence that intermediary capital risk
serves as a sub-component of the HML carry factor which contains a wider set of economic
shocks and risk. Intermediary capital appears to be an independent and more relevant
source of exchange rate risk compared to the dollar and global dollar factors, but interme-
diary capital does positively co-vary with the latter factor, suggestive that some of the risk
contained within the global dollar factor is related to the risk-bearing capacity of financial
intermediaries.
Taking a step back, recall that in standard asset pricing theory the value of an asset
is determined by the marginal investor’s trade-off between current and future consumption
in combination with the asset’s prospective cash-flows, where the marginal investor is the
agent holding the asset. The relative value of consumption is given by the marginal utility
or pricing kernel of this agent and thus asset prices and expected returns should jointly
fluctuate with her marginal utility. Assets that provide poor returns when the marginal
investor encounters low consumption, and equivalently high marginal utility, should provide
higher expected returns as otherwise the agent would have no incentive to hold this riskier
asset. Traditional asset pricing models have focused on households as the marginal investors,
a by-product of representative agent models where households are the sole bearers of assets,
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and have investigated the relevance of measures of households’ marginal utility such as
consumption growth to test this theory. These models however have generally failed and/or
entertain implausible coefficients for risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott 1985, Lustig and
Verdelhan 2007).
The outsize importance of financial intermediaries in the trading and holding of financial
assets motivates a shift towards the analysis of the marginal utilities and pricing kernels of
these more relevant agents in both theory and empirics, suggesting that we must focus on
their presumably central role in asset pricing instead of that of households. The recently
well-developed closed-economy macro-finance literature has shown that models with real-
istic, time-varying risk premia (Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014, He and Krishnamurthy
2013, Garleanu and Pedersen 2011) hinge on the presence of constrained financial interme-
diaries as the marginal investors. The level of constraint of these intermediaries, whether
through a measure of their leverage, equity capital ratio, or margin requirements, thus en-
ters as a state variable and determinant of their marginal utility and assets are then priced
via the following mechanism: when intermediaries are more constrained, their marginal
utilities are high as they would prefer higher consumption or wealth but are unable to
borrow or lever up due to their constraint. It is then the covariance of asset returns with
these determinants of marginal utility that dictates the size and presence of risk premia as
assets that provide poor returns during periods of high constraints and consequently high
marginal utility must yield larger expected returns to compensate for this downside risk.
This intuition can be extended to foreign exchange markets. When the marginal utility
of intermediaries is high, perhaps due to negative shocks that lower their net worth and
constrain their ability to trade or absorb losses, currencies that depreciate are considered
risky assets as they lose value during bad times and should provide higher expected returns
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to compensate. Similarly, currencies that appreciate when intermediaries are more con-
strained should provide lower expected returns as they serve as insurance or hedges in the
face of adverse shocks. This risk-based interpretation of exchange rate returns motivates
the recent portfolio-based studies of exchange rates and the approach of this paper.
I confirm the validity of this mechanism by looking at the relevance of fluctuations in
the capital ratios of financial intermediaries, examining whether these financial shocks are
priced into the cross-section of exchange rate returns across portfolios of various strategies
above and beyond other economic factors, namely consumption growth and the broader
market return, and currency-specific factors such as the HML carry, dollar, and global
dollar factors. I construct and employ currency portfolios to mitigate the influence of
idiosyncratic country-specific risk and more accurately estimate betas while also assessing
whether the risk premia captured by a wide range of cross-sections of currencies may be
rationalized by the central role of financial intermediaries, a potential economic source of
systematic global risk. While the recent literature has mainly focused on the identification
of novel cross-sections of returns and sources of common variation across exchange rates
through portfolio-based methods, little has been said about the fundamental economic
determinants of the sources of risk that drive the heterogeneity in currency returns. I
delineate the relevance of fluctuations in intermediary capital as an economic source of risk
embedded in the various cross-sections of foreign exchange returns and assess whether it is
distinct from or merely a component of the previously identified risk factors that do not
yet have definitive economic interpretations.
As alluded to before, I find that intermediary capital is a significant risk factor for the
pricing of the carry trade and joint cross-section of foreign exchange portfolio returns when
compared to consumption growth and the broader equity market. Currencies that more
7
positively co-vary with fluctuations in intermediary capital, or high intermediary capital
beta currencies, provide higher excess returns and vice-versa, in line with intuition and
providing support for the relevance of the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries
as an economic source of risk for exchange rates. My results confirm the validity of this
mechanism as I show that intermediary capital commands a significant and positive risk
price when examining the carry trade in isolation and the joint cross-section of currency
portfolios covering a diverse set of risk premia. My findings show that financial intermedi-
aries provide one explanation for the forward premium puzzle and failure of the uncovered
interest parity, rationalizing the higher excess returns captured by high interest rate curren-
cies through a risk-based interpretation of exchange rate movements, while also identifying
intermediary capital as a source of global risk that underlies a broad set exchange rate risk
premia.
I also show that while intermediary capital risk serves as a significant risk factor relative
to other proposed economic risk factors, it is subsumed by the portfolio-generated HML
carry factor as intermediary capital risk is no longer or only marginally significant upon the
inclusion of the robustly priced HML carry risk factor. This finding does not preclude the
relevance of intermediary capital risk and in fact clarifies its role in relation to previously
identified sources of global risk embedded in the cross-section of exchange rates. The
fact that the price of intermediary capital risk is previously significant and subsequently
overshadowed by the HML carry risk factor shows that it may be one source of risk contained
within the latter factor. Previous studies have shown the relevance of the HML carry risk
factor, but have not yet conclusively identified its economic determinants with respect to
financial shocks. The results here suggest that HML carry is the dominant risk factor
for exchange rates and that intermediary capital shocks are one economic source of risk
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embedded within it.
In addition to the findings on the interplay of intermediary capital risk with the HML
carry risk factor, I also provide an analysis of its connection with the dollar and global
dollar factors of Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) and Verdelhan (2018). I find
that intermediary capital risk maintains its relevance when compared to these two factors
and that the relevance of the risk embedded in the dollar factors for the cross-section of
exchange rates hinges on the isolation of the global risk obtained by parsing out the US-
specific component of risk - the global dollar factor is significantly priced in the wider
cross-section of currency returns whereas the dollar factor itself is not.
I proceed to formally examine whether intermediary capital shocks explain some compo-
nent of the HML carry and global dollar factors given that I hypothesize that intermediary
capital risk serves an one economic source of shocks embedded in these two factors, while
also exploring the relevance of other candidate sources of global risk. I find that interme-
diary capital is a robust source of risk contained within the HML carry factor, consistent
with the economic relevance of intermediary risk for the pricing of foreign exchange. I also
document the relevance of other economic sources of risk, namely risk aversion, liquidity,
and US real activity for the HML carry factor, in line with previous studies and theory,
and the co-movement of intermediary capital, liquidity, and US real activity for the global
dollar factor, shedding light upon potential economic sources of risk contained within this
less studied factor.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses where this paper lies in the broader
literature. Section 1.3 describes the core data, portfolio construction methodology, and
various summary statistics. Section 1.4 outlines the regression specifications, and displays
and discusses the empirical asset pricing results. Section 1.5 examines the economic deter-
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minants of the portfolio-based exchange rate factors. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper relates to a few strands of literature, most notably that on intermediary-based
asset pricing and the portfolio, risk-based studies of exchange rates. More broadly it leans
on the intuition from closed economy macro-finance models and seeks to validate recent
open economy general equilibrium models that include financial intermediaries and shocks.
The notion of intermediary-based asset pricing has been identified and tested by previous
researchers, but a deeper examination of its relevance for exchange rates has not. Adrian,
Etula, and Muir (2014) were the first to empirically test for the relevance of intermediaries
in asset pricing, using the leverage of the US broker dealer sector as a proxy for the marginal
value of wealth of financial intermediaries to find significant prices of intermediary risk for
the excess returns of various portfolios of US equities and bonds, and out-performance in
a variety of other metrics, above and beyond that of mainstream asset pricing models.
He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) perform a more expansive assessment, constructing their
proxy for the marginal value of wealth of intermediaries via the net worth, or capital
ratio, of primary dealers with the New York Fed, and test their factor on stocks, bonds,
credit default swaps, exchange rates, and commodities, finding a significant risk price of
intermediary capital. It is important to note that these two seminal papers have conflicting
findings as Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) find evidence for pro-cyclical leverage and a
positive price of intermediary leverage risk, whereas He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) find
evidence for counter-cyclical leverage and a positive price of intermediary capital risk. These
findings are contradictory as leverage should simply be the inverse of the capital ratio
and thus the prices of risk should be inverted as well. While macro-finance models can
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generate both results depending on whether the intermediary has a debt or equity constraint
respectively, I follow He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) as their measure of intermediary shocks is
available at the monthly level in contrast to the quarterly frequency of the leverage measure
from Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014). My paper departs from both by shifting focus to
the foreign exchange market, employing a wider set of exchange rate cross-sections, and
studying the relevance and interplay of intermediary shocks against previously established
risk factors in the empirical foreign exchange asset pricing literature in search of an economic
interpretation for the global shocks that drive foreign exchange returns.
Related to the connection between financial shocks and exchange rates, Adrian, Etula,
and Shin (2015) show that measures of short-term US dollar funding, namely primary
dealer repos and commercial paper outstanding, forecast appreciations of the dollar and
estimate a dynamic asset pricing model following Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2015) to
find significant prices of carry and short-term dollar funding risk for the entire cross-section
of individual currency excess returns. I deviate from their work by focusing the relationship
between the carry trade and intermediary capital to uncover whether intermediary capital
prices the carry trade and thus helps explains the forward premium puzzle, and the joint
cross-section of currency portfolios to identify the existence of a systematic global risk factor
with a meaningful economic interpretation. I also link the intermediary shocks back to their
relationship with the HML carry and global dollar factors.
The empirical international finance literature on exchange rates has shifted towards
portfolio-based tests of risk premia and the identification of novel cross-sections of currency
excess returns. This was first applied by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) who form portfolios of
currencies based on their interest rate differentials and find significant prices of consumption
risk in the cross-section of exchange rate returns, arguing that exposure to US consumption
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risk explains the carry trade and the forward premium puzzle. Lustig, Roussanov, and
Verdelhan (2011) continue this approach and find that the cross-section of carry trade
returns is driven by two factors, namely a level and slope factor. They show that sorting
currencies by their forward discounts as a proxy for interest rate differentials leads to a
monotonic relationship in excess returns by portfolio and identify the high-minus-low (HML)
carry factor that is significantly priced in the cross-section and highly correlated with the
currency slope factor. In addition, they find that the level factor is highly correlated with the
average excess returns of foreign currencies against the dollar and establish this level factor
as the dollar factor. Building on Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001), they interpret their
findings through the lens of an affine model of exchange rates that identifies the necessity
of heterogeneous loadings on a global factor that can be proxied by the HML carry factor
in order to theoretically generate the cross-section of carry trade returns.
The level or dollar factor is explored in subsequent papers, namely Lustig, Roussanov,
and Verdelhan (2014) and Verdelhan (2018). These papers identify cross-sections of cur-
rency returns distinct from the carry trade hinged on going long foreign currencies and short
the US dollar when the average forward discount is positive, with the risk of depreciation
of foreign currencies when bad shocks hit in times with high US volatility and thus high
US investor marginal utility. This paper can rationalize this mechanism as US investor
marginal utility may be proxied by the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries if
they are indeed the marginal investors in currency markets. Verdelhan (2018) highlights
the share of systematic variation in bilateral exchange rates, noting the outsize importance
of the average change in the US dollar against all foreign currencies, or what he calls the
dollar factor, in the explained variation of exchange rate movements. He identifies a sepa-
rate cross-section based on heterogeneous movements relative to this dollar factor, namely
12
the dollar betas, and establishes the notion of a global dollar factor by taking the difference
between high and low dollar beta sorted portfolios to isolate the global risk factor driving
this separate cross-section that is purged of US-specific risk. He then finds that this cross-
section of dollar portfolios is distinct from the carry trade and rationalizes its existence by
positing an affine model with two orthogonal global shocks to generate both cross-sections,
each of which can be proxied by the HML carry and global dollar factors. My paper seeks
to shed light upon the economic content of these factor in relation to intermediary-based
asset pricing.
I borrow from and build upon this line of papers by forming portfolios of currencies
as test assets sorted by forward discounts as in Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011),
dollar betas as in Verdelhan (2018), and a variety of other cross-sections previously identified
in the literature (Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), Menkhoff et al. 2012a, 2012b),
and utilize the identified risk factors, namely the HML carry, dollar, and global dollar
factors to compare to the intermediary capital shocks. I employ portfolios to reduce the
influence of idiosyncratic, country-specific risk and combine portfolios from this diverse set
of cross-sections to assess whether financial intermediaries serve as a source of systematic
global risk that is present in exchange rate risk premia. My goal is similar to this line
of research as I attempt to find another cross-section of currency returns and risk, but
also complement it by examining the interplay between the intermediary shocks, previously
identified exchange rate factors, and various cross-sections of currency portfolio returns.
More importantly, given the portfolio-based approach of identifying risk factors, previous
papers do not explicitly identify the economic source of the shocks contained within the
HML carry and global dollar risk factors or an explanation of the heterogeneous loadings
on these shocks in the lens of affine exchange rate models, although Lustig, Roussanov, and
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Verdelhan (2011) and Verdelhan (2018) do draw some connections between equity market
volatility and the HML carry factor, and systematic exposure to global capital flows and
the global dollar factor, respectively.
There also exists an immense literature on the carry trade and this paper contributes
by highlighting that fluctuations in intermediary capital serve as one economic explanation
behind its existence. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) find the significance of US consumption
growth, borrowing from Yogo’s (2006) D-CAPM model to show that currency portfolios
sorted on interest rate differentials align with consumption betas, providing evidence in
support of consumption-based asset pricing as applied to foreign exchange. Burnside (2011)
debates their findings on the basis of econometric issues, arguing that after accounting for
the estimated regressors problem associated with the first-stage consumption betas and
properly adjusting standard errors, he finds no significant risk price of consumption growth.
My work builds upon both by comparing the relevance of intermediary capital to that of
consumption growth, constructing standard errors that correct for the estimated first stage
betas, and clarifying whether it is intermediaries or households that price the carry trade and
broader cross-section of exchange rate returns. This exercise serves to distinguish between
traditional consumption- and intermediary-based asset pricing models and validate whether
the introduction of financial intermediaries into open economy models is warranted.
A series of papers examines the relevance of crash risk and peso problems to account for
the carry trade. Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) identify the negative skewness
of the carry trade, revealing the presence of infrequent, but large carry trade draw-downs
and show that increases in global risk aversion coincide with carry trade losses. Burnside
et al. (2011) argue for the relevance of peso problems as they find that traditional risk
factors fail to price the carry trade, while the hedged carry trade provides lower returns
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compared to the traditional un-hedged version, indicative of compensation for downside
risk. They proceed to show that the peso problem stems from high values of the marginal
investor’s stochastic discount factor in the peso state rather than large losses. Jurek (2014)
provides a similar analysis and constructs a crash-neutral carry trade by hedging with out-
of-the-money options, but he comes to a different conclusion. He shows that although
the hedged carry trade provides slightly lower returns compared to the un-hedged version,
there still exist significant excess returns to both and compensation for a peso state can
only account for one-third of carry trade returns, which he interprets as an inability of peso
problems to fully account for the existence of the carry trade. Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber
(2014) document the downside-CAPM model that significantly prices the carry trade and
a wide variety of assets, arguing for the asymmetry between risk premia associated with
market declines and increases. Farhi and Gabaix (2016) introduce rare disaster risk into
an open economy model, suggesting that some countries have higher interest rates because
their currencies disproportionately depreciate when disasters arrive and investors must be
compensated for this disaster risk through positive expected returns.
This paper connects to this literature by showing that financial intermediaries’ risk-
bearing capacity can be one way to rationalize crash risk. Burnside et al.’s (2011) finding
that marginal utilities are disproportionately high in peso states for which the carry trade
is compensated for is consistent with intermediary-based asset pricing as in times when
intermediary capital is low and they are constrained, their marginal utility of wealth and
thus stochastic discount factor is high, with risk premia sharply rising when intermediaries
are almost or fully constrained. One class of peso event can then be financial crises in which
intermediaries are constrained and demand higher risk premia, consistent with the closed-
economy intermediary-based asset pricing literature. Similarly, down-side and disaster risk
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can be viewed through the lens of intermediary-based asset pricing as currencies that more
positively load onto intermediary capital risk should disproportionately depreciate upon
realizations of large negative capital shocks that lead intermediaries to become increasingly
or completely constrained.1 Furthermore, the relevance of global risk-aversion can also
be interpreted through intermediary-based asset pricing as intermediaries with lower risk-
bearing capacities should endogenously become more risk averse, thus commanding higher
risk-premia and I confirm Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen’s (2008) finding that risk
aversion is negatively associated with carry trade returns.
Menkhoff et al. (2012), Hassan (2013), Daniel, Hodrick, and Lu (2017), Ready, Rous-
sanov, and Ward (2017), Richmond (2016), and Jiang (2018) provide a variety of alternate
explanations for the cross-section of carry trade returns due to volatility risk, country size,
dollar and equity risk, commodity exporters, trade networks, and fiscal risks, respectively,
and I look to add to this literature by examining whether intermediary capital risk can
also provide an economic explanation of the carry trade. I go beyond these papers by
assessing whether intermediary capital accounts for not only the carry trade, but also the
joint cross-section of a variety of currency portfolios, showing that intermediary-based as-
set pricing alone provides an elegant and fundamental economic explanation to the forward
premium puzzle and reveals an economic risk factor that underlies a wide set of exchange
rate risk premia. In addition, the economic interpretations behind the shocks contained in
the dollar and global dollar factors identified by Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011)
and Verdelhan (2018) are less widely studied and I approach both through the lens of finan-
cial intermediaries, and a provide a formal analysis of potential determinants of the global
1This paper does not explicitly account for non-linearities in the asset pricing tests. Non-linearities are
however explicitly modeled in the closed economy macro-finance literature, e.g. He and Krishnamurthy
(2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
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dollar factor.2
The empirical intermediary-based asset pricing literature is based predictions from the
closed economy macro-finance literature that hinges upon the existence of constrained fi-
nancial intermediaries. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), He and Krishnamurthy (2013),
Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2011), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), Garleanu and Ped-
ersen (2011), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) explore macro-finance models with con-
strained intermediaries whose relative risk-bearing capacities, net worth, and/or leverage
matter for the behavior of risk premia and thus asset prices. Most closely related to this
paper is He and Krishnamurthy (2013) who construct a model in which financial inter-
mediaries serve as the marginal investors in risky assets as households are restricted from
holding these assets and can only gain exposure by funding intermediaries who invest on
their behalf. Intermediary net worth, and equivalently risk-bearing capacity, plays a central
role as households only invest up to a fraction of the intermediary’s net worth, which can
be interpreted as providing an incentive for intermediaries to optimally choose their port-
folios as poor choices will negatively erode their capital and dry up their funding, leaving
them more constrained. Non-linearities arise in the model because when the intermediary
becomes fully constrained, risk premia sharply rise, in contrast to the unconstrained region.
The notion of financial intermediaries in macroeconomic models has also been extended
to the open economy. Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) develop an open economy model with a
constrained global financier/bank that intermediates all international bond trades and show
that their model produces intuitive exchange rate movements that emphasize the role of the
risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries and portfolio flows in exchange rate deter-
2In Appendix A.3 I explore whether capital flow elasticities to fluctuations in intermediary capital align
with the dollar betas, finding a positive relationship between the two. My results point towards capital flows
in relation to intermediary capital as an economic rationale behind the pattern of dollar betas.
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mination. Their paper also contains theoretical predictions regarding the carry trade and
the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries as they show that carry trade returns
erode upon realizations of shocks that negatively impact the intermediary’s risk-bearing ca-
pacity and that intermediaries must be compensated for holding currencies that depreciate
upon the realization of tighter financial conditions - I confirm their theoretical predictions in
both asset pricing and standard regression tests. Itskhoki and Mukhin (2017) emphasize the
role of financial shocks in general equilibrium open economy models, namely through a UIP
wedge, to produce empirically consistent exchange rate movements. The financial shocks in
their model can be interpreted as fluctuations in the risk-bearing capacity of financial inter-
mediaries that drive deviations from the UIP as more constrained intermediaries will be less
inclined to remove and balance deviations in the UIP and must be compensated via higher
expected returns to hold high interest rate currencies that run the risk of depreciation. This
paper thus seeks to validate the role of financial intermediaries for consistent exchange rate
behavior by measuring whether risks emanating from their existence can account for the
cross-sectional heterogeneity in excess returns across currencies and the predictions of the
models are borne out in the data. I however abstract from writing down a full structural




I obtain daily spot and forward data from Datastream, combining Barclays and
WM/Reuters data as the former extends farther back but with less currencies, whereas
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the latter contains the full set of currencies. To remain consistent with previous studies, I
splice the datasets in January 1997, using the Barclays data prior to this date and only the
WM/Reuters data after. I obtain an end-of-the-month series for each currency from Jan-
uary 1983 to March 2018 subject to availability. All spot and forward rates are expressed
in US dollars, or quoted as foreign currency units per dollar. The dataset covers the fol-
lowing countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Euro
area, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and the United King-
dom. Countries that adopted the euro are kept until January 1999, and I contrast with the
existing literature by omitting the pegged currencies of Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates.
To remain consistent with the previous literature, I delete the following observations
as in Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) and corresponding papers due to large
failures of covered interest parity: South Africa from July 1985 to August 1985, Malaysia
from August 1998 to June 2005, Indonesia from December 2005 to May 2007, Turkey from
October 2000 to November 2001, and United Arab Emirates from June 2006 to November
2006. Note that since the financial crisis there have been widespread deviations in covered
interest parity (Du, Tepper, Verdelhan 2018), but I abstain from deleting observations in
the latter part of the sample given the prevalence of deviations for most developed countries.
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Intermediary Capital Shocks
I obtain data on the equity capital ratio of financial intermediaries and the corresponding
shocks directly from He, Kelly, and Manela (2017), available at both monthly and quarterly
frequencies on Asaf Manela’s website. They obtain the set of primary dealers vis-à-vis the
New York Fed, namely the financial intermediaries that trade directly with the Federal
Reserve in open market operations, from the New York Fed’s website. They then hand-
match these dealers to balance sheet data on their respective public holding companies from
CRSP, Compustat, and Datastream in order to construct the aggregate primary dealer





where MarketEquityi;t is the share price times number of shares outstanding on the
last day of the month and BookDebti;t is total assets less common equity for dealer i in
month t.
Note that the capital ratios aggregate and thus value-weight rather than average across
dealers. Although the ideal would be to weight each dealer by their relative share of
intermediation in each respective asset, my case being foreign exchange, this data is not
readily available outside of proprietary surveys, and thus the value weighting serves as
second best under the implicit assumption that dealers with larger values of market equity
intermediate relatively more in volume.
To obtain the capital ratio shocks, He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) estimate a first order
auto-regression on the capital ratio series and take the residual as the shock. Formally:
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Figure 1.2: Intermediary Capital Ratio and Shock Series
Notes: The shaded bars indicate US NBER recessions.
t = 0 + t 1 + ut (1.1)
The shock is then scaled to obtain a growth rate:
CShockt = ut/t 1 (1.2)
Figure 1.2 plots the equity capital ratio and capital shock series. We observe that
equity capital ratios tend to be pro-cyclical, in line with the intuition that bad shocks to
intermediary capital coincide with periods of financial turbulence as evident by the sharp
drops during the months containing Black Monday in 1987, the Russian default in 1998,
and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008.
Table 1.1 displays the summary statistics for both the level of intermediary capital
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Statistic N Mean SD Min 25th Pct 75th Pct Max
Capital Ratio 574 0.063 0.024 0.022 0.045 0.076 0.134
Capital Shock 574 0.001 0.068  0.280  0.040 0.040 0.396
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Intermediary Capital
ratio and capital shocks. We observe that intermediaries on average have 6.3% of equity
capital to assets, ranging from as high as 13.4% in 1998 to a low of 2.2% in the midst
of the Global Financial Crisis in 2009. Shocks to the capital ratio, as measured by the
scaled residual of an autoregressive model, are our primary variables of interest. The series
appears stationary, with a mean of .001, but is volatile, ranging from as low as -.28 to .4,
with a standard deviation of .068. Economically, these suggest that the largest negative
shock reduced the intermediary capital ratio by almost a third of its previous value and a
one-standard deviation shock causes the capital ratio to fluctuate by 7%.
Given that the following analysis will be done at the monthly level, it is important to
note that most of the variation in the intermediary capital ratio and shock will come solely
from fluctuations in the market value of equity as balance sheet data is only available at
the quarterly frequency at best. To show that intermediary shocks do not solely come
from broad stock market fluctuations, I compute correlations of the intermediary capital
shock series with the returns of the S&P 500 financials and excluding financials indices, and
the Fama-French global market. Looking at the correlations in Table 1.2, it is apparent
that intermediary capital shocks coincide with fluctuations in the financials sector of the
S&P 500 and that these shocks are not overwhelming correlated with the broader market,
suggestive of some orthogonality in terms of shocks. In other words, some of the variation
in the intermediary shock series comes from shocks solely affecting the risk-bearing capacity
of financial intermediaries, rather than the entire market and economy.
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CShock SPX Fin SPX ex Fin FF Global
CShock 1.00 0.84 0.49 0.65
SPX Fin 0.84 1.00 0.58 0.70
SPX ex Fin 0.49 0.58 1.00 0.64
FF Global 0.65 0.70 0.64 1.00
Table 1.2: Correlations of Intermediary Shocks and Equity Indices
Notes: Correlations are estimated for the intermediary shock series and the monthly returns of the S&P 500
Financials only, S&P 500 excluding Financials, and Fama French Global Market
Excess Returns
Let st and ft denote the log spot and forward rates respectively defined in foreign currency
units per dollar. An increase denotes an appreciation of the dollar and depreciation of the
foreign currency in question. Buying or going long a currency by engaging in a forward
contract today to buy the foreign currency and sell it on the spot market in the future
yields a log excess return of:
rxt+1 = ft–st+1
Note that we can decompose this return into gains stemming from exchange rate move-
ments and, if covered interest parity holds, interest rate movements:
rxt+1 = ft–st + st–st+1  it   it  st+1
where it is the foreign interest rate and it is the US interest rate. The log excess return
is thus approximately equal to the interest rate differential less exchange rate depreciation.
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Portfolio Construction
As pioneered by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) for foreign exchange, who were influenced by
Fama-French (1993) and the subsequent empirical asset pricing literature, recent studies in
the international finance literature have focused on using portfolio methods to identify and
explain cross-sections of currency returns. Currencies are ranked and sorted into portfolios
based on a country- or currency-specific characteristic such as their forward discount or
exposure to a factor, analogous to sorting equities on size or book-to-market ratios, upon
which one takes the average excess returns of the currencies in each portfolio. The main
benefit of this approach is that the averaging of multiple currencies in each portfolio should
purge each portfolio of idiosyncratic country-specific shocks and isolate the variation in
excess returns due solely to the criterion of the portfolio sorts and thus relative exposure
to a source of risk with the main drawback being the sharp decrease in sample size.3 In
addition as explained in Cochrane (2005), utilizing portfolios of assets rather than the assets
themselves enhances the measurement of betas as portfolios tend to have lower residual
variance and more stable betas over time, mitigating measurement error issues in the asset
pricing tests. Furthermore, given that characteristics may be highly variable for currencies,
measuring betas using portfolios sorted by characteristics provides more stable estimates
as characteristic-specific betas may be less volatile.
This paper adopts the portfolio construction approach and constructs a variety of cur-
rency portfolios in order to examine whether intermediary capital shocks price the carry
trade, the broader joint cross-section, and reveal their own cross-section of excess returns.
I discuss each in turn.
3Note that given the limited number of currencies, this approach of nullifying idiosyncratic risk is of
course not as effective compared to equities which are more numerous.
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Intermediary Capital Shock Portfolios
In order to determine whether exposure to intermediary shocks constitutes a new and inde-
pendent cross-section of returns, I construct portfolios of currencies sorted by “intermediary
capital shock” betas. I obtain the latter by running the following 36-month rolling window
regression:
rxi;t = i + 
CS
i CShockt + i;t
I sort currencies based on their time-varying co-movements with the intermediary
shocks, CSi;t , estimated via rolling regressions, and form six portfolios based on these sensi-
tivities. Intuitively, the high portfolio contains currencies that should provide higher excess
returns as they provide poor returns when negative intermediary shocks arrive, whereas the
low portfolio contains currencies that appreciate or depreciate by relatively less than high
beta currencies upon realizations of negative shocks. If the intermediary shocks capture
a significant risk factor, we should observe a monotonic relationship between exposures to
the risk factor and excess returns. I examine this formally both via summary statistics and
asset pricing tests shortly.
High-Minus-Low (HML) Carry Portfolios and Factor
A commonly known yet puzzling trading strategy has been the carry trade. It comprises of
going long or purchasing the currencies of countries with high interest rates, typically the
Australian or New Zealand dollars, while funding these investments by shorting or selling
currencies of countries with lower interest rates, such as the Japanese yen or Swiss franc, in
the context of G10 currencies. The carry trade is predicated on the failure of the uncovered
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interest parity as theory suggests that higher interest rate countries’ currencies should
depreciate sufficiently to offset interest rate differentials and equate expected returns across
currencies, a prediction inconsistent with the data as the strategy yields sizeable returns.
This anomaly gives rise to the forward premium puzzle.
To generate the cross-section of portfolios that represent the carry trade, I follow Lustig,
Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) and sort currencies by their forward discounts, ft–st,
rebalancing every month. Recall that if covered interest parity holds, then this is approxi-
mately equal to the interest rate differential against the dollar, namely ft–st  it   it, and
thus sorting currencies by forward discounts is essentially sorting by interest rates. I split
the currencies into 6 portfolios so that the first portfolio contains the lowest interest rate
currencies, while the sixth portfolio contains the highest interest rate currencies.
To obtain the HML carry risk factor, I take the difference in the excess returns between
the top and bottom portfolios, which is equivalent to going long high interest rate currencies
by shorting low interest rate currencies. This is a zero-cost investment that exploits the
cross-sectional variation in excess returns contingent on interest differentials and isolates
the excess return given if one were to have full exposure to the risk factor embodied in the
cross-section of carry trade returns. An investor that is long the carry trade is compensated
for taking on the risk that when bad shocks are realized, currencies with high interest rates
tend to depreciate, while those with low interest rates tend to appreciate, thus providing
poor returns to the strategy during bad times. This rationalizes higher expected returns
at all other times as compensation for this risk and the HML carry factor proxies for the
underlying global risk factor.4
4Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) rationalize the existence of the carry trade in an affine model
of exchange rates and show that countries must be heterogeneously exposed to a global shock. Differencing
the top and bottom portfolios is equivalent to isolating this global shock.
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Dollar Portfolios and Global Dollar Factor
Verdelhan (2018) identifies an additional risk factor and cross-section of currency excess re-
turns, distinct from the carry trade. He first estimates the co-movement of each currency’s
spot exchange rate changes with the average spot rate changes of all currencies against the
dollar, obtaining each currency’s dollar beta. He then sorts currencies into six portfolios
based on these dollar betas, generating a cross-section of currency portfolios with monoton-
ically increasing levels of co-movement with the average of movements of the dollar which
he argues is also monotonically increasing in excess returns. I call these portfolios sorted
by dollar betas the dollar portfolios.
Similar to Verdelhan (2018), my dollar portfolios are obtained by first running 36-month
window rolling regressions of the excess return of a specific currency against the average
excess return of going long all foreign currencies against the dollar. I depart from his con-
struction with spot rates as I find the strategy constructed from the univariate specification
with excess returns to be more profitable, but both strategies have the same interpretation
- high dollar beta currencies provide higher returns when the dollar depreciates on average
against all currencies and vice versa. Thus high dollar beta currencies are those whose ex-
cess returns are most sensitive to average changes in the dollar as they depreciate by more
than low dollar beta currencies when shocks that cause the dollar to broadly appreciate are
realized. For each currency I run:
rxi;t = i + 
Dol
i DolRXt + i;t
With the rolling regressions, I obtain a set of time-varying dollar betas, Doli;t for each
currency, i, which I use to sort currencies into six portfolios whose excess returns are the
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average of the excess returns of the currencies contained in each. Furthermore, following
Verdelhan (2018), I condition these portfolios by shorting portfolios if the average forward
discount of advanced economies is negative as forward discounts may contain information
about future returns.
To obtain the global dollar factor, I take the difference between the high and low dollar
beta portfolios to obtain a zero-cost investment that goes long high dollar beta currencies
and short dollar beta currencies. Differencing the two dollar portfolios purges the US-
specific information component of the dollar factor if we assume that all portfolios equally
load onto US-specific risk, and isolates the global risk factor that each currency or portfolio
is differentially exposed to in the cross-section.5 Note that in contrast to the dollar strategy
itself, I do not take into account going long or short depending on the average level of
forward discounts in order to omit information contained in the average forward discounts
and isolate the shocks that solely affect average excess returns against the dollar. Although
slightly more nuanced, the risk embodied in these portfolios is that when shocks occur that
cause the dollar to appreciate, high dollar beta currencies tend to depreciate more than low
dollar beta currencies, and thus going long the former and short the latter as a zero-cost
strategy bears the risk of poor returns in times of dollar appreciation and justifies higher
expected returns at all other times.
Momentum Portfolios
In addition to the intermediary capital, carry, and dollar portfolios, I construct a set of
momentum portfolios, following Menkhoff et al. (2012a). Currencies are ranked on their
previous month’s excess returns with the idea that winners continue their out-performance
5Verdelhan (2018) provides a full affine model that illustrates this mechanism formally.
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while losers extend their losses. I construct six portfolios as with the other cross-sections,
with the highest portfolio containing the currencies that have the largest lagged excess
returns and vice-versa for the lowest portfolio. A momentum factor can also be extracted as
in the previous cases by taking the difference between the high and low portfolios, forming
a zero-cost strategy that goes long previously well-performing currencies and short poor
performers.
Volatility Portfolios
Menkhoff et al. (2012b) examine the carry trade from the perspective of foreign exchange
volatility, positing that carry trade returns are rationalized because the strategy performs
poorly during bouts of high volatility. I construct a measure of monthly foreign exchange











where j;ij is the absolute log change in the spot rate of currency i on day  . Tt
and N signify the number of trading days in a given month and currencies on a given
day, respectively. Monthly foreign exchange volatility is equal to the monthly average of
the daily averages of absolute daily log spot changes. Volatility-sorted portfolios are then
constructed by regressing each currency’s excess returns on the residuals of an AR(1) model
of the FXt series and sorting currencies by their past volt in a series of rolling regressions,
i.e.
rxi;t = i + 
V ol
i V olt + i;t
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where V olt is the residual from the first order autoregression of the volatility series.6
Currencies with the largest covariances with volatility innovations should yield low ex-
cess returns as they perform similar to hedges against volatility, yielding high returns in
bouts of elevated volatility. On the other hand, currencies with little or no covariance with
volatility should yield higher excess returns as they may depreciate and pay off poorly when
volatility is elevated. Note that the pattern of excess returns and high-minus-low are con-
structed opposite all of the other portfolios as the “high” portfolio here contains currencies
with the lowest exposures and volatility betas.
Value Portfolios
Finally, I construct currency value portfolios as in Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013).
Currencies are sorted by their value, computed as the 5-year change in purchasing power
parity (PPP) or real exchange rate (RER) given by the negative ratio of the log average
spot rate from 4.5 to 5.5 years ago and the log spot rate today less the difference in inflation
between the foreign country and the US, as measured by changes in the CPI.



















The intuition is that currencies with large increases in their PPP have become more un-
dervalued because higher PPP’s, equivalent to real exchange rates, imply that the domestic
currency is too weak given the relative price levels. The domestic currency eventually needs
to appreciate against the dollar in order to push the real exchange rate back to unity and
equate purchasing power across currencies, hence investing in the currency now provides
6I also construct the portfolios with the difference in the volatility series as the factor and find qualita-
tively similar results.
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good value as it will eventually appreciate and yield higher excess returns down the line.
Note that the construction of these portfolios differs from Asness, Moskowitz, and Ped-
ersen (2013) as I do not focus only on G10 currencies and generate a larger number of
portfolios, namely six versus their three.
Portfolio Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 displays summary statistics for each of the portfolios described in the previous
sections. Moments are annualized and in percentage terms, namely means are multiplied
by 12, whereas standard deviations are multiplied by
p
12. I display each portfolio’s mean
excess return, standard deviation, and Sharpe ratio to elucidate which strategies appear to
be the most profitable before conducting the formal asset pricing tests.
The intermediary capital shock portfolios do not display monotonically increasing mean
excess returns but suggest profitability. The top portfolio indeed yields the highest mean
return of 2.4%, whereas the bottom portfolio yields a negative return of -1.3%. Combined,
a high-minus-low portfolio of going long the top and short the bottom portfolio appears
mildly profitable with a mean excess return of 3.5% per annum and a Sharpe ratio of .38.
However given the lack of a discernible pattern in mean excess returns across portfolios, it
is unlikely that intermediary capital shocks constitute their own cross-section.
The carry and momentum portfolios are almost and definitively monotonically increasing
in returns across portfolios with the high-minus-low, or zero-cost-investment, strategies
yielding mean excess returns of 7.1% and 6.1% per annum respectively. The pattern of
increasing mean excess returns supports the existence of a risk-based explanation of foreign
exchange returns as it shows that currencies with higher forward discounts or larger previous
momentum, both of which implicitly proxy for larger exposures to some source of global
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1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
Capital
Mean -1.31 0.71 -0.19 0.12 0.66 2.37 3.54
SD 8.15 8.68 8.34 8.85 9.16 9.26 9.31
Sharpe -0.16 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.38
Carry
Mean -1.74 -0.48 1.82 2.80 2.26 5.35 7.08
SD 9.72 8.14 8.14 8.65 9.51 10.51 10.29
Sharpe -0.18 -0.06 0.22 0.32 0.24 0.51 0.69
Dollar
Mean 0.46 1.84 2.14 2.75 4.68 4.16 3.59
SD 5.34 5.77 8.31 9.93 10.30 11.11 10.54
Sharpe 0.09 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.34
Momentum
Mean -1.97 0.50 1.44 2.83 2.97 4.07 6.05
SD 12.05 9.12 8.77 8.88 8.71 8.83 11.59
Sharpe -0.16 0.06 0.16 0.32 0.34 0.46 0.52
Volatility
Mean -0.45 1.09 -0.19 0.75 -0.32 2.50 2.99
SD 7.51 7.62 8.36 8.57 9.49 10.82 9.73
Sharpe -0.06 0.14 -0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.23 0.31
Value
Mean -2.86 1.00 0.07 -0.66 3.07 3.63 5.79
SD 12.05 10.08 10.34 9.91 11.12 8.82 11.32
Sharpe -0.24 0.10 0.01 -0.07 0.28 0.41 0.51
Table 1.3: Portfolio Excess Return Summary Statistics
Notes: Columns (1) - (6) represent the lowest to the highest of the six sorted portfolios for each cross-section.
HML reflects the difference in excess returns of the highest portfolio (6) minus the lowest portfolio (1). All
moments are annualized, with means multiplied by 12 and standard deviations scaled by
p
12. Sharpe Ratios
are taken as the ratio between the two.
risk, grant higher mean excess returns as compensation for greater risk exposure. With
Sharpe ratios of .69 and .52 respectively, these strategies appear profitable with decent
risk-to-return trade-offs.
For the dollar portfolios, we almost have a monotonic increase in excess returns as we
move along portfolios with larger dollar exposure, with the exception of the outsize return
in the fifth, or second highest, portfolio. Note that these portfolios are conditional on the
average forward discount, namely they are dynamic as I choose whether to go long or short
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the currencies against the dollar depending on if the average forward discount is positive
or negative, respectively. The top portfolio has a mean excess return of 4.2%, while the
high-minus-low yields 3.6% per annum with a Sharpe ratio of .34. In contrast to the carry
and momentum portfolios, the high-minus-low does worse than simply going long the top
portfolio as shorting the bottom portfolio does not yield additional returns.
The top volatility portfolio contains currencies that are the least exposed to foreign
exchange volatility and exhibits the highest returns compared to those that are relatively
more exposed.7 This is in line with intuition as the currencies in the bottom portfolio,
which have the higher volatility betas, tend to provide higher returns when volatility is
high, and thus serve as insurance or a hedge that should yield lower excess returns at all
other times. The high-minus-low yields a mean excess return of 3% with a Sharpe ratio of
.31, improving upon the return of only the top portfolio due to the shorting of the bottom
portfolio.
Finally for the value portfolios, while we do not obtain a strict monotonic pattern in
excess returns, we observe a significant spread between the high and low portfolios. The
best value portfolio yields a mean excess return of 3.6% per annum, while the worst value
portfolio performs poorly with a mean loss of 2.9% per annum. The high-minus-low thus
provides significant mean excess returns at 5.8% and a Sharpe ratio of .51, comparable to
the momentum cross-section.
Figure 1.3 displays the cumulative returns from investing $1 in each portfolio. As was
suggested by the summary statistics, an investor would have increased their initial in-
vestments to under $10 and a little over $6 if following the carry trade and momentum
7Recall that the top volatility portfolio, namely portfolio 6, contains currencies with the lowest volatility
betas, whereas the bottom portfolio contains those with the highest volatility betas. I use this convention
to remain consistent with the other portfolios in which the top portfolio contains risky currencies, while the
bottom has the least risky.
33
Figure 1.3: Cumulative Returns of FX Portfolio Strategies
Notes: These plots reflect cumulative returns of investing in an individual portfolio in each respective cross-
sectional sort. Each portfolio’s excess return is calculated as the average excess return of the currencies
sorted into the respective portfolio. Portfolio 1 is the lowest sort, Portfolio 6 is the highest sort, and HML
is the difference in average excess returns between portfolios 6 and 1.
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high-minus-low strategies, respectively. Furthermore for the cross-section of carry and mo-
mentum portfolios, the cumulative returns appear to almost be monotonically increasing
across portfolios, in line with the summary statistics. This builds support for the existence
of a risk-based explanation for the cross-section of returns as it appears that increased load-
ings or exposure to potential risk factors and shocks are associated with consistently higher
returns.
Cumulative returns to the dollar strategy are less impressive, as the initial outlay in-
creases to a little less than three-fold by 2014 before declining persistently since then. An
investor would have been better off only going long the top portfolios as indicated by the
larger cumulative and excess returns without shorting the bottom portfolio, which recall
has positive mean excess returns and erodes profitability. All portfolios however decline
from 2015 onwards, presumably due to dollar appreciation.
The intermediary capital portfolios do not display monotonicity in terms of cumulative
returns, but the high-minus-low portfolio does steadily increase the initial outlay 2.5 times
over the sample period. The cumulative return peaks in 2015 before sharply dropping and
stagnating since then. The volatility portfolios display mild capital gains up until 2009 in
which we observe a sharp drop for all portfolios. There is a recovery following this sharp
drop, but returns essentially stagnate from then on.
Cumulative returns from the value strategy appear consistently profitable, although not
to the magnitude of the carry and momentum strategies. An initial investment increases
four fold by the end of the sample, but note the periods of persistent declines, most notably
from 2004 to 2007, 2010 to 2012, and 2014 to 2015. In contrast to all other strategies, the
value strategy is unique in consistently being profitable over the past 3 years.8
8Note that nearly all of the strategies except value appear to reach peaks in 2010 and have not been
nearly as profitable since then. I examine this further in the Appendix A.2 by deconstructing portfolio
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1.4 Empirical Results
I shift now to a formal empirical analysis of the relationship between intermediary capital
and exchange rate movements. I begin with a brief analysis of exchange rate movements
with the intermediary capital shocks and the HML carry and dollar factors to assess whether
currencies exhibit the predicted patterns, namely whether risky currencies depreciate and
safe haven currencies appreciate when negative capital shocks are realized. I then proceed
to conduct asset pricing tests to evaluate the relevance of intermediary capital compared to
the market return and consumption growth. My findings align with the theoretical predic-
tions outlined in the introduction and literature review in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, supporting
the central role of financial intermediaries in exchange rate determination and providing
evidence in favor of open economy, intermediary-based asset pricing models.
The latter part of this section examines the interplay of intermediary capital with the
HML carry, dollar, and global dollar factors. My asset pricing tests display the dominance
of the HML carry factor as a significant source of risk for exchange rates and the sub-
sumption of intermediary capital risk upon inclusion of the HML carry factor suggests that
intermediary capital risk is one of the many sources of risk embedded within the HML carry
factor. My results with the dollar and global dollar factor maintain the relevance of finan-
cial intermediaries, and show that the global component of dollar risk, as isolated by the
global dollar factor, significantly prices the joint cross-section of exchange rate portfolios.
returns into interest rate and exchange rate depreciation components for the pre- and post-2010 periods
for each cross-section and find that a combination of compressed interest rate differentials and unfavorable
dollar appreciation lead to declines in currency strategy returns.
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Spot Changes and Intermediary Shocks
I first examine whether intermediary capital shocks contain any information content beyond
that held in the spot changes of the HML carry and dollar factors. The former takes the
difference between exchange rate changes of the currencies with the largest and smallest
forward discounts, which proxy for interest rate differentials, while the latter reflects the
average of all exchange rate changes against the dollar. I estimate the following for each
currency:
si;t = i + 
HML
i HML i;t + 
Dol
i Dol i;t + 
CS
i CShockt + i;t (1.3)
Note that HML i;t and Dol i;t exclude the currency on the left-hand-side to avoid
regressing on the same variable. This regression estimates the size and direction of exchange
rate movements with respect to systematic variation. For example, if the dollar on average
appreciates by one percent, Doli yields the amount country i’s currency depreciates in
percentage terms.
The results for the G11 currencies are displayed in Table 1.4. Column (1) displays
the sensitivities of exchange rate movements to the risks contained within carry trade as
measured by spot rate movements. We observe a positive co-movement of traditionally risky
currencies, such as the Australian and New Zealand dollars, with that of the carry trade,
namely when the carry trade appreciates, these currencies do as well, in line with intuition.
Similarly for traditional safe haven, low interest rate currencies such as the Japanese yen
and Swiss franc, we observe negative coefficients, suggesting that these currencies appreciate
when the carry trade is depreciating.
Column (2) displays the systematic co-movements of currencies with the average changes
37
Table 1.4: Systematic Variation in Exchange Rate Changes (Developed)
HML Dol CShock R2 (HML) R2 (HML, CS) R2 (All)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Australia 0.20*** 0.80*** -0.08*** 8.13% 11.13% 37.02%
Canada 0.10*** 0.42*** -0.08*** 6.80% 13.66% 32.37%
Switzerland -0.29*** 1.35*** 0.09*** 0.65% 1.37% 71.92%
Denmark -0.26*** 1.33*** 0.03*** 0.58% 0.33% 83.87%
Euro -0.32*** 1.35*** 0.04** -0.45% 3.92% 78.91%
United Kingdom -0.06 0.92*** 0.02 -0.13% -0.32% 47.07%
Japan -0.28*** 0.65*** 0.05** 3.49% 3.69% 24.02%
Norway -0.10*** 1.25*** -0.01 -0.20% 0.39% 69.79%
New Zealand 0.02 0.93*** -0.09*** 1.75% 5.57% 37.60%
Sweden -0.14*** 1.25*** -0.03* -0.25% 1.01% 69.10%
Notes: This table displays the coefficients from the regression in Equation 1.3 for the set of developed
countries. The first three columns display the respective betas, while the latter three columns display the
R2 of regressions including only the HML, HML and intermediary shock, and the full set of regressors.
Standard errors are Newey-West heteroskedasticity auto-correlation consistent with 12 lags.
of the dollar. Here we observe that all coefficients are robustly significant and positive,
which is expected given that we are looking at bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar.
The heterogeneity of the coefficients around 1 is of interest, as the currencies of Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan, and New Zealand each depreciate less than one-for-
one with the average depreciation against the dollar, while those of Switzerland, Denmark,
Europe, Norway, and Sweden depreciate by more than the average. There appears to be
no commonality for why these currencies move more or less than the average, but this is
open to future research.
My contribution is the addition of the intermediary capital shock and the corresponding
elasticities. We observe that the Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand dollars all have
significant and negative coefficients. Recall that a negative intermediary capital shock
means a decrease in the intermediary capital ratio, suggestive of tighter financial conditions
and times of higher marginal utility. When primary dealers are hit with negative shocks,
the aforementioned currencies tend to depreciate, in line with their reputation as riskier
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currencies as they yield poor returns when intermediaries need them most. In terms of
economic magnitude, a one standard deviation intermediary capital shock is associated with
approximately a half of a percent in depreciation. In contrast, if we instead look at the haven
currencies, namely the Japanese yen and Swiss franc, we observe positive coefficients, with
economic magnitudes of a quarter and a half percent appreciation respectively. Consistent
with intuition, safe haven currencies tend to appreciate when negative intermediary capital
shocks hit.
Columns (4)–(6) display the R2’s of the regressions with only the HML, HML and
intermediary capital shock, and the full specification, respectively. We can see that the
intermediary capital shock adds some explained variation, suggesting that intermediary
capital shocks provide some additional information content above and beyond that of the
carry trade itself. The full specification has quite high R2’s of up to 83% for the Danish
krone and 78% for the euro, showing that average changes in the dollar account for an
outsize portion of exchange rate movements, as found by Verdelhan (2018). In other words,
currencies appear to share a large amount of systematic variation as a lot of their movements
are linked to broad movements of the dollar against all currencies.
Table 1.5 displays the results for emerging markets currencies. Column (1) shows that
the vast majority of emerging markets currencies positively co-move with the carry trade,
the exceptions being the Czech krona, Hungarian forint, and Kuwaiti dinar. Column (2)
again shows that all emerging market currencies positively co-move with the average level
of the dollar with some level of heterogeneity in magnitude, but the majority moves by
less than the average against the dollar. While Column (3) only yields a few significant
estimates, note that they are mostly negative and similar in magnitude to the risky advanced
economy currencies. If we take the stance that emerging markets currencies are risky,
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Table 1.5: Systematic Variation in Exchange Rate Changes (Emerging)
HML Dol CShock R2 (HML) R2 (HML, CS) R2 (All)
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Czech Republic -0.31*** 1.48*** -0.00 0.01% 3.48% 65.10%
Hungary -0.16*** 1.61*** -0.00 0.96% 6.60% 66.25%
Indonesia 0.21 1.00*** -0.12 2.89% 5.32% 10.76%
India 0.10** 0.50*** -0.01 9.46% 11.46% 34.14%
Korea -0.07 1.06*** -0.07** 7.51% 16.29% 53.56%
Kuwait -0.05*** 0.21*** 0.00 -0.40% 1.01% 36.51%
Mexico 0.19*** 0.47*** -0.11*** 15.19% 24.91% 34.36%
Malaysia 0.36*** 0.70*** 0.05** 25.17% 24.74% 48.17%
Philippines 0.23*** 0.44*** 0.02 12.23% 12.06% 24.74%
Poland -0.02 1.61*** -0.06** 9.21% 20.46% 74.59%
Singapore 0.00 0.52*** -0.01 0.32% 1.15% 54.34%
Thailand 0.24*** 0.66*** 0.04 8.32% 7.98% 24.39%
Turkey 0.33*** 0.83*** 0.01 13.14% 13.44% 29.17%
Taiwan 0.02 0.45*** -0.01 3.80% 7.04% 39.25%
South Africa 0.11 0.99*** -0.08*** 2.61% 4.81% 28.44%
Notes: This table displays the coefficients from the regression in Equation 1.3 for the set of emerging
countries. The first three columns display the respective betas, while the latter three columns display the
R2 of regressions including only the HML, HML and intermediary shock, and the full set of regressors.
Standard errors are Newey-West heteroskedasticity auto-correlation consistent with 12 lags.
this is consistent with theory as negative intermediary capital shocks are associated with
emerging markets currency depreciation. Finally as before, we observe a moderate increase
in explained variation by adding in the intermediary capital shock, and the average change
in the dollar increases the explained variation tremendously.
Pricing of Intermediary Capital Risk
I now conduct an examination of the pricing of intermediary capital risk in the cross-section
of foreign exchange returns. I perform a series of asset pricing tests to establish the relevance
of intermediary capital as a risk factor, comparing its performance to the market return and
global consumption growth in order to establish its role as a fundamental economic source
of global risk embedded in the cross-section of foreign exchange returns. I then assess the
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significance of intermediary capital risk in combination with the HML carry, dollar, and
global dollar factors to shed light upon its relationship with these exchange rate factors.
I show the following in turn: First, intermediary capital shocks provide an economic
source of risk that underpins the carry trade, robust to the inclusion of consumption growth
which reflects the relevance of financial intermediaries’ pricing kernels over those of house-
holds. Although intermediary capital shocks do not constitute their own, independent
cross-section of returns, the results show that they do matter for the carry trade and the
joint cross-section of all currency portfolios. Second, the HML carry factor subsumes the
risk embedded in the intermediary capital shocks and prices both the carry trade and the
entire cross-section of currency portfolios, pointing towards intermediary capital risk as a
component of the broader HML carry risk. In addition, the global component of the dollar
factor as a proxy for global shocks independent of those contained within the HML carry
factor matters for the cross-section of excess returns, whereas the dollar factor, un-purged
of US-specific risk, does not.
My estimation of the prices of risk follows the standard two-stage Fama-MacBeth pro-
cedure. In the first stage, for each test portfolio I run a time series regression of its excess
returns on a constant and the candidate risk factors to obtain a set of portfolio-specific
betas. Formally:
rxi;t = i + i’ft + i;t for i = 1; :::; N (1.4)
where ft is a vector of factors and i is the vector of factor loadings for portfolio i, and
N is the number of test portfolios. In the second stage, I estimate the prices of risk by
running a cross-sectional regression for each time period t and take the average to obtain
the final estimates:
41
rxi;t = ti’+ i;t for t = 1;…; T (1.5)
The coefficient of interest is ^ = P ^t/T , namely the vector of risk prices for each
factor. I estimate the first stage betas with ordinary least squares, and compute the second
stage risk prices using the pooled mean group estimator. Per Burnside’s (2011) critique of
Lustig and Verdelhan (2007), I construct GMM standard errors following Cochrane (2005)
to alleviate concerns about standard errors as our second stage regressors, namely the first
stage betas, are estimated.9
Before diving into the results, note that in contrast to previous studies that use the US
market return, I employ the Fama French global market return as my control risk factor. I
utilize the Feng et al. (2017) two-pass procedure which employs machine learning techniques
as the immense number of pre-existing factors in the empirical asset pricing literature make
the selection of baseline factors both tedious and inconsistent given the difference in esti-
mates depending on which factors are included in the asset pricing regressions. I perform
this control factor selection procedure as empirical asset pricing studies for exchange rates
have not yet carefully found the correct factors to serve as controls in baseline specifica-
tions, making studies generally incomparable. I fill this void by formally identifying the
Fama French global market return as the most relevant control factor in comparison to
other factors for exchange rates, and argue that future studies of exchange rate risk factors
9Another option is the Shanken (1992) correction. Suppose we have N test portfolios, K factors, and T





(0) 10(0) 1(1 + 0 1f ) + f

where 0 is an N  K matrix containing the estimated betas from the first stage in Equation ??,  =
Cov(0t;
0 t) is the NN variance-covariance matrix of the residuals from Equation 1.4, 0 is an K1 vector
of the estimated average risk prices from Equation 1.5, and f = Cov(f 0t ; ft) is theKK variance-covariance
matrix of the factors.
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should always be compared to this baseline.10 Interested readers are encouraged to refer to
Appendix A.1 where I provide a full discussion of the factor selection procedure.
Intermediary Capital as an Economic Risk Factor
Table 1.6 displays the results from the asset pricing tests of intermediary capital shocks
with the global market return and consumption growth to examine the relevance of financial
intermediary capital risk in the pricing of foreign exchange risk. I depart from the previous
literature by using the Fama French global market return given its survival in the factor
selection procedure, and also employ a wider set of exchange rate portfolios when testing
for the significance of intermediary capital risk.11
Column (1) shows the risk prices estimated on the cross-section of six currency portfolios
sorted by intermediary capital shock betas. If intermediary capital risk constitutes its own
cross-section of excess returns, I expect a significant and positive price of intermediary
capital risk as currencies that depreciate upon realizations of negative intermediary capital
shocks provide lower excess returns at bad times and are thus deemed risky, compensating
investors for the aforementioned risk by providing higher expected returns at all other times.
We do not observe a significant price of intermediary capital risk or the global market, thus
eliminating the existence of this independent cross-section of exchange rate excess returns.
However moving to Column (2), we observe a significant price of intermediary risk for
the cross-section of carry trade portfolios sorted by forward discounts. Intermediary capital
10My selection procedure also highlights the S&P 500 excluding financials as a factor, but for parsimony I
only include the results with the global market return given the limited number of test portfolios, especially
for the carry trade. The results with this other control factor in lieu of the global market are included in
the Appendix A.1 and results are similar.
11He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) test their factor against the carry trade and momentum portfolios from
Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber (2014) and Menkhoff et al. (2012), finding significant and positive prices of
risk. I augment their results by extending the sample period up to the end of 2017 and testing on a wider























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































risk is priced into the carry trade at 5.9% per annum, implying that high interest rate
currency portfolios have high intermediary capital betas as their returns more positively
co-move with the intermediary capital shocks, and are thus compensated for the risk of low
returns when intermediary capital erodes. This provides support for intermediary capital
as a fundamental economic source of risk embedded in exchange rates and provides an
explanation for the forward premium puzzle as investors appear to be rewarded for holding
high interest rate currencies that run the risk of depreciation when intermediary capital
declines. Notice that intermediary capital risk is priced despite the presence of the global
market return showing that it contains more information than equity prices - I interpret this
as reflecting the outsize importance of intermediary capital as proxying for the risk-bearing
capacity of relevant financial intermediaries that theory suggests.
This result is not limited to the cross-section of the carry trade - it also holds for the
joint cross-section of all currency portfolios. Column (5) displays the risk price estimates
from the sample that simultaneously employs all of the constructed portfolios, namely
intermediary capital, carry, dollar, momentum, volatility, and value as described in Section
1.3, each of which presumably captures different sources of risk premia and anomalies in
exchange rates. I find a significant price of intermediary capital risk at 2.6% per annum.
While smaller in magnitude than the estimate from the carry trade portfolios alone, this
finding supports the importance of intermediary capital in the pricing of exchange rates as
using the broader set of portfolios identifies one systematic economic source of global risk
that is embedded within a wide range of exchange rate risk premia, invariant to the type
of sorting and portfolio construction. Furthermore given the low excess returns of all other
cross-sections of exchange rates, it is not surprising that I obtain a smaller estimate.12
12I also test each cross-section independently in the online appendix. None of the other cross-sections
of foreign exchange returns exhibit significant intermediary capital risk prices when estimated individually,
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An additional finding is the significance of the global market return for the entire cross-
section of foreign exchange returns at 10.7% per annum. Previous studies have had difficul-
ties explaining exchange rate excess returns with the market return (Daniel, Hodrick, and
Lu 2017), but I find that it is global market risk that may be the relevant factor, at least for
the wider cross-section of exchange rate excess returns. The significance of this estimate
is in line with its relevance as a baseline control factor and supports the two-stage factor
selection procedure.
The significance of the intermediary capital shock for the risk pricing of the carry trade
and the wider cross-section of foreign exchange excess returns leads one to question whether
it is a distinct economic source of risk independent of the consumption growth risk found
by Lustig and Verdelhan (2007). One could argue that intermediaries are just a veil for
households and that intermediary capital risk may just proxy for household consumption
growth risk. If this is true, models with financial intermediaries may then be adding an
additional layer of complexity that is not necessarily warranted. I examine this notion by
performing my asset pricing tests with US durable and non-durable consumption growth
as additional risk factors to determine whether it is consumption growth, intermediary
shocks, or a combination of the two that account for excess returns in exchange rates. This
exercise clarifies the relevance of financial intermediaries versus households in the pricing
of exchange rates.
Column (3) of Table 1.6 displays the results from the Fama MacBeth regressions with
intermediary capital shocks and durable and non-durable US consumption growth as risk
factors for the carry trade. I find that intermediary risk is still significant and positively
priced at 4.2% per annum, while the consumption growth factors are not priced. My
but this could be due to the depressed returns in the past decade.
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results show that intermediary capital risk is more important than household consumption
risk in explaining the carry trade as investors appear to be compensated for co-movement of
exchange rate returns with fluctuations in the financial intermediaries’ pricing kernel rather
than that of households. My findings validate the notion that open economy models require
constrained intermediaries at the center of asset markets in order to account for the failure
of the UIP and existence of the forward premium puzzle as the prediction and pattern of
high interest rate currencies more positively co-varying with intermediary capital and thus
subject to larger relative depreciations upon the realization of negative intermediary capital
shocks is borne out in the data.
This finding is again extended to the entire cross-section of foreign exchange portfolios as
indicated in Column (6). As before, we find a smaller, but significant price of intermediary
risk at 2.5% per annum, verifying the robust importance of intermediary capital risk for
the joint cross-section of exchange rate returns. In contrast to estimates with the carry
trade alone, I also obtain a positive and significant price of non-durable consumption risk,
providing support for Lustig and Verdelhan’s (2007) original finding. However given the
significance of intermediary risk for both carry and entire cross-sections, I interpret this as
highlighting the larger importance of the financial intermediary’s pricing kernel over that
of the households. It is important to keep in mind that I am not claiming that households
are completely irrelevant to pricing exchange rates or asset pricing in general, merely that
financial intermediaries may the be more relevant marginal investor given the recent success
of the theory and my more robust findings in support of intermediary capital risk. My
results provide support for the importance of including constrained financial intermediaries
in open economy macro-economic models in order to reconcile some of the inconsistencies
between the theory and data.
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Columns (4) and (7) serve as robustness checks by controlling for the global market
return as well. For the carry trade I find that in contrast to before, none of the factors are
now significant as displayed in Column (4). However, I rationalize this finding in two ways:
first, note that the global market return is correlated with the intermediary capital shocks
as displayed in Table 1.2 and thus its inclusion may dilute the significance of intermediary
capital risk, especially if the relevant components of consumption growth and the capital
shocks are also partially contained within the global market return. Second, given that I
only have six portfolios in the carry trade cross-section, the regression has almost as many
regressors as test portfolios - the risk prices may then be mis-estimated and the lack of
significance may be a by-product of this.13
On the other hand, the full specification in Column (7) for the joint cross-section retains
the significance of intermediary capital risk. Risk prices are presumably more precisely es-
timated in this larger sample given the increased number of portfolios and I find that
intermediary capital is again a significant and positively priced risk factor for exchange
rates at 2.3% per annum. The risk price of intermediary capital decreases in the level of
significance, which I attribute to dilution due to the inclusion of the global market return,
which is also significantly priced at 15.4% per annum. Given that non-durable consumption
growth remains significantly priced, my results thus suggest that while financial intermedi-
aries have the more robust pricing kernels, the risk embedded in consumption growth also
plays a role, consistent with Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) and intuition as one would expect
real shocks to be relevant for a wider set of exchange rate risk premia.
To visualize the effectiveness of intermediary capital in pricing the cross-sections of for-
13I have also run specifications with only one type of consumption growth risk that include the global
market return. I find significance for intermediary capital risk in the specification with only intermediary
capital shocks, non-durable consumption growth, and the Fama French global market return.
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Figure 1.4: Carry Trade Mean Excess Returns and Intermediary Capital Betas
This figure displays the mean excess returns of each portfolio of the carry trade cross-section, namely
currencies sorted on forward discounts. The x-axis contains intermediary capital betas, estimated for each
portfolio by regressing its excess returns across the whole sample on a constant and the intermediary capital
shock. The line reflects the best fit for the relationship between average portfolio returns and betas.
eign exchange, Figures 1.4 and 1.5 display scatter plots of mean portfolio returns against
intermediary capital betas. Figure 1.4 shows that the carry trade portfolios are monotoni-
cally increasing both in mean excess returns and intermediary capital betas, implying that
the carry trade and forward premium puzzle may be explained through the lens of inter-
mediary capital risk as it is apparent that higher interest rate currencies are precisely those
that are more exposed to intermediary capital shocks. These currencies enjoy higher excess
returns because their larger co-movement with intermediary capital leads to depreciations
and losses when intermediary capital erodes, coinciding with times of high intermediary
marginal utility that require increased compensation and risk premia for downside risk.
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Figure 1.5 displays the analogous plot for the joint cross-section of all currency portfo-
lios. I obtain a similar pattern as with the carry portfolios - high portfolios enjoy higher
excess returns and coincide with larger intermediary capital betas, while lower portfolios
yield lower excess returns and have lower and even negative intermediary capital betas.
Risky currency portfolios are again those that exhibit larger mean excess returns which are
rationalized by relatively larger co-movements with intermediary capital, while the safer
currency portfolios exhibit low or even negative co-movement with intermediary capital,
in line with the intuition that currencies which appreciate upon the realization of negative
intermediary capital shocks serve as hedges and should provide lower returns. Although not
strict, I do observe a generally monotonic relationship between portfolios and intermediary
capital betas as the bottom left, middle, and top right of the plot contain the low and less
risky, intermediate, and high and most risky portfolios, respectively.
It is important to note that this pattern holds despite the different measures upon which
each cross-section is sorted and constructed. The robust pattern between intermediary
capital betas and portfolio excess returns is invariant to the sorting characteristic, lending
credence to the notion that intermediary capital risk in fact underpins a wide set of exchange
rate risk premia and thus serves a systematic source of global risk. Currency portfolios that
are deemed as risky due to their larger exposure to risk factors are also more exposed to
fluctuations in intermediary capital, implying that intermediary capital risk is embedded
and compensated for in a variety of cross-sections of exchange rates and risk premia.
In summary, I have found that intermediary capital shocks are a significantly priced risk
factor for the cross-section of carry trade returns and the wider cross-section of all currency
portfolio returns. My results point towards the central role that financial intermediaries
play in open economy models in order to give rise to deviations in the UIP and the forward
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Figure 1.5: Mean Excess Returns and Intermediary Capital Betas
This figure displays the mean excess returns of each portfolio of the joint cross-section of exchange rates,
which includes six portfolios for intermediary capital, carry, dollar, momentum, volatility, and value. The
x-axis contains intermediary capital betas, estimated for each portfolio by regressing its excess returns across
the whole sample on a constant and the intermediary capital shock. The line reflects the best fit for the
relationship between average portfolio returns and betas.
premium puzzle as high interest rate currency portfolios provide higher mean excess returns
as compensation for larger exposures to fluctuations in intermediary capital. I also show
that intermediary capital risk underpins a number of exchange rate risk premia as the
positive relationship between intermediary capital betas and risky portfolios holds for the
joint cross-section, invariant to the criteria of sorting, thus providing evidence in favor of
intermediary risk-bearing capacity as a systematic source of global risk.
Furthermore, I find that intermediary capital risk remains a significantly priced risk
factor when compared to household consumption risk, providing evidence in support of
financial intermediaries as the marginal investors in open economy asset pricing models as
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opposed to households. The evidence is strongest for the carry trade as intermediary capital
risk is significantly priced whereas consumption risk is not, consistent with the notion that
open economy models require constrained intermediaries to resolve some of the discrepancies
between theory and empirics. While my results do not preclude the relevance of households
in the pricing of exchange rate risk as non-durable consumption growth risk is significantly
priced in the joint cross-section, the more robust evidence in favor of intermediary capital
risk leans towards the larger relevance of the intermediaries.
Intermediary Shocks vs. Portfolio FX Factors
I now investigate whether intermediary capital shocks provide additional information con-
tent and serve as a risk factor beyond previously identified exchange rate risk factors. I
estimate the prices of risk for the carry trade and joint cross-section of exchange rate returns
using the intermediary capital shocks, HML carry, dollar, and global dollar factors as risk
factors. The intuition is that if the HML carry and global dollar factors offer excess returns,
the covariances or betas with their returns represent relative exposures to sources of global
risk that underlie the existence of excess returns within their respective cross-sections. If
intermediary capital shocks serve as a distinct source of risk from these two factors, we
expect significant prices of intermediary risk in addition to that of the HML carry, dollar,
and global dollar factors. On the other hand, if the risk embedded in intermediary capital
shocks is merely a component of these factors, we expect insignificant risk prices as they
should be subsumed by factors that contain a wider set of shocks and risk. I show evi-
dence for the latter point, highlighting the role of fluctuations in intermediary capital as an
economic source of global risk contained within the HML carry factor.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































factor for the carry trade portfolios. The HML carry factor completely subsumes the sig-
nificance of the intermediary capital shock as only HML carry risk is priced into the cross-
section of the carry trade at 7.8% per annum whereas the price of intermediary capital
risk is now insignificant. This is not surprising as we expect the risks embedded within
the carry trade to wholly account for its cross-sectional variation, but it is of interest that
intermediary capital risk is now no longer significantly priced. We observe the robust signif-
icance of the price of HML carry risk again in the full sample with all cross-sections tested
simultaneously at 7% per annum in Column (6). Both estimates are significant at the 1%
level, displaying the dominant role of the global risk embedded in the HML carry factor in
pricing foreign exchange returns. The global risks proxied by the HML carry factor appear
to be important for the pricing of a wide set of exchange rate risk premia, not just the carry
trade itself.
The significance of the HML carry factor over the previously significant intermediary
capital shocks provides new information about the interaction between these two risk fac-
tors. In my baseline specifications I find that intermediary capital shocks serve as the most
relevant risk factor in the pricing of both the carry trade and the wider cross-section of
exchange rate returns. The fact that the inclusion of the HML carry factor removes this
significance and that it takes the place of the intermediary capital risk factor at an even
higher level of significance suggests that intermediary capital risk is embedded within the
HML carry factor. The HML carry factor appears to contain a broader array of global shocks
as evident by its more dominant role in pricing the risks located within the cross-sections of
exchange rate returns and intermediary capital shocks merely serve as one economic source
of risk contained within it.
Columns (2)-(3) and (7)-(8) of Table 1.7 compare intermediary capital to the dollar
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and global dollar factors for the carry trade and joint cross-sections, respectively. In both
cases, we find the robust significance of the price of intermediary capital risk for the carry
and full cross-sections as before at 5.6% and between 3.1% and 3.5% respectively, further
supporting the role of intermediary capital as a fundamental economic source of risk. The
dollar factor itself fails to serve as significant risk factor, but the global dollar factor enters
in as a priced risk factor at 8.8% per annum for the joint cross-section.
The finding that dollar risk is not priced whereas global dollar risk is sheds light upon
how heterogeneous exposures to global shocks help explain the cross-section of foreign ex-
change returns. Despite my early confirmation of Verdelhan’s (2018) finding that a large
amount of exchange rate fluctuations are explained by average changes in the dollar, I find
here that it is only the global component, namely risks that are purged of US-specific risk,
that matters for pricing the cross-section. This is surprising as we would expect a risk factor
that contains more information to have a higher likelihood of being significantly priced in
the cross-section. Note however that Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011) show that
the dollar factor is akin to a level factor as all currencies load onto it equally. It is not
surprising then that it contains no significant pricing power as there is no heterogeneity in
exposure to this risk factor, so it should not account for the cross-sectional heterogeneity
in returns. On the other hand, the global component of this factor should be differentially
loaded upon as shown by Verdelhan (2018), allowing an assessment of its risk pricing and
relevance for the cross-section of exchange rate returns.
Columns (4) and (9) of Table 1.7 display the results of the asset pricing tests with
the HML and dollar factors simultaneously as risk factors. It is again apparent that the
HML carry factor is the dominant pricing factor as we observe significant prices of risk
for the cross-sections of the carry trade and all portfolios at 8.4% and 7.2% per annum
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respectively. Intermediary capital is again subsumed for the carry trade, but it is marginally
significant for the joint cross-section with a risk price of 1.9%. The results show that while
intermediary capital serves as a relevant risk factor for both the carry and joint cross-sections
in absence of the HML carry factor, the HML carry factor serves as the more dominant
pricing factor, either mitigating or eliminating the relevance of intermediary capital entirely.
I interpret this as evidence that the HML carry factor encapsulates a wider array of sources
of global risk of which intermediary capital is one. Furthermore note that dollar risk is never
significantly priced, despite earlier findings that a large amount of exchange rate fluctuations
are explained by average changes in the dollar, which presumably represent one source of
risk, consistent with my previous findings when comparing intermediary capital and dollar
risk without the HML carry factor.
Columns (5) and (10) of Table 1.7 display a similar exercise but instead using the global
dollar factor, which recall is the difference in excess returns between high and low dollar-beta
currency portfolios. While the dollar factor itself contains information about US-specific
shocks as bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar must contain some information about
the US pricing kernel, when we take the difference between the dollar portfolios, we purge
US-specific shocks and isolate the global source of risk present in the average excess returns
against the dollar. HML carry risk is again significantly priced for the carry trade and
all portfolios at 8.4% and 6.5% per annum respectively. As in the case with the dollar
factor, intermediary capital risk is also marginally priced at 2.3% per annum for the joint
cross-section, but not the carry. Furthermore note that in contrast to the specification
without US risk purged, we now obtain a significant risk price for the global dollar factor
for the entire cross-section of foreign exchange returns at 8.7% per annum. This confirms
the previous result that global risk is pertinent in the pricing of exchange rate risk and
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contains risks that are independent of those contained within the HML carry factor.
One might ask whether the marginal significance of intermediary capital risk in the
joint cross-section in the specifications in Columns (9) and (10) invalidates the claim that
intermediary capital is contained within the HML carry factor as it should be insignificant
upon the inclusion of the factor that subsumes it. Concerns may be alleviated under the
assumption that the HML carry factor contains a number of risks, which include intermedi-
ary capital. It could be the case that there are times when intermediary capital fluctuates,
but other risks contained in the HML carry factor also move, nullifying the effect of in-
termediary capital risk on the carry trade and leaving a net zero effect on the HML carry
factor. However if intermediary capital risk is still relevant for exchange rate risk premia,
the capital shock alone would capture this variation, whereas it would be overlooked and
awash if only proxied by the HML carry factor. I posit that the marginal significance
of intermediary capital risk despite the inclusion of the HML carry factor captures this
relationship.
Figure 1.6 displays the scatter plot of mean portfolio returns and HML carry betas for
all cross-sections. As with the intermediary capital betas, we observe a relatively monotonic
relationship between mean portfolio excess returns and exposure to the HML carry factor as
measured by each portfolio’s HML carry beta. Lower, less risky portfolios are contained in
the bottom left of the plot, while the risky, high portfolios occupy the upper right of the plot.
The plot thus supports the notion that the HML carry factor contains sources of global risk
that currency portfolios are all differentially exposed to, with the most exposed yielding the
highest excess returns as compensation for HML carry risk and the least exposed yielding
lower returns due to the relative safety in the face of adverse shocks that erode the HML
carry factor.
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Figure 1.6: Mean Excess Returns and HML Carry Betas
Notes: This figure displays the mean excess returns of each portfolio of the joint cross-section of exchange
rates, which includes six portfolios for intermediary capital, carry, dollar, momentum, volatility, and value.
The x-axis contains HML carry betas, estimated for each portfolio by regressing its excess returns across
the whole sample on a constant and the HML carry factor. The line reflects the best fit for the relationship
between average portfolio returns and betas.
My asset pricing tests have thus illuminated the following: first, intermediary capital
shocks provide an economic source of risk behind the carry trade and the broader cross-
section of currency portfolios, improving upon consumption growth factors despite not
constituting their own cross-section. Intermediary capital risk thus provides an explanation
for the existence for the carry trade and forward premium puzzle, and provides an economic
source of global risk that is systematically contained in a large number of cross-sections of
exchange rates and their corresponding risk premia. Second, the HML carry factor subsumes
the risk embedded in the intermediary capital shocks and more dominantly prices the carry
trade and entire cross-section of currency portfolios, suggesting that intermediary capital
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risk is contained within the HML carry factor. Third, intermediary capital remains a robust
economic source of risk for exchange rates in both the carry and joint cross-section when
compared to the dollar and global dollar factors. Finally, the global component of the dollar
factor as a proxy for broader global shocks appears more relevant than the dollar factor
alone for the joint cross-section of currency portfolios, showing that it is global risk that
is priced and that one must fully purge idiosyncratic, country-specific risk to identify this
relationship.
1.5 Determinants of the FX Factors
In the previous sections, I showed that intermediary capital shocks price the carry trade
and the joint cross-section of currency portfolios, but also found that they were subsumed
by the HML carry factor. Given that the latter is formed via portfolio methods and thus its
economic determinants and sources of risk are ambiguous, I aim to uncover the economic
sources of the shocks contained within it. For completeness, I also examine the sources of
shocks contained in the global dollar factor given its outsize role in explained variation of
bilateral exchange rate movements.
My approach entails examining the contemporaneous correlations of candidate shocks
with the excess returns that proxy for each factor, a simple exercise that identifies the most
meaningful shocks behind these risk factors. The candidate shocks are inspired by Verdelhan
(2018) who suggests fundamental economic shocks coming from the risk-bearing capacity
of intermediaries, US monetary policy, risk aversion, liquidity, and real activity. I proxy for
each in turn using the He, Kelly, and Manela (2017) intermediary capital shocks as before,
the Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) high frequency identified US monetary policy shocks,
changes in the level of the VIX, changes in the Libor-OIS spread, the Chicago Fed’s National
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Activity Index, and durable and non-durable US consumption growth, respectively. The
regression specification is:
rxt = + ’ft + t (1.6)
where
ft = [CShockt;DurableCt;NonDurableCt;V IXt;LibOISt; CFNAIt;MPShockt]
.
Table 1.8 displays the results of this regression, where Columns (1)-(4) examine the HML
carry factor. The univariate specification in Column (1) shows that intermediary capital
shocks indeed positively co-move with the HML carry factor, supporting the notion that
fluctuations in intermediary capital are a fundamental economic source of risk contained in
the cross-section of the carry trade and equivalently the HML carry factor. Furthermore
given that the HML carry factor also prices the entire cross-section of foreign exchange
portfolios, this provides further evidence that intermediaries and their capital play a central
role in the pricing of broader exchange rate risk.
Column (2) examines the role of consumption growth; if households are relevant and
their pricing kernels matter for the existence of the carry trade, I expect a positive and
significant correlation of durable and/or non-durable consumption growth with the HML
carry factor. Consistent with the asset pricing tests, I find an insignificant correlation be-
tween consumption growth and the HML carry factor, whereas intermediary capital shocks
remain significantly positive. The evidence again points towards the importance of financial
intermediaries over households as the relevant marginal investors whose marginal utilities
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Table 1.8: Determinants of Foreign Exchange Factors
Dependent variable:
HML Carry Global Dollar
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
CShockt 0.121 0.125 0.103 0.083 0.071 0.068 0.200 0.184
(0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.032) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.039)
DurableCt  0.071  0.013  0.003  0.017  0.102  0.100
(0.066) (0.078) (0.076) (0.069) (0.107) (0.103)
NonDurableCt  0.144  0.094  0.104 0.266 0.103 0.117
(0.194) (0.339) (0.334) (0.261) (0.484) (0.480)
V IXt  0.041  0.038  0.027  0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019)
LibOISt  0.021  0.018  0.028  0.025
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
CFNAIt 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
MPShockt  0.119  0.109  0.097  0.078





Observations 406 406 147 147 358 358 147 147
R2 0.072 0.077 0.321 0.331 0.023 0.025 0.332 0.343
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.070 0.287 0.293 0.020 0.017 0.299 0.305
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: This table displays the estimates of the specification in Equation 1.6. Columns (1)-(4) and Columns
(5)-(8) contain the HML carry and global dollar factors as dependent variables, respectively. Standard
errors are Newey-West heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation consistent with optimal lag lengths following
Andrews (1991)
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matter for the pricing of foreign exchange and existence of the forward premium puzzle.
Column (3) assesses whether other economic sources of risk are embedded within the
HML carry factor and whether they wash out the importance of intermediary capital.
Intermediary capital shocks remain a robust component of the HML carry factor, retaining
their level of significance and only mildly decreasing in magnitude. For the other economic
sources of risk, we observe negative and significant correlations of the HML carry factor
with changes in the VIX and Libor-OIS spreads, and a marginally positive correlation
with real activity as measured by the Chicago Fed’s National Activity Index. Given the
VIX’s role as a proxy for broader risk aversion and equity market volatility, this finding is
consistent with the previous literature that shows the carry trade does poorly at times of
high volatility and risk aversion (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen 2008, Clarida, Davis,
Pedersen 2009). Similarly, the negative relationship between the HML carry return and
changes in the Libor-OIS spread suggest that times of higher funding costs and/or low
liquidity are associated with poor returns for the carry trade, a finding related to Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003).
The significance of the Chicago Fed National Activity Index sheds light upon the rele-
vance of real activity for the HML carry factor. The positive estimate is in line with intuition
as we expect real activity to be expanding during good times which coincide with positive
excess returns for the carry trade, whereas when adverse real global shocks hit, carry trade
returns should erode as currencies that are more exposed to the shocks depreciate while the
safer currencies that are used as funding appreciate. This finding is encouraging because
while this paper argues for the outsize relevance of financial intermediaries and consequently
financial activity, negative shocks that affect real activity and production that should also
serve as an additional economic source of global risk are found to be relevant determinants
62
of the dominant HML carry factor that underlies foreign exchange risk.
In terms of explained variation, the univariate specification shows that intermediary
shocks account for 7% of the variation in the HML carry factor. Consumption factors
do not increase the R2 or adjusted R2 by much, again supportive of the dominant role
of financial intermediaries over households for the pricing of exchange rate risk. The full
specification reaches an adjusted R2 of 28.7%, showing that while intermediary capital risk
is a component of the total risk contained in the HML carry factor, other economic sources
of risk such as risk aversion, liquidity, and real activity also play a significant role. However
given that these determinants only explain up to a third of the variation in the HML carry
factor, there is still much work to be done in uncovering its other economic determinants.
Columns (5)-(8) display similar specifications for the global dollar factor. In the baseline
specifications in Columns (5) and (6), I do not find a significant correlation with intermedi-
ary capital shocks, suggestive that intermediary capital risk is distinct from that contained
within the global dollar factor. However upon controlling for other economic sources of risk,
I obtain a positive and significant estimate for the intermediary capital shocks.14 Given
that intermediary capital risk was not subsumed by the global dollar factor in the asset
pricing tests yet I find a positive correlation here signifies that while intermediary capital
risk may not be wholly contained in the global dollar factor, they do share some common
variation, namely shocks that affect intermediary capital may also affect other sources of
risk embedded within the global dollar factor.
With regards to the other economic determinants, liquidity, as proxied by the Libor-OIS
14Note that the sample size significantly decreases upon controlling for the Libor-OIS spread, which is
only available from 2002, and the Nakamura and Steinsson monetary policy shocks which are only available
up to 2014. A univariate specification run from 2002 onwards displays a significant price of intermediary
capital risk, suggesting that the linkage between the global dollar factor and intermediary capital shocks
arose in the last two decades.
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spread, is negatively correlated with the global dollar factor, consistent with the intuition
that global risk and liquidity are inversely related. In bad times when liquidity becomes
thin, investors shift their portfolios towards safer assets and safe haven currencies which
include US treasury bonds and the dollar. The dollar appreciates upon the realization of
these capital flows and currencies that depreciate the most vis-à-vis the dollar yield poorer
excess returns. Given that the global dollar factor reflects being long these currencies, the
strategy suffers and the risk of being long currencies more exposed to depreciation against
the dollar is realized.
It is surprising that my proxy for real activity, the Chicago Fed National Activity In-
dex, is marginally significant, albeit with the correct positive sign, as the global dollar is
presumably purged of US-specific risk. Given the marginal significance, I interpret this
finding as reflecting US real activity as a weak proxy for broader global real activity, but it
could also be the case that differencing the dollar portfolios does not fully purge the factor
from US-specific risk. This could arise if for example currencies pairs vis-à-vis the dollar
are differentially exposed to US-specific shocks.15
In Columns (4) and (8), I assess whether the global dollar and HML carry factors are
jointly determined and significantly co-vary. This specification clarifies whether one of these
factors subsumes the other or they share common variation outside of the aforementioned
economic determinants. I find that neither serves as a significant covariate with the other,
supporting Verdelhan’s (2018) finding that these factors represent two orthogonal sources
of global risk.
I have thus confirmed the previous hypothesis that intermediary capital is an economic
source of risk that is contained within the HML carry factor. My findings on the relevance of
15This however is inconsistent with Verdelhan’s (2018) baseline affine model of exchange rates.
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other economic sources of risk such as risk aversion, liquidity, and, marginally, real activity
reveal that the HML carry factor contains a broad array of economic shocks including
but not limited to intermediary capital risk. Further work must be done to uncover other
economic sources of risk embedded within the HML carry factor which I have shown plays a
dominant role in the pricing of risk embedded within the cross-sections of foreign exchange.
Fluctuations in intermediary capital also appear to be related to the global dollar factor,
although this relationship significantly arises in the past two decades. Liquidity and real
activity risk are embedded within this factor in line with intuition, but note that the
significance of my proxy of real US activity is counterintuitive, given that the global factor
should be purged of US-specific risk. This leads me to posit that US real activity may serve
as a proxy for broader real activity risk that is captured by fluctuations in the global dollar
factor, but may also suggest that individual currencies differentially load onto US-specific
risk. One can rationalize the latter point through the lens of heterogeneity in financial and
trade linkages of countries with the US.
1.6 Conclusion
Does intermediary capital matter for the pricing of exchange rates? I find that the answer is
yes as the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries helps explain the carry trade and
pattern of excess returns of the joint cross-section of a wide number of currency portfolios.
Intermediary capital shocks carry a significant risk price for both, improving upon the Fama
French global market return as well as durable and non-durable consumption growth, thus
pointing towards the central relevance of financial intermediaries for the pricing of exchange
rates and identifying a fundamental economic source of risk that drives the cross-section
of foreign exchange returns. The central role of financial intermediaries and their risk-
65
bearing capacity rationalizes the existence of the forward premium puzzle as the differential
exposures of currencies to intermediary capital risk align with the pattern of carry trade
returns, a result that extends to the joint cross-section of currency portfolios. My findings of
a positive and significant risk price of intermediary capital shocks for the joint cross-section
show that they serve as a systematic source of global risk with a meaningful economic
interpretation that underlies a wide variety of exchange rate risk premia.
My comparison of the intermediary capital shocks to the HML carry factor reveals
the latter as the most dominant pricing factor in the carry and joint cross-sections of
exchange rates and that its presence in the asset pricing tests removes or dampens the
significance of the price of intermediary capital risk. Combining this result with my previous
findings suggests that intermediary capital risk must be a component of the global risk
embedded within the portfolio generated HML carry factor as it is significantly priced in
all other specifications without this larger factor that subsumes it. I verify this claim by
showing that intermediary capital shocks positively and significantly correlate with the HML
carry factor. In addition, I explore other potential economic determinants and show that
changes in the VIX and Libor-OIS spread, proxies for market volatility and risk aversion,
and liquidity, respectively, are negatively correlated with carry trade returns, in line with
empirical findings by previous researchers and the theoretical predictions of the macro-
finance literature. I also show evidence for the relevance of real activity for the HML carry
factor.
Analogously, I also explore the interaction of intermediary capital shocks with the dollar
and global dollar factors identified by Verdelhan (2018) to assess their relative performance
against these foreign exchange risk factors that are systematically responsible for an outsize
portion of exchange rate movements. I find that intermediary capital risk is significantly
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priced in relation to these factors, displaying the importance of the risks emanating from
fluctuations in the risk-bearing capacity of financial intermediaries for exchange rate risk
premia. Intermediary capital shocks robustly price both the carry trade and joint cross-
section of currency portfolios and I uncover the relevance of the global dollar factor purged
of US-specific risk for the pricing of the wider cross-section. In contrast, the dollar factor
itself which still contains US-specific risk fails to be significantly priced, showing that the
risk premia in the cross-section of exchange rates stems from exposure to global shocks as
inclusion of US-specific risk appears to dilute the relevant information contained in dollar
factor.
Focusing on the global dollar factor, I find that intermediary capital shocks positively
correlate with this global factor only after controlling for a variety of other potential shocks.
This finding however is primarily due to the linkage between the two arising in the past
two decades. Furthermore, I uncover the significance of liquidity and, surprisingly, US real
activity for the global dollar factor, despite the fact that it should be purged of US-specific
information. I interpret the latter finding as either US real activity serving as a proxy for
global real activity and/or heterogeneous exposure to US risk that prevents it from being
fully removed.
My findings thus validate open economy models with financial intermediaries, providing
empirical support for this theoretically successful class of models. I show that financial
intermediaries help us better understand existing exchange rate factors as fluctuations in
their risk-bearing capacity serve as a fundamental economic source of risk that generates the
carry trade and broader joint cross-sections of exchange rate excess returns. Future work
may be done in terms of finding more complete measures of intermediary capital shocks and
risk-bearing capacity, perhaps constructing shocks for other participants in foreign exchange
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markets such as large buy-side investors, e.g. hedge funds, asset managers, and other
institutional investors. It may very well be the case that we are missing a key piece of the
intermediary-based asset pricing by not utilizing their pricing kernels as an additional risk
factor. Furthermore, given my findings on the central relevance of financial intermediaries,
it would be of interest to fully derive an open economy intermediary-based asset pricing
model to clearly outline and interpret my findings in general equilibrium. I leave these
exercises open to future research.
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Chapter 2
The Role of Dollar Funding and
US Monetary Policy in
International Bank Lending
2.1 Introduction
Motivated by theory, the growth of financial integration in the international banking sector
could yield important diversification benefits. Global banks can provide an additional
source of funding for local businesses that may substitute for local lending during domestic
downturns and expand growth prospects in normal times due to access to funding that
is unconstrained by the level of domestic savings. The introduction of foreign banks can
also help import improved institutional and regulatory standards (Cetorelli and Goldberg
2011), potentially accelerating the pace of financial development in emerging economies.
Furthermore, with increased global financial integration, capital can be more easily allocated
to where it provides the best marginal product, which may subsequently improve real global
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Figure 2.1: Total International Claims
Notes: The variables are obtained from the BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics looking at international
claims from all reporting countries, the Euro Area, Japan, and the US vis-à-vis all nonresidents. There may
be breaks in the series due to the inclusion of banks in certain countries, a prime example being the huge
spike in US claims around 2009 Q1 which is attributed to more reporting banks.
growth.
Unfortunately there are two sides to every coin and global financial integration is no
different. In contrast to the many potential benefits, global banks’ cross-border activities
can also serve as a destabilizing mechanism, transmitting financial conditions across borders
that lead to declines in real variables in economies that would have otherwise been insulated.
One example is the Global Financial Crisis in which we observed a sharp contraction of
bank capital flows to emerging economies, falling from approximately $500 to $100 billion
between 2007 and 2008 (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011). The general notion is that when
banks are hit with a negative shock, they curtail lending throughout their entire balance
sheet, including but not limited to cross-border claims. If domestic entities fail to replace
70
this gap in lending, domestic businesses presumably experience tighter borrowing conditions
that may lead to worse real outcomes.
The previous discussion however has abstracted from the fact that different countries
have different currencies. Banks may engage in international lending with counterparties in
countries with different currencies, providing the additional margin of currency denomina-
tion when granting cross-border credit. One might expect banks to prefer to lend in their
own currency in order to utilize their domestic currency deposits, generally their primary
source of funding, and avoid tight funding conditions or currency mismatches on their bal-
ance sheet that leave them vulnerable to fluctuations in exchange rates. However Figure 2.2
paints a different picture, displaying the dominant role of the dollar. Dollar-denominated
lending encapsulates nearly two-thirds of all international lending, twice the amount of
euro-denominated lending, the next most common currency choice. In other words, global
banks tend to lend a significant amount in dollars despite not necessarily having stable
dollar deposit base.
Thus far I have painted the picture of a world with significant cross-border activities
of global banks that are primarily lending and borrowing in dollars, invariant to their own
domestic currency. Unable to obtain dollars for lending from insured deposits, these banks
must then obtain dollar financing from uninsured sources such as US money market funds
and other banks, or engage in swap markets, exchanging domestic currency for dollars
(Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein 2015). Under the assumption that there exist some limits
to arbitrage in swap markets1, an increase in the cost of dollar funding from US money
markets or other banks decreases the spread on lending in dollars, which should lead to a
1If there exist no limits to arbitrage, banks could simply swap their domestic deposits for US dollars at
exactly the same cost as borrowing dollars directly from insured sources, preventing a need to utilize costlier
uninsured funding.
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Figure 2.2: International Claims and Liabilities by Currency Denomination
Notes: This graph displays the total volume of international claims and liabilities in the positive and negative
axes respectively for all BIS reporting banks. The data is sourced from Table 5A of the BIS Locational
Banking Statistics.
decline in dollar-denominated loans. This manifests into an overall decline in cross-border
lending activity if the substitution towards lending in other currencies is not sizeable enough
to offset the reduction in dollar-denominated loans.
This paper aims to examine this hypothesis by attempting to answer the following
questions. First, do funding conditions in the US affect the amount of cross-border lending
abroad? If so, through which channel(s) does this spillover operate? How do global banks
adjust their balance sheets in response to these shocks?
I approach this question by focusing on the relationship between monetary policy in
the United States and the activities of global banks as proxied by aggregate data from the
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BIS, searching for evidence of an international bank lending channel of monetary policy.
The original bank lending channel posits that contractionary monetary policy leads to a
decrease in reserves and thus a decline in the size of deposits. Banks then have to substitute
the decline in deposits with an alternative source of funding which can be more costly under
the existence of financial frictions.2 Given the higher cost of funding, banks will then cut
back on supply, completing the transmission of monetary policy to lending.
The mechanism that I look to identify is quite similar as it relies on the existence of a
friction for global banks in obtaining dollar financing. The idea is that US monetary pol-
icy shocks pass through to the borrowing rates of global banks for dollar funding, namely
contractionary shocks should make it costlier to obtain dollars in US money or interbank
Eurodollar markets. As previously described, higher costs in dollar funding lead banks to
decrease international dollar lending, and potentially total international lending if substi-
tution effects are not large enough. It follows then that banks with larger dollar funding
exposure should experience larger declines in international claims as it should be more
difficult to compensate for the decline in dollar funding.
I first show that contractionary monetary policy shocks as borrowed from the high
frequency identification literature indeed passes through to higher borrowing rates in dollar
money and interbank markets. For a variety of interest rates and horizons, I find an almost
one-for-one pass-through of the shocks to LIBOR and Eurodollar deposit rates by the end of
the days of US monetary policy announcements, an effect that does not significantly reverse
in the following weeks. This is consistent with persistent pass-through of US monetary
policy to offshore dollar borrowing rates.
Moving to international lending, I find that lender country banking systems with a
2If the world is frictionless as in Modigliani-Miller, banks would be able to costlessly substitute the
decline in deposits with other funding, thus leaving the asset side of their balance sheet unchanged.
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higher fraction of dollar to total liabilities have larger declines in lending growth following
contractionary monetary policy shocks, consistent with the proposed mechanism. This
result is robust to controlling for leverage and dollar swap pressure, sector fixed effects, and
removing the US as either lenders or borrowers. After dividing my sample into counterparty
sectors, I show that these results are primarily driven by contractions in lending to the non-
bank private and banking sectors, suggestive of real international effects associated with
US monetary policy. I then explore whether global banks differentially alter their lending
at short and long maturities, as well as local lending in local currency, another form of
cross-border credit. I show that long-term lending is slightly more affected by monetary
policy shocks and that local currency lending is not affected.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related literature. Section 2.3
describes the data sources and provides summary statistics. Section 2.4 outlines the econo-
metric methodology and identification strategy. Section 2.5 presents results. Section 2.6
provides alternative explanations and issues with and potential confounders of the results.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
This paper is primarily related to the empirical literature on global banks and their role
in transmitting shocks across borders. The seminal contributions by Peek and Rosengren
(1997, 2000) document the decline in lending by US branches of Japanese banks following
the collapse of the Nikkei in the early 1990s, a shock to the capital of a subset of global banks.
Khwaja and Mian (2008) develop a novel identification strategy involving borrower fixed
effects to estimate the effects of the liquidity shock caused by the nuclear tests in Pakistan
in 1998 on bank lending, finding a decline after controlling for contemporaneous demand
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shocks. Schnabl (2012) follows their identification strategy and examines the effect of the
1998 Russian default on the lending of international and domestic banks in Peru, finding
that reductions in lending were greatest for banks that were more reliant on international
funding and did not have alternate funding sources. Other papers that look at the effects
of liquidity shocks through global banks include Acharya and Schnabl (2010), Chava and
Purnanandum (2011), Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2012), and Acharya, Afonso, and Kovner
(2017).
Most similar to this paper is Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) who employ the Khwaja
and Mian (2008) methodology to aggregate international bank lending data to examine
the change in loan growth extended from advanced to emerging economies before and
after the 2007-2009 crisis. Exploiting the heterogeneity of dollar exposure of advanced
economy lenders, they find that lenders that were more exposed to dollar funding ex-
ante had lower ex-post lending growth to emerging markets. I differ from their paper
by making use of the time dimension in my analysis as opposed to only examining the
difference between the pre- and post crisis periods. Furthermore, I focus on the relationship
between US monetary policy shocks, dollar funding exposure as proxied by fraction of
dollar-denominated liabilities, and international lending growth to advanced and emerging
economies alike.
My mechanism draws upon the international bank lending channel that has been posited
and explored by a number of researchers. The story most closely related to my own comes
from Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015). They construct a theoretical model that
illustrates how a global bank with local currency deposits and lending in dollars and local
currency will choose to substitute away from dollar lending if the cost of dollar funding
increases in both direct funding and swap markets. The authors proceed to verify this
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mechanism by focusing on the period between May 2011 and June 2012, namely the peak
of the European sovereign debt crisis that affected the creditworthiness of Eurozone banks
and decreased access to wholesale dollar funding from US money market funds. Using
syndicated loan data, they show that there is a decline in the participation of Eurozone
lenders in international loan syndicates during this crisis period which they attribute to a
loss in dollar funding from US money market funds.
I depart from Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015) by focusing on the increased cost
of dollar funding coming from US monetary policy rather than a decrease in the supply. A
few other papers have looked at a similar relationship. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) look
at the response of global banks to US monetary policy, finding an internal transmission
of funds from foreign affiliates and decrease in foreign loans following contractionary US
monetary policy. Brauning and Ivashina (2017) examine the response of global banks to
changes in the interest rate on excess reserves finding that global banks shift funds towards
holding reserves in higher interest rate countries, a capital flow that places pressure on swap
markets, increasing the cost of funding and thus causing a decrease in loans denominated
in the higher interest rate currency.
Most related to this paper in this strand of literature is Morais, Peydro, and Ruiz (2015)
who use Mexican banking micro-data to examine the effects of interest rate changes and
quantitative easing (QE) from the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank (ECB), and
Bank of England (BoE) on international bank lending to Mexico. The authors find that
monetary policy changes only affect banks of the same nationality, for example ECB policy
only curtails the lending of European banks, but not necessarily US banks. Similarly, a
recent paper by Ongena, Schindele, and Vonnak (2017) examine the differential responses
following changes to domestic and foreign monetary policy using a Hungarian supervisory
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dataset. Both papers have better identified empirical specifications attributed to their usage
of micro-data, but my paper serves to provide supporting evidence that looks at a wider
range of countries to further encourage the study of the international bank lending channel.
Lastly, this paper is broadly related to the literature on determinants of global banking
capital flows. Most papers have focused on the role of the VIX, which proxies for global risk
aversion or uncertainty, as a major push factor in capital flows as in Forbes and Warnock
(2012), Rey (2015), Broner et al. (2013), Bruno and Shin (2015a), Avdjiev et al. (2017).
Rey (2015) and Bruno and Shin (2015b) take this one step further and posit a global
financial cycle driven by US monetary policy through a risk-taking channel, suggesting that
expansionary US monetary policy increases risk-taking which lowers the VIX, leading to a
loosening of global bank balance sheets and allowing an increase in cross-border lending.
Although my paper also looks at the relationship between US monetary policy and global
bank lending, I emphasize the different mechanism of the international bank lending channel
involving dollar funding costs and remain agnostic about the effects on and of risk-taking.
2.3 Data
Data Construction
My dataset comes from four sources: the Bank for International Settlements’ International
Banking Statistics, the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments and Financial
Indicators, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and Bloomberg.
The international bank lending data come from the Bank for International Settlements
Consolidated and Locational Banking Statistics. The Consolidated Banking Statistics con-
tain the aggregated bilateral claims of all banks with main headquarters in the reporting
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country vis-à-vis counterparty countries on immediate counterparty and ultimate risk bases.
Importantly, this measure of lending includes activities of foreign subsidiaries and branches,
but attribute them to the home country of the parent bank. The data is generally not gran-
ular as claims cannot be subdivided into instrument type, counterparty sector, or currency
denomination for immediate counterparty basis. Additional granularity with respect to
counterparty sectors is available for the ultimate risk basis, but the variable definition con-
founds exactly to whom the loan is granted as it measures who ultimately collateralizes the
loan. This data is available semi-annually from 1983 Q2 – 1999 Q4, and quarterly from
2000 Q1 – 2016 Q3. I utilize the quarterly data from 2000 Q1 – 2016 Q3 which contains 31
reporting countries and 219 counterparty countries.
The locational banking statistics provide the aggregate bilateral claims and liabilities on
all banks in reporting countries. The distinction between the locational and consolidated
statistics is that the former reports on a residential basis, namely claims are attributed to the
country in which they are booked as opposed to the country in which the parent bank resides
as in the consolidated statistics. I utilize the ability of the locational banking statistics to
divide claims and liabilities vis-à-vis all non-residents into currency denomination, using
the fraction of dollar to total liabilities as my proxy for exposure to dollar funding. I take
the amount of dollar-denominated liabilities for all banks with headquarters in a given
country as the amount of dollar-denominated liabilities in a given country instead of the
location where the liability was booked to remain consistent with the consolidated basis of
my bilateral claims. This data is only available for 12 reporting countries quarterly from
2000 Q1 - 2016 Q3. Given my interest in dollar funding exposure, the locational banking
statistics limit my sample to the bilateral data available for these 12 reporting country
lenders.
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Data on country banking characteristics comes from the World Bank’s World Devel-
opment Indicators. I obtain the ratio of country banking sector capital to assets available
annually from 2000 Q1 – 2016 Q4, with a break for some countries between 2004-2005.
Given the quarterly frequency of my lending data, in order to exploit this higher frequency
with annual data, I left-piecewise interpolate the annual leverage data to construct quar-
terly data. For example I set leverage in all quarters of 2000 equal to the annual leverage
in 2000, all quarters of 2001 equal to the annual leverage in 2001, and so forth.
My monetary policy shocks are the policy news shocks from Nakamura and Steinsson
(2018), available online on either of the authors’ websites. The measure is constructed
via high frequency identification, namely they measure unanticipated changes in realized
and expected federal (Fed) funds rates, and expected Eurodollar futures rates at 2-, 3-,
and 4-quarters ahead horizons over the 30-minute window enclosing Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) announcements. The idea is if no other relevant information is revealed
during this 30-minute window, the measures capture the pure surprises in monetary policy
stemming from the FOMC announcement. Nakamura and Steinsson then construct the
policy news shock as the first principle component of the unanticipated changes in the five
aforementioned interest rates. It is important to note that this measure captures the effect of
the monetary policy shock across a larger portion of the yield curve as short movements are
captured by the Fed funds rate changes, while movements further out in the term structure
are captured by the Eurodollar futures rates changes. This serves as an improvement over
only the change in the Fed funds rate as up until December 2015, the Fed funds rate was
stagnant at the zero lower bound and US monetary policy primarily comprised of forward
guidance.
In an ideal setting, I would have more high frequency data on banking claims to isolate
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the effects of these monetary policy shocks on lending. However given the quarterly peri-
odicity of the BIS data, I am unable to exploit the daily frequency of the monetary policy
shocks. Instead, I aggregate all of the monetary policy shocks in a given quarter and use
that as my quarterly monetary policy shock measure.
Lastly, the interest rate data comes from the money market monitor in Bloomberg. I
obtain daily, end-of-day rates for a variety of Eurodollar and US LIBOR rates from 2000 to
present. I match these with the dates of scheduled and unscheduled FOMC announcements
from the Nakamura and Steinsson data in order to study the pass-through of US monetary
policy shocks to dollar interest rates relevant for global banks.
Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 displays summary statistics of my sample. The 12 available lender countries
are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States with 216 potential counterparty
countries from 2000Q1 to 2016Q3, yielding an upper bound sample size of 61,497 after
accounting for missing values. International lending growth, computed as the difference in
log international claims to a particular counterparty, ranges from mean and median declines
of 1.8% in Belgium and Canada, respectively, to mean and median growth in the United
States of 2.4% and 1.7% as measured across all counterparties and quarters. The mean
and median over all lenders, counterparties, and quarters are 0.8% and approximately 0%,
respectively.
I construct dollar funding exposure as the fraction of dollar-denominated liabilities to
total liabilities for a given lender country as obtained from the BIS Locational Banking
Statistics. I obtain this measure for all 12 lender countries in my sample in each of the 67
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quarters from 2000Q1 to 2016Q3 for a total of 804 observations. The mean and median over
all lender countries and quarters are 43.6% and 39.6%, respectively, with a minimum of 9%
as observed in Belgium and a maximum of 84.8% in the United States. Aside from Canada
and the United States, all means and medians lie between 19% and 56%, confirming the
role of the dollar in international financing.
The remaining variables are monetary policy shocks as drawn from Nakamura and
Steinsson (2018), leverage as measured by theWorld Bank’s bank capital-to-assets ratio, and
my measure of dollar swap pressure. The monetary shocks have a mean of approximately
0 and median of .007, ranging from -.187 to .082, with a positive value corresponding to a
hawkish announcement reflecting potential monetary tightening by the FOMC. Dollar swap
pressure is computed as the difference between dollar-denominated claims and liabilities over
total claims as obtained from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. As with the fraction
of dollar liabilities, this is available for all 12 countries for the 67 quarters between 2000Q1
and 2016Q3. The mean is -.003 and median is -.013, reflecting an overall lack of pressure
when averaging across all lenders and quarters as a more positive value denotes a larger
currency mismatch in the balance sheet. Lastly leverage as measured annually has a mean
of 5.714 and median of 5.294, ranging from 2.7 to 12.7.
2.4 Econometric Methodology
Establishing the existence of an international bank lending channel requires the disentan-
glement of loan demand and loan supply, a common identification problem in the literature.
I am interested in the effects on loan supply that result from monetary policy shocks and
thus must account for concurrent shocks to loan demand, otherwise estimates for the supply
effects will be biased and confounded.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
International Lending Growth
Country Mean Median SD Min Max N
Belgium -0.018 0.000 0.494 -5.714 4.736 9150
Canada -0.014 -0.018 0.302 -2.112 2.211 394
France 0.013 0.000 0.428 -4.564 4.585 11981
Germany 0.004 0.005 0.134 -1.124 1.010 719
Italy 0.009 -0.005 0.338 -3.121 3.218 1117
Japan 0.017 0.008 0.319 -4.248 5.953 6725
Netherlands 0.009 0.015 0.163 -0.933 0.896 1056
Spain 0.013 0.000 0.436 -6.019 5.863 9638
Sweden -0.002 -0.004 0.634 -6.396 7.711 2893
Switzerland 0.017 -0.001 0.574 -7.649 7.312 3075
United Kingdom 0.011 0.000 0.440 -5.056 5.602 11185
United States 0.024 0.017 0.229 -2.176 1.494 3564
Total 0.008 0.000 0.436 -7.649 7.711 61497
Fraction of Dollar Liabilities
Country Mean Median SD Min Max N
Belgium 0.202 0.225 0.066 0.090 0.331 67
Canada 0.703 0.696 0.045 0.512 0.787 67
France 0.370 0.366 0.042 0.299 0.474 67
Germany 0.389 0.388 0.029 0.323 0.467 67
Italy 0.209 0.192 0.066 0.105 0.362 67
Japan 0.543 0.530 0.075 0.386 0.659 67
Netherlands 0.325 0.311 0.053 0.245 0.463 67
Spain 0.359 0.369 0.046 0.247 0.427 67
Sweden 0.390 0.364 0.090 0.269 0.615 67
Switzerland 0.552 0.549 0.043 0.461 0.640 67
United Kingdom 0.414 0.414 0.036 0.307 0.481 67
United States 0.782 0.794 0.037 0.703 0.848 67
Total 0.436 0.396 0.179 0.090 0.848 804
Independent Variables
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Monetary Policy Shocks -0.000 0.007 0.047 -0.187 0.082 53
Dollar Swap Pressure -0.003 -0.013 0.112 -0.280 0.309 804
Leverage 5.714 5.294 1.972 2.700 12.739 704
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The general approach to parsing out loan supply from demand shocks follows the iden-
tification strategy of Khwaja and Mian (2008). With bilateral data, the researcher has the
identity of the borrower and lender, allowing them to control for borrower fixed effects that
soak up demand shocks that would otherwise have been in the residual and bias coefficient
estimates. Under the requirement that borrowers obtain loans from multiple lenders, the
borrower fixed effects remove the average of loans granted across all lenders, effectively
controlling for the borrower’s average loan demand and yielding the within borrower es-
timate of the lending supply shock. The researcher is then estimating the effect on loan
supply offered to a given borrower conditional on a lender’s exposure to the shock. More
specifically suppose the lending supply schedule is given by the following:
Li;j = j + Di + i;j (2.1)
where Li;j is the change in loans from bank i to borrower j, Di is bank i’s exposure
to the shock, and j contains unobservable characteristics or shocks to borrower j.
Without including borrower fixed effects, if the unobserved shock to borrower j, j ,
is correlated with the monetary policy shock, the estimate of  will be biased. However
once borrower fixed effects are accounted for, demand shocks should be controlled for thus
isolating the effect on loan supply. Note that the identifying assumption is then that
borrowers demand the same type of loans from all lenders, namely there are not borrower-
lender specific interactions.
The previous discussion focuses on a differences-in-differences methodology, looking at
the change in loan supply before and after a single shock event. I depart from this method-
ology and exploit the variation in the time series data on bank lending and monetary
shocks. The immediate benefit is an increase in sample size attributed to the time dimen-
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sion. Monetary policy shocks occur following every FOMC announcement, so with eight
announcements per year, we have at least one shock per quarter. Furthermore, if effects
occur with lag, we may trace out the dynamics over time. Abstracting from the latter
notion I estimate the following:
Li;j;t = i + j;t + 0Di;t 1 + 1Di;t 1  USMPt 1 + i;j;t (2.2)
where Li;j;t is the change in log loans from the banking sector in country i to all
borrowers in country j between quarter t and t  1. USMPt 1 is the sum of the previous
quarter’s monetary shocks and Di;t 1 is a proxy for dollar funding exposure in country
i. My fixed effects or unobservables are now i and j;t, the lender time-invariant and
borrower-time fixed effects, respectively.
Some important differences arise here. First given my aggregate data, the borrowers and
lenders are all sectors in a given country receiving a loan from all banks in a lender country,
respectively. Thus one may think of the fixed effects as country-borrower or country-
banking sector specific. My results will only be suggestive as I cannot identify whether the
monetary policy shock is affecting country- or bank-specific supply, or both. Second, we
have another margin for shocks, namely the magnitude of the monetary policy shock in
addition to the ex-ante exposure of the lender country as opposed to only exposure in the
previous specification. Third and most importantly, because we are no longer looking at a
single shock, country-borrower fixed effects alone cannot entirely control for demand shocks
as they are time-invariant, namely they only capture unobserved characteristics that remain
static over the entire sample. Some examples of this include countries that rely primarily
on external financing or very financially integrated countries that on average have a higher
amount of international loan demand than other countries.
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In order to control for demand shocks, I include country-borrower-time fixed effects,
captured by j;t. Analogous to the borrower fixed effects in the differences-in-differences
regression, these fixed effects control for the average of loan demand for a given country in
a given quarter across all lenders. Without including these time-varying fixed effects and if
loan demand in country j in quarter t covaried with either the monetary policy shock, the
level of exposure in country i, or both, the estimate of the sensitivity of lending to monetary
shocks conditional on the level of dollar funding exposure will be biased.
The idea then is if country j experiences a demand shock in a given quarter, averaging
out its demand across lenders for that quarter should control for the shock, leaving only the
potential lending supply shock. This requires the country to borrow from multiple lenders
which allows me to measure the within-country effect, namely the effect of monetary shocks
on loan supply to a given country contingent on a lender country’s dollar exposure.
Given the country-borrower-time fixed effects, collinearity prevents me from including
time-varying regressors that are not lender-specific. The identification strategy limits the
regressors to time-varying lender-specific variables and interactions. Alternatively if we
were interested in time-varying country borrower characteristics, I could include time fixed
effects. However, this would assume that demand shocks are homogeneous across all bor-
rowers, a much stronger assumption than that required by the country-borrower-time fixed
effects.
My specification thus controls for confounding demand shocks by exploiting the bilateral
nature of the BIS data that allows me to control for the average country-borrower loan
demand across all lenders in a given quarter and identify the effect on loan supply. The
coefficient of interest, 1, measures the sensitivity of the effect of monetary shocks on loan
supply conditional on a lender’s exposure to dollar funding. This is completely analogous to
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Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) with the main difference being the additional time dimension,




Before examining the impacts on international bank lending, it is important to document
the pass-through of US monetary policy shocks as my mechanism operates through an
increase in the cost of dollar funding. The policy shock measures changes in the actual and
expected current and future path of dollar interest rates following FOMC announcements.
Given no arbitrage in money and interbank markets, changes in the market expectation of
interest rates of one source of dollar funding should thus lead to changes in dollar borrowing
rates in related markets.
I confirm this by regressing changes in Eurodollar and US LIBOR rates at a variety
of maturities on the policy indicator. To measure the extent of pass-through, I calculate
the announcement effect by regressing the change of a particular interest rate between the
end of the announcement day and the end of the previous day. A positive and significant
coefficient on the indicator suggests initial pass-through of the policy shock to relevant
borrowing rates for global banks. This result would support the notion that a surprise
contraction in US monetary policy leads to a realized increase in dollar borrowing rates
both on- and offshore.
It is important to note that an announcement effect may not necessarily translate to
persistent pass-through as the rates may initially adjust to match the monetary policy
86
shock, but markets may be overreacting and not actually adjust borrowing rates over the
medium and long term. Global banks presumably utilize dollar funding markets multiple
times in a quarter, not only on FOMC announcement days, so the mechanism crucially
depends on persistent pass-through as this would imply altered dollar borrowing rates long
after the announcement.
To measure the extent of persistent pass-through, I follow the finance literature and mea-
sure the extent to which there is a reversal of the announcement effect. If the pass-through
is persistent, we should observe little to no reversal of the effect of the shock on interest
rates at future horizons. Specifically, I regress the change between the relevant interest
rate on the day after the announcement and one, two, four, and twelve weeks following
the announcement on the policy shock. If there is a reversal, we should see a negative and
significant coefficient on the indicator as this implies that after the initial announcement
effect the market moves rates in the opposite direction, nullifying the announcement effect
and implying only a transitory pass-through.
My regression specification is thus:
Rt = + USMPt + t (2.3)
where Rt is the change in the relevant interest rate for the window of interest, namely
the announcement or future reversals.
Table 2.2 shows evidence consistent with initial pass-through. In column (1), we see
that the US monetary policy shock has a positive and significant effect on offshore dollar
rates as measured by the Eurodollar deposits rates and interbank dollar borrowing rates as
measured by the LIBOR at all horizons. With the exception of the 1-month LIBOR rate,
the coefficient is quite large, ranging from .725 for the 3-month LIBOR, to 1.178 for the
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Table 2.2: US Monetary Pass-through to Dollar Borrowing Rates
1-month LIBOR Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Announcement 1 Week 2 Week 1 Month 1 Quarter
Monetary Shock 0.0544** 0.0226 0.243* 1.239 0.694
(0.0254) (0.0958) (0.127) (1.019) (1.387)
Observations 100 103 101 47 101
R-squared 0.045 0.001 0.036 0.032 0.003
3-month LIBOR Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Announcement 1 Week 2 Week 1 Month 1 Quarter
Monetary Shock 0.725*** -0.817 -0.566 0.824 2.187
(0.0926) (1.881) (0.604) (3.358) (1.637)
Observations 106 106 106 49 106
R-squared 0.371 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.017
3-month Eurodollar Deposit Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Announcement 1 Week 2 Week 1 Month 1 Quarter
Monetary Shock 1.178*** -0.0603 -0.0539 1.166 -0.0642
(0.144) (0.0820) (0.201) (1.039) (1.427)
Observations 106 103 102 48 103
R-squared 0.391 0.005 0.001 0.027 0.000
6-month Eurodollar Deposit Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Announcement 1 Week 2 Week 1 Month 1 Quarter
Monetary Shock 1.024*** -0.191 -0.326 0.717 -0.282
(0.147) (0.133) (0.235) (1.030) (1.433)
Observations 106 103 101 48 103
R-squared 0.317 0.020 0.019 0.010 0.000
1-year Eurodollar Deposit Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Announcement 1 Week 2 Week 1 Month 1 Quarter
Monetary Shock 1.046*** -0.413** -0.898*** -0.245 -0.833
(0.156) (0.191) (0.304) (1.078) (1.463)
Observations 106 103 102 48 103
R-squared 0.303 0.044 0.080 0.001 0.003
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3-month Eurodollar rate, suggesting almost complete pass-through.
Columns (2) to (5) examine the extent of potential reversals of this announcement effect
at the 1-, 2-, 4-, and 12- week horizons. With the exception of the 1-year Eurodollar rate,
there is no evidence of reversal as nearly all coefficients are insignificant. Although we do
observe some negative coefficients, the magnitudes are quite small relative to the initial
announcement effect, suggesting that while there may be a reversal, it is quite mild and
rates still persistently respond to US monetary policy shocks.
The results thus show that there is an announcement effect of US monetary policy
shocks on a variety of dollar funding rates that is persistent for at least up to one quarter
in the future. This supports the notion that US monetary policy can indeed influence the
cost of obtaining dollars both at home and abroad in the expected direction, a cost that
will presumably be passed on to those that borrow and lend in dollars. I now proceed to
examine the effect on international lending in the following section.
Baseline
I begin my empirical investigation with the baseline specification of the change in log in-
ternational loans on the fraction of dollar liabilities and its interaction with the aggregated
policy shock. If my mechanism is indeed at play, I expect a negative and significant coeffi-
cient on the interaction term, suggesting that monetary policy shocks decrease international
lending growth with increasing magnitude contingent on the fraction of dollar-denominated
liabilities to total liabilities for a given lender country’s banking system.
The results are displayed in Table 2.3. Column (1) is the OLS regression with no
fixed effects, our potentially most problematic regression. A lack of fixed effects will fail
to account for country-specific characteristics, time-varying shocks, simultaneous demand
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Table 2.3: Baseline Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t)
Di;t 1 0.0754*** 0.186*** 0.111*** 0.138***
(0.00897) (0.0329) (0.0351) (0.0334)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 0.437*** 0.463*** -0.428 -0.706**
(0.0886) (0.0891) (0.277) (0.280)
Observations 46,077 46,077 46,077 46,077
R-squared 0.001 0.006 0.017 0.319
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes No
Borrower-Time FE No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.00105 0.00109 0.0106 0.118
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable in this regression is the change in log cross-border claims of country banking
sector i on all borrowers in all sectors in country j. The independent variables are the fraction of dollar-
denominated liabilities to total liabilities of the lender country in the previous quarter. Country fixed effects
denotes time-invariant borrower and lender country fixed effects. Time fixed effects denote quarterly fixed
effects. The regression in column (4) includes only time-invariant lender fixed effects and borrower-quarter
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the lender-borrower pair level.
shocks, and other omitted variables that may confound the estimates and bias results. As
we can see, this specification yields a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction
between monetary policy shocks and fraction of dollar liabilities, contrary to the proposed
mechanism. Column (2) holds similar results after controlling for time-invariant country-
borrower specific fixed effects, but note that this regression is still subject to bias coming
from unobserved time-varying demand shocks. Both regressions yield incredibly low R2’s,
on the order of 0.1% to 0.6% of variation explained, suggesting that not much is being
picked up by these specifications and omitted variables bias may be rampant.
Column (3) provides a slightly better specification, accounting now for global time-
varying shocks as captured by time fixed effects. I obtain a negative, albeit insignificant
coefficient on the interaction term, and although still small, we do see a substantial im-
provement in the R2 to 1.7% of variation explained. Column (4) provides the most illu-
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minating results as I am now controlling for time-varying borrower-country fixed effects.
This specification more convincingly and cleanly absorbs unobserved credit demand, and,
as hypothesized, we observe a negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between
monetary policy shocks and fraction of dollar-denominated liabilities. Concerns about omit-
ted variables may be somewhat alleviated as we observe a sharp increase in both the raw
and adjusted R2, with the former jumping to almost 32%, and the latter to 11.8%, over ten
times that of the prior specification.
Controls
I now augment the baseline regression with lender country banking sector leverage and dollar
swap pressure. Leverage is captured by the banking sector’s ratio of capital to assets with
the idea that more highly levered country banking sectors should be relatively more sensitive
to funding shocks. Dollar swap pressure is captured by the difference between a given
country’s banking sector’s dollar-denominated claims and liabilities, scaled by the country’s
total claims. If a banking sector has more dollar-denominated claims than liabilities, it is
lending more than borrowing in dollars, and thus must be funding these claims by swapping
currency for dollars. Given that global banks can choose whether to obtain dollars either
directly through borrowing in money and interbank markets or swapping domestic currency
for dollars, controlling for the latter controls for the notion that if the cost of direct dollar
borrowing increases, banks can substitute for dollar funding by engaging in swap markets.
We thus expect an opposite effect of the interaction between the monetary shock and swap
pressure compared to that of the proxy for dollar exposure as access to swap markets should
help alleviate the decline in lending attributed to the increase in funding costs.
My results are presented in Table 2.4. First, the inclusion of controls has confirmed
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Table 2.4: Full Regression with Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t)
Di;t 1 0.101*** 0.223*** 0.142*** 0.166***
(0.0141) (0.0352) (0.0365) (0.0345)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 -0.143 -0.538 -1.053** -1.668***
(0.371) (0.395) (0.468) (0.460)
Levi;t 1 -0.00148 -0.000438 0.000304 -0.000426
(0.00129) (0.00171) (0.00188) (0.00182)
Levi;t 1 MPt 1 0.0461 0.0787** 0.0906** 0.120***
(0.0312) (0.0335) (0.0397) (0.0377)
Swapi;t 1 0.0144 0.0332 0.120** 0.0784
(0.0155) (0.0409) (0.0483) (0.0495)
Swapi;t 1 MPt 1 0.372 0.403 0.582 0.952**
(0.354) (0.357) (0.407) (0.396)
Observations 38,719 38,719 38,719 38,719
R-squared 0.002 0.008 0.018 0.339
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes No
Borrower-Time FE No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.00143 0.00180 0.0112 0.127
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log international claims of country i on country j. The
independent variables are the lagged fraction of dollar-denominated liabilities, leverage as measured by
bank capital-to-asset ratio, swap pressure as measured by dollar-denominated claims less liabilities scaled
by total claims, and their interactions with the sum of monetary policy shocks in the previous quarter. Fixed
effects are as in the baseline regression. Standard errors are clustered at the lender-borrower pair level.
the presence of omitted variables bias in the OLS counterparts of the baseline regression as
the sign of the interaction between dollar liabilities and the monetary policy shock is now
robustly negative across all specifications. Significance is not obtained until I control for
time fixed effects in columns (3) and (4), but it becomes even stronger than the baseline
case without controls. Explained variation as measured by the R2 marginally improves, but
not by enough to warrant a higher weighting on the additional channels introduced.
Moving to the controls now, the interaction of dollar swap pressure and monetary policy
enters in positive and significant, consistent with a substitution effect. As monetary policy
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in the US appears more contractionary, lenders perhaps find it more profitable to lend in
dollars funded by swap markets instead of borrowing in dollar funding markets, thus leading
them to increase their international lending. This then offsets the reduction in international
lending stemming from increased cost of dollar funding, leaving the overall effect on total
international lending potentially ambiguous.
We may check the overall effect on total lending by performing a back-of-the-envelope
calculation. The means of the fraction of dollar funding and swap pressure are .436 and
-.003, respectively, hence a one-standard deviation shock to monetary policy of .047 leads
to a decrease in cross-border lending vis-à-vis one country borrower by 3.42% from dollar
funding and almost no change from dollar swap pressure. The dollar funding channel
dominates, namely the substitution to dollar swap markets is not enough to offset increased
costs, and we thus should expect lower international lending following a contractionary
shock.
A lower levered or more capitalized banking system appears to be associated with a
positive effect of monetary shocks on lending growth holding the fraction of dollar funding
and swap pressure constant. In magnitudes, with a mean of 5.714, a one-standard deviation
shock yields an increase in cross-border lending of 3.22%. The net effect of monetary policy
shocks on lending is thus still negative, namely -0.20%, but it appears that well capitalized
banking sectors tend to be economies that are relatively insulated from dollar funding shocks
coming from changes in US monetary policy.
Sector Fixed Effects
The previous analysis has abstracted from the specific sector of counterparties, a limita-
tion of the banking claims data when using the immediate counterparty basis. The BIS
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Consolidated Banking Statistics also include total claims on an ultimate risk basis that
provides granularity in counterparty sectors. I exploit this rich feature of the data in order
to examine whether the patterns documented in the previous sections remain robust to the
inclusion of borrower-country-sector-time fixed effects, a specification that more precisely
controls for potential demand shocks, and to analyze potential heterogeneity in the response
of international claims to specific sectors.
I begin by looking at the original specification with controls, but with observations now
at the lender country, borrower-country-sector, and time level. With borrower fixed effects
now at the sectoral level, we should observe an improvement in controlling for borrower
demand as the specification now accounts for the heterogeneity in borrower demand across
sectors. As before, my regressions range from no fixed effects, time-invariant fixed effects,
global time fixed effects, and borrower-sector-specific time-varying fixed effects.
The patterns identified in the previous section remain robust as displayed in Table
2.5, namely the negative interaction between the fraction of dollar funding and monetary
policy shocks and the positive interactions between lender country leverage, dollar swap
pressure, and monetary policy shocks are as before. The magnitudes of these coefficients
have become much larger and I now obtain 1% significance across all specifications. More
carefully controlling for demand shocks by accounting for the heterogeneity in the response
of lending to particular sectors in a given counterparty country has in fact strengthened the
results, providing additional evidence in favor of the international bank lending channel.
Subsamples Sectors and Controls
I now exploit the granularity of the ultimate risk basis data in order to study the heteroge-
neous response of international bank lending to monetary policy shocks across counterparty
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Table 2.5: Full Regression with Sector Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable log(Li;j;s;t) log(Li;j;s;t) log(Li;j;s;t) log(Li;j;s;t)
Di;t 1 0.249*** 0.517*** 0.258*** 0.308***
(0.0236) (0.0681) (0.0691) (0.0710)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 -5.567*** -6.400*** -6.882*** -8.112***
(1.252) (1.347) (1.431) (1.388)
Levi;t 1 -0.0129*** -0.0124*** -0.00782* -0.00857*
(0.00206) (0.00317) (0.00455) (0.00475)
Levi;t 1 MPt 1 0.465*** 0.528*** 0.669*** 0.779***
(0.101) (0.108) (0.119) (0.119)
Swapi;t 1 -0.0658*** 0.0382 0.147 0.0968
(0.0205) (0.0850) (0.0894) (0.0979)
Swapi;t 1 MPt 1 1.233** 1.219** 2.332*** 3.028***
(0.540) (0.542) (0.691) (0.761)
Observations 50,393 50,393 50,393 50,393
R-squared 0.003 0.007 0.021 0.372
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE No Yes Yes No
Time FE No No Yes No
Borrower-Sector-Time FE No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.00239 0.00231 0.0155 0.102
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log international claims of the banking sector in country i
on sector s in country j. Sectors are classified by bank, non-bank financial, official, and non-bank private.
Sector FE denotes time-invariant sector fixed effects, while borrower-sector-time FE denotes fixed effects
at the country-sector-quarter level, namely j;s;t as opposed to j;t. Standard errors are clustered at the
lender-borrower country pair level.
sectors. In particular, I estimate regressions as in the previous sections on the subsamples
of each counterparty sector in order to identify which are most affected or immune to
the monetary shocks and provide some broader insight into how global banks adjust their
international lending in response to dollar funding shocks at an aggregate level.
The BIS data disaggregates counterparty sectors into banks, non-bank financial insti-
tutions, the official sector, and the non-bank private sector, for each of which I construct
subsamples and run the previous regressions. Note that for brevity I have only included
the full regression specifications with time-varying borrower country fixed effects and only
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Table 2.6: Counterparty Sector Specific Regressions
Counterparty Banks Non-Bank Financial Official Non-Bank Private
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Di;t 1 0.372*** 0.300** 4.846 25.27 -0.125 0.00629 0.222*** 0.268***
(0.0900) (0.124) (8.279) (17.96) (0.106) (0.132) (0.0704) (0.0870)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 -0.0791 -0.507* -2.377 -7.539 0.238 -0.0380 -0.631*** -1.222***
(0.187) (0.270) (5.595) (10.12) (0.238) (0.331) (0.112) (0.174)
Levi;t 1 -0.0111 -1.222 -0.00188 0.00139
(0.00889) (0.853) (0.00951) (0.00606)
Levi;t 1 MPt 1 0.249** 17.55 0.349** 0.449***
(0.107) (12.99) (0.144) (0.0820)
Swapi;t 1 -0.0265 -14.62 0.493** 0.103
(0.187) (15.81) (0.230) (0.108)
Swapi;t 1 MPt 1 0.165 471.9 2.985** 1.477*
(1.307) (374.0) (1.353) (0.796)
Observations 18,948 15,932 855 855 15,994 13,511 23,985 20,095
R-squared 0.351 0.365 0.267 0.273 0.348 0.377 0.354 0.398
Adjusted R2 0.0970 0.0983 -0.0414 -0.0402 0.0609 0.0811 0.115 0.151
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log international claims of the banking sector in country
i on the counterparty sector in country j. This regression is estimated on four different subsamples that
isolate the counterparty sectors. In the interest of space, I only display the baseline and full specification
results that include lender country time-invariant and borrower country-time fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the lender-borrower country pair level.
compare the baseline specification to that with the two controls.
Table 2.6 displays my results for each of the subsamples and specifications. First note
that the interaction between contractionary monetary policy shocks and fraction of dollar-
denominated liabilities is negative for all sectors except the official sector. Furthermore we
consistently see a positive interaction for leverage and swap pressure.
The strongest results reside with non-bank private sector counterparties, with coeffi-
cients of -0.631 in the baseline and -1.222 in the full specification in columns (7) and (8).
This yields a 2.5% decline in lending to non-bank private sector counterparties in aggregate
following a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. It appears then that the decline
in international lending from global banks hits the non-bank private sector the hardest,
namely firms and households. If they are unable to substitute international bank lending
for an alternate source, say from domestic banks, we should expect to see real international
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spillovers and effects from the US monetary shock.
The next set of results in columns (1) and (2) pertain to banking sector counterparties.
We observe a negative interaction between the fraction of dollar funding and monetary
shocks, but significance is only marginally obtained in the full specification with controls.
The magnitude is much lower than that observed in the non-bank private sector subsample
at -0.507, suggesting that the monetary shocks more strongly affect lending to the non-bank
private sector than banks. For reference, this yields a 1.03% decline in cross-border lending
to banking sector counterparties following a one standard deviation shock.
Results for the non-bank financial sector yield no significance as displayed in columns
(3) and (4), but this could be attributed to the small sample size. Note however that the
sign on the interaction between fraction of dollar funding and monetary shocks is negative
as expected, and that the magnitudes on coefficients are quite large. This may of course
just be due to small sample bias.
Finally for the official sector in columns (5) and (6), note that there is no significance
on the interaction between fraction of dollar liabilities and monetary shocks and the sign is
in fact positive. More interestingly we observe a large and positive significant interaction
between dollar swap pressure and monetary shocks at 2.985, above and beyond that of
the non-bank private sector. This then suggests that with higher dollar rates and swap
pressure, global banks will in fact increase their cross-border claims on official sectors. This
is consistent with the notion of carry trade, as higher rates abroad should lead domestic
agents to borrow in their own currency and lend in foreign currency to take advantage of
higher interest differentials.
To summarize, I have found that lending to the non-bank private sector is most sensitive
to US monetary policy shocks, followed by the banking sector. The official sector, while not
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significantly affected by monetary shocks through their interaction with lender’s fraction
of dollar-denominated liabilities, appears to be positively impacted by monetary shocks
through the interaction with dollar swap pressure, suggesting an increase in cross-border
claims potentially due to participation in the carry trade.
Maturity
I next examine whether global banks differentially adjust claims of different maturities
following US monetary shocks. The consolidated banking statistics on an immediate coun-
terparty basis distinguish between claims of all maturities and those up to and including
one year, the latter of which I consider short-term lending. I take the difference between
these two series to construct my measure of longer-term lending and run regressions on the
subsamples of short, long, and all maturity lending.
My results are displayed in Table 2.7. At first glance, we see that the interactions
between fraction of dollar funding and monetary shocks are negative for all maturities and
significant in the full specifications, suggesting a homogeneous response to higher dollar
funding costs. Note however that significance and magnitude are larger for the longer
maturity claims, at -1.494 in the full specification compared to -1.343 for short maturity
claims.
Short maturity claims fail to have significance in the interaction between leverage and
monetary shocks, but are estimated with a positive coefficient, consistent with previous
results. Long maturity claims have both a positive and significant coefficient of .149, slightly
higher than that estimated for all maturities.
Short maturity claims further differentiate from longer term and all maturity claims in
their positive and significant coefficients on lender country leverage and dollar swap pressure.
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Table 2.7: Maturity Regressions
Maturity Short-Term Long-Term All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Di;t 1 0.181*** 0.256*** 0.150*** 0.149*** 0.138*** 0.166***
(0.0468) (0.0562) (0.0428) (0.0501) (0.0334) (0.0345)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 -0.492 -1.343* -0.217 -1.494** -0.706** -1.668***
(0.391) (0.689) (0.400) (0.678) (0.280) (0.460)
Levi;t 1 0.00552** -0.00300 -0.000426
(0.00264) (0.00238) (0.00182)
Levi;t 1 MPt 1 0.0835 0.149*** 0.120***
(0.0549) (0.0485) (0.0377)
Swapi;t 1 0.278*** -0.0791 0.0784
(0.0788) (0.0696) (0.0495)
Swapi;t 1 MPt 1 0.411 0.604 0.952**
(0.718) (0.468) (0.396)
Observations 34,002 28,063 31,744 25,999 46,077 38,719
R-squared 0.393 0.401 0.414 0.434 0.319 0.339
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.141 0.169 0.184 0.118 0.127
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log international claims of the banking sector in country i on
the counterparty sector in country j. This regression is estimated on three different subsamples, short-term
claims with maturity less than and up to 1 year, claims of all maturities, and long-term claims obtained
by subtracting short-term claims from all claims. In the interest of space, I only display the baseline and
full specification results that include lender country time-invariant and borrower country-time fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the lender-borrower country pair level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In contrast to longer maturity lending growth, short maturity lending growth appears to be
higher in countries that are either more highly levered or exhibit a large amount of dollar
swap pressure. Note that these effects are invariant to the interaction with the monetary
policy shocks, suggesting that these differences remain even in the absence of shocks.
Local Lending
Recall that the consolidated banking statistics attribute banks’ claims to their parents’
locations, namely those coming from offices in their headquartered countries and those
booked at their foreign affiliates located abroad are both categorized as credit from the
parent country. Given that not all international lending is done cross-border as banks may
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choose to extend loans abroad through their affiliates located in the borrower country, it
is of interest to examine whether there is a differential response of this type of lending
following US monetary shocks.
Analogous to the previous sections, I regress the change in log local claims on the
fraction of dollar funding, its interaction with the monetary policy shock, and the controls
and their interactions. Note that the local claims in the BIS data only include those booked
in local currency. For example, local claims booked vis-à-vis counterparties in Argentina
will only include those denominated in Argentine Pesos. Given the limited availability of
data, this exercise should serve as both a placebo as well as a check for a substitution
effect. Specifically, I expect either no change in local lending as increased dollar funding
costs should not affect lending denominated in domestic currency or should increase local
lending as I expect that banks would replace the decline in dollar-denominated loans with
loans in the domestic currency.
Consistent with my conjecture, in Table 2.8 we do not observe a statistically signifi-
cant interaction between the monetary shock and fraction of dollar-denominated liabilities,
successfully passing the placebo test. Furthermore the sign of the interaction depends on
whether I include controls, thus providing inconclusive evidence regarding the existence of
a substitution effect.
Note however that lack of conclusive evidence for a substitution effect does not invalidate
its existence as my prior regressions were looking at changes in international or cross-
border lending whereas this set of results pertains to local lending. If we were to observe a
substitution effect, it would more likely appear in changes in international lending in foreign
currency, a level of granularity not available in my dataset.3
3Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015) use syndicated loan data to show that there is indeed a shift
in lending from dollar-denominated loans to euro denominated loans at Eurozone banks in the midst of the
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Table 2.8: Local Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t)
Di;t 1 0.118*** 0.535*** 0.421*** 0.276**
(0.0294) (0.0887) (0.0935) (0.113)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 0.414 -0.597 -0.781 -0.778
(0.581) (0.634) (0.638) (0.811)
Levi;t 1 -0.00778*** -0.00424 0.00289 0.00391
(0.00278) (0.00351) (0.00378) (0.00480)
Levi;t 1 MPt 1 -0.0240 0.0622 0.117** 0.131**
(0.0451) (0.0497) (0.0522) (0.0660)
Swapi;t 1 -0.0403 -0.200* 0.0899 0.0272
(0.0324) (0.106) (0.114) (0.136)
Swapi;t 1 MPt 1 -0.162 -0.237 0.203 0.566
(0.531) (0.535) (0.652) (0.812)
Observations 17,086 17,086 17,086 17,086
R-squared 0.001 0.015 0.024 0.390
Country FE No Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No No Yes No
Borrower-Time FE No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.000292 0.00374 0.0102 0.0534
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log local lending of banks located in country j with head-
quarters in country i to borrowers in country j denominated in the local currency of country j. The
independent variables, fixed effects, and regression specifications are as in previous exercises. Standard
errors are clustered at the lender-borrower country pair level.
2.6 Potential Critiques
The previous empirical analysis is not immune to critiques regarding the identification
strategy, proxy variables used, and usage of aggregate data. I discuss a few potential
critiques in this section.
Endogeneity and Identification
This paper seeks to estimate the causal effect of US monetary policy shocks on international
bank lending which relies heavily on the assumption of exogeneity of the monetary policy
Euro crisis.
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shocks themselves. One might argue that the shocks used are not exogenous as it could be
the case that even though Nakamura and Steinsson’s measure cleanly isolates the changes
in relevant interest rates through high frequency identification, because we are looking at
quarterly horizons, other events could have occurred in that time period that have caused
the change in monetary policy, the fraction of dollar liabilities, and cross-border lending.
This would then leave my regression subject to omitted variables bias which would confound
my estimates.
One counterargument to this point is that when controlling for global time fixed effects
in my specifications, which would soak up variation from events occurring in each quarter
that could lead to omitted variables bias, my results remain robust in the sense that I almost
always obtain a negative interaction between monetary shocks that is significant once all
controls are added to the specification. In this sense, concerns may be somewhat alleviated
as my effect still holds despite controlling for potential shocks that otherwise would have
biased results.
This of course does not completely exonerate my results as it is easy to think of a
situation in which the FOMC adjusts monetary policy due to factors that also affect inter-
national lending. In this case, I am then not measuring the causal effect of US monetary
policy shocks on international lending, but rather the effect of whatever factors lead the
FOMC to adjust monetary policy on international lending. In this case, the only way to
estimate the causal effect would be to find an instrument for US monetary policy, one exam-
ple being oil price shocks. Unfortunately oil price shocks would likely violate the exclusion
restriction as oil prices affect credit supply and demand outside of their effects on dollar
interest rates.
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Fraction of Dollar Liabilities as Proxy for Dollar Funding Exposure
The bulk of my analysis relies on the usage of the fraction of dollar-denominated liabili-
ties as a proxy for a lender country’s banking system reliance on dollar funding or dollar
funding exposure. It is not necessarily the case that all of these dollar liabilities come from
uninsured wholesale dollar funding sources such as US money markets or the interbank
market and thus a country’s sensitivity to US monetary policy shocks may be much less
than that measured by the fraction of all dollar-denominated liabilities. If the fraction of
dollar-denominated liabilities overstates dollar funding exposure, my estimates would in
fact understate the effect of a monetary policy shock on cross-border lending, which should
not be a problem as we have then established a lower bound on the effect.
However, it could also be the case that fraction of dollar liabilities understates dollar
funding exposure. This scenario seems more likely as global banks use uninsured dol-
lar funding sources only for short term dollar funding, so scaling by all liabilities rather
than short-term liabilities can understate the exposure. The ideal measure would be the
fraction of dollar funding from US money markets and the interbank market over all short-
term dollar-denominated liabilities, a variable that to the best of my knowledge cannot be
constructed.4 In this case if dollar funding exposure is understated by my measure, my
estimates would overstate the effect of monetary shocks on lending.
Another issue with using my proxy is that it may not reflect dollar funding exposure
and instead other reflects differences in banking sector balance sheets, a point discussed by
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011). In this case, my empirical results would not be confirming
my proposed mechanism of increased cost of dollar funding leading to a curtailing of in-
4Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015) construct the sum of money market fund holdings and scale
it by the sum of bank deposits and short-term debt, but note that short-term dollar denominated debt is
unavailable.
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ternational lending and would instead be providing evidence for some other balance sheet
mechanism in the veil of my own.
Lack of Granularity to Pin Down Mechanism
The previous point on an inability to clearly attribute the decline in lending to the dollar
funding channel extends further given that the aggregate data lacks granularity with respect
the currency denomination of lending. The cross-border claims data from the BIS fails to
break down the volume of lending done in individual currencies when examining bilateral
lending relationships. I thus am unable to determine specifically whether the volume of
dollar-denominated loans decreases following the monetary shock in line with the proposed
mechanism.
With only data on total cross-border lending vis-à-vis counterparty country borrowers,
I cannot verify whether the decline in lending is due to a curtailing of dollar-denominated
loans due to the higher funding costs or a decline in overall loans perhaps due to US
monetary policy proxying for broader economic conditions. The results from Section 2.5
do provide some reassuring evidence as we do not see a response in local currency lending
following monetary shocks, but as discussed, we could better determine the channel through
which US monetary policy decreases lending with access to the currency breakdown of
cross-border lending, allowing us to document the change in dollar-denominated lending
and explore to what extent a substitution towards lending in other currencies occurs.
Usage of aggregate country data also makes it difficult to definitively attribute the effects
to banking sector specific or country-specific factors. Because I do not have individual bank
lender data, my independent variables may be capturing country-specific rather than bank-
specific factors that affect exposure of cross-border lending to US monetary policy, the latter
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of which I am interested in. The inability to disentangle bank-specific from country-specific
factors makes it difficult to assert that the dollar funding exposure of individual banks
leads to a decline in international lending following monetary shocks as my regressions
could just be picking up variation coming from country-specific factors rather than bank-
specific factors. The ideal scenario would be to have bank-specific lending data and dollar
funding exposure with the nationality of each bank identified, allowing me to average out the
country specific factors and isolate the bank-specific effects. To the best of my knowledge,
the available data does not permit this exercise.
Results Driven by US
The final potential critique is that my results may be driven primarily by the inclusion of
US borrowers and lenders. If this were the case, declines in international lending following
contractionary US monetary policy shocks may perhaps not be attributable to the offshore
dollar funding mechanism that I argue for, but rather the traditional bank lending channel
and mechanical response of US banks facing higher domestic funding costs. Declines in
observed lending could also be due to decreased borrowing demand by US counterparties
due to contractionary monetary policy at home, although this effect should have already
been absorbed by the borrower-time fixed effects. I alleviate this concern by running my
regressions on the sample excluding US lenders and borrowers and comparing the results
to the full sample to determine whether there are any significant differences.
Table 2.9 displays my results for the full and non-US subsample. In both the baseline
and full specifications, my result remains robust as we observe a negative and significant
interaction between fraction of dollar liabilities and the monetary policy shock. The magni-
tude of this interaction becomes even larger when excluding the US, increasing from -0.706
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Table 2.9: Full Sample vs. Excluding US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t) log(Li;j;t)
Di;t 1 0.138*** 0.161*** 0.166*** 0.192***
(0.0334) (0.0358) (0.0345) (0.0369)
Di;t 1 MPt 1 -0.706** -1.642*** -1.668*** -3.525***
(0.280) (0.573) (0.460) (0.836)
Levi;t 1 -0.000426 -0.00376*
(0.00182) (0.00215)




Swapi;t 1 MPt 1 0.952** 1.831***
(0.396) (0.504)
Observations 46,077 42,736 38,719 35,670
R-squared 0.319 0.324 0.339 0.346
US in Sample Yes No Yes No
Adjusted R2 0.118 0.107 0.127 0.113
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: The regressions in (1) and (3) are the same as in Section 2.5 including lender and borrower-time
fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4) run these regressions on the sample excluding US lenders and borrowers.
Standard errors are clustered at lender-borrower country pair level.
to -1.642 in the baseline and up to -3.525 from -1.668 in the full specification. The mean of
dollar funding exposure is 40.4% for the sample excluding the US, so a back-of-the-envelope
calculation yields a larger decline in international lending of 3.12% in comparison to 1.45%
for the full sample in response to a one-standard deviation shock in the baseline regression.
It follows then that my results are not being driven by the inclusion of US borrowers and
lenders as my results remain robust and get larger in magnitude once I exclude them. Given
that the proposed mechanism should be stronger for non-US banks, this provides further




In this paper I explore the relevance of US monetary policy for international bank lend-
ing, finding evidence for the transmission of US monetary policy to cross-border credit. I
document the pass-through of US monetary policy shocks to offshore and interbank dollar
borrowing rates relevant for global banks. I then use bilateral international banking data to
examine the effects of US monetary policy shocks on international lending by global banks,
controlling for loan demand shocks by employing country borrower-time fixed effects. I find
a negative interaction between a country lender’s fraction of dollar liabilities and monetary
policy shocks, suggesting a larger decline in cross-border lending for more dollar funding
exposed country lenders in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. This re-
sult remains robust to adding in leverage and dollar swap pressure and their interactions
with monetary policy as controls, controlling for sectors, and excluding US borrowers and
lenders. Furthermore I show that this effect is primarily relevant for lending to non-bank
private and bank borrowers.
The results of this paper are merely suggestive as a precise empirical analysis of the
international bank lending channel requires micro-data containing bank-firm-loan level in-
formation that would more tightly estimate effects, control for confounding demand effects,
and separate bank- and country-specific factors affecting international lending. In addi-
tion, definitively establishing the causal link between US monetary policy and bank lending
requires an exogenous instrument for monetary shocks, an exercise saved for future work.
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Chapter 3
International Bank Lending and
the October 2016 US Money
Market Fund Reform
3.1 Introduction
One stylized fact in international finance has been the dominant role of the dollar as the
currency of choice for cross-border claims and liabilities. Its omnipresence in international
lending markets leads one to ask what are the relevant implications and potential for in-
ternational spillovers, namely does the outsize role of the dollar cause shocks emanating
from the US to propagate across borders? This paper seeks to answer one dimension of this
question by focusing on the relevance of dollar funding US money market funds and their
potential effects on international bank lending.
Figure 3.1 displays the total cross-border claims of all reporting Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) banks decomposed into currency denomination. A large portion of cross-
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Figure 3.1: Cross-Border Claims by BIS Reporting Banks by Currency Denomination
Notes: This graph displays the total volume of international claims and liabilities in the positive and negative
axes respectively for all BIS reporting banks. The data is sourced from Table 5A of the BIS Locational
Banking Statistics.
border claims are denominated in dollars - approximately $14 trillion out of the $29 trillion
dollars, or about 40%, in outstanding cross-border claims by global banks as of 2017 Q1.
One may posit that the prevalence of the dollar may be a by-product of the size of the US
economy and banking sector. However if we look further and decompose this $14 trillion
of dollar-denominated cross-border claims into US and non-US banks, it is apparent from
Figure 3.2 that the lion share of these claims are in fact extended by non-US banks. In
other words, foreign banks, or what I call global banks, extend the majority of cross-border
dollar credit in the world.
What is the relevance of this stylized fact? To start, we must consider the differences
between US and global banks. At the most primitive level, banks are responsible for taking
on deposits, generally from domestic households or businesses. Hence it is likely that a
bank’s deposit base, its primary source of funding, is mostly denominated in its domestic
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Figure 3.2: Cross-Border Claims by BIS Reporting Banks by Nationality
Notes: This graph displays the total volume of dollar-denominated international claims for all US and
non-US BIS reporting banks. The data is sourced from the BIS Locational Banking Statistics.
currency - for example, German banks have euro deposits and Japanese banks have yen
deposits. Foreign banks may still raise dollar deposits abroad, but note that in the US,
only US banks have insured dollar deposits via the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), while foreign bank dollar deposits are uninsured.1 US banks thus have a stable
source of dollar funding through deposits, whereas the dollar deposits of foreign banks may
be uncertain from a stability standpoint and vulnerable to runs.2
Global banks need not only rely on domestic deposits for dollar funding. Some other
sources include swapping foreign currency into dollars, offshore (Eurodollar) deposits,
dollar-denominated bond issuance, and short-term unsecured borrowing from other banks
1Dollar deposits of foreign banks are secured if obtained through an established subsidiary domiciled in
the United States.
2The intuition is that during bad times, US banks are less likely to undergo a bank run and flighty
deposits a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) because their deposits are insured. Foreign banks on the other
hand appear more vulnerable and risky to depositors who likely will withdraw funds during a crisis.
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or financial institutions. This paper focuses on the latter, namely short-term foreign bank
borrowing from US money market funds, and examines whether a shock to this source
of dollar funding affects their international lending behavior with regards to the currency
composition of their loan portfolio and total volume of dollar-denominated loans.
To answer this question, I focus on the effects of the US money market fund reform
enacted in October 2016. Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought to improve regulation on US money market
funds given the run that occurred following the collapse of Lehman Brothers.3 It targeted
prime funds, namely those responsible for extending short-term dollar credit to domestic
and foreign financial institutions, changing rules regarding the general valuation of and
redemption from these funds during potential liquidity crises. As a result, these funds lost
their attractiveness to investors who subsequently withdrew a large portion of their money,
moving them to funds not subject to the new rules and effectively removing a substantial
source of dollar funding for foreign banks.
I exploit this arguably exogenous shock to dollar funding markets and utilize the cross-
sectional heterogeneity of banks’ reliance on US money market funds prior to the shock to
isolate the effect of a loss of dollar funding on international lending volume and compo-
sition. I find that despite the large magnitude of the loss in dollar funding, the effect on
international syndicated lending is largely ambiguous, leaning more towards a lack of an
effect, suggestive of banks’ ability to substitute for other sources of dollar funding in line
with evidence from the BIS Quarterly Review (2017).
3The Reserve Primary Fund held exposure to Lehman Brothers in commercial paper. Following
Lehman’s bankruptcy in September 2008, these assets became worthless, causing the fund to decrease
its net asset value to 97 cents a share from the standard dollar per share, effectively “breaking the buck,”
one of the first times witnessed in history by a money market fund. Although the losses from Lehman only
accounted for less than 1.5% of the fund’s balance sheet, investors rapidly began withdrawing funds out of
fear. This widespread fear spread to other funds, even those without exposure to Lehman and AIG, thus
providing an example of one of the worst runs in money market funds in history.
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My analysis entails two approaches. The first employs a Bartik instrument in which
I proxy for the exposure or treatment of each bank to the decline in US money market
funding with the pre-reform share of money market funding to total short-term liabilities.
I use the Bartik instrument in two ways: cross-sectionally by examining the pre- and post-
reform lending for each bank and dynamically by utilizing the time series variation from
2011 to 2017 in money market funding to assess whether changes in money market funding
in the previous quarter lead to declines in lending in the following quarter. My results
from the cross-sectional specifications do not provide evidence of a contraction in lending
following the reform, while those from the dynamic specifications are unable to find robustly
significant effects after accounting for global shocks as captured by time fixed effects and
alternate sources of dollar funding.
The second approach also exploits cross-sectional variation, but employs the within
estimator as pioneered by Khwaja and Mian (2008). This approach identifies the effect of
the US money market fund reform on bank lending by controlling for borrower demand
with borrower fixed effects which I employ at the individual borrower and borrower-sector
levels. As with the specifications with the Bartik instrument, I do not find a consistently
significant effect of the decline in dollar funding from US money market funds on lending
volume. I do however find an effect on the prices of loans as I obtain a significant increase
in loan spreads over LIBOR following the reform when controlling for individual borrower
fixed effects. This result however does not hold in the sectoral specifications.
With regards to composition, I do not find evidence of a robustly significant change
in the fraction of dollar-denominated loans relative to all loans before and after the shock
period, as well as over time as identified by the quarterly time series specifications. I
do obtain some significant estimates in the time series that suggest that the fraction of
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dollar-denominated loans increases in both value and quantity contrary to my prior, but
these results do not survive the more well-identified specifications that isolate the loss in
funding from prime funds and control for alternate sources of dollar funding coming from
government funds and dollar bond issuance. Given the findings, I again conclude that the
results lean towards a lack of an effect.
My results thus suggest that the US money market fund reform did not have a significant
impact on foreign bank lending, a surprising result given the magnitude of the loss in dollar
funding. I provide some evidence of substitute sources of dollar funding such as increased
funding from US government money market funds and dollar bond issuance. Banks may
have been able to smooth their dollar funding needs across other dimensions as well such as
obtaining increased offshore dollar deposits, but data limitations prevent me from exploring
this hypothesis. There does not appear to be a significant relationship between dollar
funding from US money market funds and international bank lending, both in volume
and composition, illuminating the fact that perhaps not all dollar funding sources are as
important as expected.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relevant literature. Section
3.3 provides the institutional background behind US money market funds and the October
2016 reform. Section 3.4 describes the data and provides some summary statistics on bank
lending and money market funding. Section 3.5 explains the identification strategy and
empirical methodology. Section 3.6 displays the empirical results. Section 3.7 provides a
discussion of the results. Section 3.8 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to closely examine the implications of
the US money market fund reform with careful treatment of the econometrics and causal
interpretation. There has been previous work examining the linkage between US money
market funds and foreign bank lending, namely Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015).
They focus on the European Sovereign Debt Crisis of 2011-2012 and argue that during this
period US money market funds withdrew their dollar funding to Eurozone banks, which,
in combination with strained swap markets4, lead to a dry-up in dollar funding. They
find that Eurozone banks shifted their lending portfolios away from dollar-denominated
loans and towards euro-denominated loans, and firms that had previously borrowed from
Eurozone banks had a lower probability of obtaining a dollar-denominated loan. Similarly,
Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate (2012) focus on the US subsidiaries of foreign banks, finding
that during the same period foreign banks lost a large portion of time deposits, which they
attribute to US money market funds, and subsequently decreased their dollar-denominated
lending, controlling for sector fixed effects. This paper looks to answer similar questions
through the same channel, but differentiates from the literature by focusing on a more
plausibly exogenous shock5 and carefully estimating the effects on international lending by
exploiting bank-level exposure to US money market funds.
This paper in essence examines the effect of a liquidity shock on bank lending. In par-
ticular, I employ the Khwaja and Mian (2008) within-firm estimator in a few specifications
to isolate the effect of the shock on credit supply by controlling for borrower demand. Re-
4If swap markets are frictionless, the cost of swapping foreign currency into dollars should equal the cost
of borrowing directly in dollars
5Eurozone banks could have cut back lending due to other concerns revolving around the European
Sovereign Debt Crisis.
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lated papers include Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Schnabl (2012) who find that shocks
from abroad may transmit across borders into lending through global banks. I focus on a
similar mechanism of liquidity shocks affecting international bank lending, but with partic-
ular emphasis on the role of the dollar and its related funding markets. Acharya, Afonso,
and Kovner (2017) find that foreign banks differentially lost dollar funding relative to US
banks during the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007, and as a result passed on
higher interest rates through their dollar-denominated loans. I examine this notion, but
with respect to the decline in dollar liquidity attributed to money market funds.
There also exists a literature on money market funds with regards to their role as lenders
and susceptibility to runs. Most closely related is Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) who
find that money market funds exposed to Eurozone banks experienced large outflows during
the Euro crisis of 2011 which lead to a decline in short-term financing for borrowers heavily
reliant on such funds. This paper builds upon this notion, looking at the effects of the
decline in short-term financing on loans extended by these lenders. Schmidt et al. (2016)
examine the money market fund run following the Lehman bankruptcy, noting that more
sophisticated investors, namely institutional as opposed to retail investors, withdrew funds
much faster, providing support for imposing fees and gates on redemptions from certain
types of money market funds. Kaperczyk and Schnabl (2013) also look at the Lehman run,
instead shedding light on the risk-taking behavior of money market funds that lead to runs
in bad times. The money market fund reform was not a run as in the previous episodes
studied in the literature, but bears similarities in the sense of fund outflows and a decline
in short-term debt financing for banks.
Lastly, given the alternative sources of dollar funding, this paper broadly relates to
the literature on relating deviations in the covered interest parity (CIP) to dollar funding
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markets and lending. Traditionally, if the CIP held, banks could frictionlessly substitute
for dollar funding by borrowing in domestic currency and swapping into dollars. However
turbulence in dollar funding markets can spill over to swap markets, leading to deviations in
CIP as was observed in the second half of 2007 (Baba, Packer, and Nagano (2008), Coffey,
Hrung, and Sarkar (2009)), and more recently researchers have found a relationship among
deviations in CIP, cross-border bank lending, and the strength of the US dollar (Avdjiev
et al. 2017). Deviations in the CIP since the Global Financial Crisis have been identified
by Du et al. (2016) and Rime et al. (2017), with authors arguing for the role of limited
risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs to eliminate the mispricing. This paper takes the
deviations in CIP as given, assuming that banks may find it more costly to finance dollar
lending via swap markets, and are thus more sensitive to shocks to dollar funding markets
as in the model in Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015).
3.3 US Money Market Funds and the October 2016 Reform
Money market funds are mutual funds that invest in relatively safe, short-term debt secu-
rities. They serve as liquid investments that provide potentially higher returns than cash
equivalents as they mainly hold government securities and commercial paper. This paper
focuses on prime funds, namely those that invest in the commercial paper and certificates
of deposits of financial institutions, and to a lesser extent, government funds which hold
US treasuries, agency debt, and the related repurchase agreements (repos).
Investors purchase shares of the fund, which conventionally are priced at a net asset
value (NAV) of $1 per share, and receive dividends for holding this share. Up until October
2016, money market funds maintained stable NAV’s of $1, with a recent exception being
the Reserve fund following the Lehman collapse in October 2008, leading the fund to “break
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Figure 3.3: Total Assets of US Prime Money Market Funds
the buck” as its NAV declined to less than $1.
US prime money market funds are of particular relevance as they provide short-term
liquidity to both US and foreign financial institutions. Banks may issue certificates of
deposits or commercial paper, or engage in repo transactions with these money market
funds, providing them short-term dollar funding to be paid back and generally rolled over
maturities of less than a year. Figure 3.3 displays the total assets of all US prime money
market funds. These funds held a quantitatively large amount of short-term bank liabilities
at approximately $1.8 trillion from 2011 to 2015. Focusing only on foreign counter-parties
in Figure 3.4, observe that prime funds provided $1.1 trillion of dollar funding to foreign
banks, which presumably was used to finance dollar-denominated loans or assets.
The October 2016 money market fund reform was adopted on July 23rd, 2014 to address
the risk of investor runs on money market funds. The reform re-classified prime funds into
institutional and retail prime funds, distinguished by the type of investor in the funds, and
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Figure 3.4: US Money Market Funding to Non-US Banks
Notes: Data come from Money Market Fund Monitor from the US Office of Financial Research.
enacted rules on the institutional prime funds in order to provide safeguarding measures
in the case of a future run. In particular, institutional prime funds were required to have
a daily floating NAV based on the current market value of their portfolio as opposed to
the stable $1 NAV typical in money market funds prior in order to allow share prices to
more accurately track the market values and dis-incentivize investors from withdrawing
their money during bad times.
The reform also introduced new rules on liquidity fees and redemption gates to further
discourage and prevent runs. The liquidity fees impose a fee of up to two percent on all
redemptions if a money market fund’s level of “weekly liquid assets” falls below 30% of
total assets, and a minimum fee of one percent if weekly liquid assets fall below 10% of
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total assets.6 This rule in effect allows fund managers to impose a discretionary fee during
particularly bad times to dis-incentivize investors from withdrawing funds. In the case that
this fails, fund managers can also impose a gate on redemptions, preventing investors from
withdrawing funds for up to 10 business days if the fund’s level of weekly liquid assets falls
below 30%.
All in all, the reform reduced the general safety and attractiveness of institutional prime
funds by potentially removing liquidity benefits during bad times. Investors responded by
withdrawing an enormous amount of funds, with outflows starting in late 2015. As shown in
Figure 3.3, total assets of prime funds dropped from $1.8 trillion to $700 billion by October
2016, when the reform was officially enacted. Foreign banks in particular lost approximately
$500 billion in funding, which was not offset by the corresponding increase in funding of
about $200 billion from government funds as displayed in Figure 3.4.
I thus use this gradual, yet precipitous drop in funding from institutional prime funds
as the shock to the dollar funding of foreign banks. The decline appears quantitatively
large at first glance as banks lost over 50% of their prior funding in aggregate. I provide
a rough measure of how relevant this shock was for foreign banks in relation to the size of
their balance sheets, but first introduce the data.
3.4 Data
The dataset comes from a few sources: the Office of Financial Research’s Money Market
Fund Monitor, Thomson Reuters Dealscan, Orbis BankFocus, and Datastream.
The main source of heterogeneity stems from foreign banks’ exposures or prior reliance
6“Weekly liquid assets” refer to cash or government securities with remaining maturities of less than 60
days and securities that may be liquidated into cash within a week.
119
on US money market funds. The Office of Financial Research (OFR) provides the U.S.
Money Market Fund Monitor which tracks the investment portfolios of all U.S. money mar-
ket funds, disaggregated into specific fund, fund type, borrower, and type of instrument at
the monthly frequency from January 2011. For each bank, I observe the type of instrument
that each specific type of fund holds, e.g. the amount of commercial paper or certificates of
deposits issued by Deutsche Bank held by all prime funds. I aggregate these instruments
by summing at the bank level to obtain the bank-specific level of money market funding,
split into prime and government funds.
The data from the OFR lists banks at the bank-holding company level, so I match
this data with quarterly and annual bank-holding company level balance sheet data from
Orbis BankFocus. I assume that balance sheet variables are constant in a given quarter
and construct scaled money market fund exposures by dividing the level of money market
funding from the OFR data by the total amount of short-term liabilities of a given bank.
Given the ultimate interest in effects on bank lending, I merge the bank money market
fund exposures and balance sheet variables with the syndicated loan data from Thomson
Reuters Dealscan. Dealscan provides origination data on international syndicated loans,
namely those with multiple lenders, and one can observe the total loan amount, borrower,
currency denomination, and in some cases the spread charged over LIBOR. One issue is
that many of the loan observations do not include the share that each lender contributed,
so I extend the sample following Chodorow-Reich’s (2014) imputation method7 in order
to more accurately ascribe the amount of credit extended by each lender in a syndicate.
7I assume that syndicates with similar structures have similar compositions of loan amounts. For example
if I observe that syndicates with 1 lead arranger and 1 participants split the loan amount by 60% and 40%,
I assume that all syndicates of with this structure have the same composition. In general, I take the shares
to be the mean loan amount share for either the lead arrangers or participants over all loans of the same
syndicate structure. My results remain robust to utilizing the original, non-imputed data.
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Furthermore, I attribute loans at the bank-holding company level, e.g. loans extended by
subsidiaries of HSBC in other countries will still be attributed to HSBC.
Lastly, I obtain data on dollar bond issuance at the bank-holding company level from
Datastream. For each bank-holding company I aggregate the amount of dollar bond issuance
at the quarterly level to obtain the time-varying bank-specific level of dollar funding from
bond markets.
My dataset manifests into two forms. First, I have a quarterly panel of banks with
the aggregate amount and fraction of dollar-denominated loans matched with their scaled
money market fund exposure. Second, I have a cross-section of bank-firms where I observe
the last loan extended before my shock period, which I describe in the following section,
and the first loan extended after, matched with the change in the bank’s money market
fund exposure over the same time period.
Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 provides preliminary summary statistics for the dataset. The quarterly average of
total US money market funding is about $15 billion per bank, going as high as $145 billion.
As described previously, most of this comes from prime money market funds, who provide
$12.7 billion on average to each bank, with government funds providing the remaining $3
billion.
Taking into account now the size of the bank, I scale the money market fund exposures
by the liabilities and short-term deposits of each bank to get a better sense of the relative
exposures of each bank. On average, US money market funding accounts for 3.9% of
liabilities, but note that this number understates the relevance as I am only interested in
dollar-denominated liabilities, whereas the denominator includes all currency liabilities. As
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expected, the bulk of this fraction comes from prime funds at 3.5% of liabilities.
Looking at quarterly changes in funding, I observe a mean drop of $297 million per
quarter overall, with a $443 million quarterly decline in prime funding. This is skewed
towards zero by the more numerous quarters in which money market funding barely changed
and thus seems small relative to the total amount of funding for each bank. However if
we take the mean over the reform period from November 2015 to October 2016, I obtain
a mean quarterly drop of $1.3 billion in funding. A more precise measure of the drop in
money market funding will come shortly.
Summarizing the loan data, I observe an average loan size from a given bank of $62.6
million with a spread of 232 basis points over LIBOR and maturity of 56 months. The
average dollar loan size is a bit larger at $77.8 million per loan, but with similar spread and
maturity of 231 basis points and 55 months, respectively. Lastly, looking at the number
of loan originations, I see that on average each bank extends 121 loans, with 56, or 45%,
of those loans being dollar-denominated. Note the heterogeneity however as the standard
deviation in loan amount and number are both quite large, suggesting that some banks are
much larger and extend many loans relative to the average bank in the sample.
I now examine the cross-section directly around the shock period, namely the difference
between the quarter before November 2015 and quarter after October 2016, in Table 3.2.
The average bank lost $8.3 billion in dollar funding from US prime funds, which after
accounting for an increase in funds from government funds, netted to a mean loss of $5.2
billion in funding. It is important to note however that some banks actually increased
their dollar funding during this period, as I observe a maximum increase of $35.8 billion
in money market funding over the period, attributed to BNP Paribas, or Deutsche Bank,
which saw an increase of $20 billion. These banks are examples in which government funding
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Table 3.1: Quarterly Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max Median
Total MMF 5079 15.768 21.505 0.000 145.229 4.144
Prime MMF 5079 12.758 16.628 0.000 88.725 3.660
Gov MMF 5079 3.009 7.768 0.000 93.567 0.000
Total MMF Scaled 5079 0.039 0.049 0.000 0.377 0.020
Prime MMF Scaled 5079 0.034 0.045 0.000 0.377 0.017
Gov MMF Scaled 5079 0.005 0.012 0.000 0.215 0.000
Total 1719 -0.297 3.884 -43.021 23.717 0.000
Prime 1719 -0.443 3.391 -32.172 12.584 0.000
Gov 1719 0.146 1.822 -18.578 24.593 0.000
Loan Amount 218658 62.586 132.601 0.000 12500.000 31.553
Spread 104819 232.660 153.940 1.000 4645.000 195.000
Maturity 214924 56.666 40.528 0.000 725.000 60.000
Dollar Loan 95887 77.846 150.359 0.000 12500.000 41.577
Dollar Spread 70334 231.460 148.857 1.000 1450.000 187.500
Dollar Maturity 94195 54.989 30.754 0.000 721.000 60.000
Quarterly No. Loans 1799 121.549 170.632 1.000 1722.000 56.000
Quarterly No. $ Loans 1716 55.879 75.075 1.000 434.000 20.000
Fraction $ Loans 1716 0.450 0.253 0.018 1.000 0.413
increased substantially during this period, which either counteracted and even superceded
the previous reliance on prime funding.
The average decline in US money market funding to liabilities is 1.5%, which is a little
less than half the pre-reform average of 3.9%, while the ratio of prime funding to liabilities
dropped by 2.1%. Government funding increased by .6% on average, which was not enough
to cover the decline in funding for most banks, bar a few exceptions that were previously
mentioned. Lastly, contrary to our priors, there was average loan growth rather than decline
in the quarter before and after the period as the median is 5.4%.
3.5 Identification
As with most of the empirical bank lending literature, I focus on the effect of credit supply
rather than credit demand shocks. In order to argue for causality, I require a plausibly
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Table 3.2: Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max Median
MMF 72 -5.203 11.298 -46.045 35.853 -1.616
Prime 72 -8.317 11.873 -52.282 2.766 -1.650
Gov 72 3.113 7.545 -0.165 39.308 0.000
MMFScaled 72 -0.015 0.036 -0.123 0.188 -0.008
PrimeScaled 72 -0.021 0.028 -0.123 0.018 -0.013
GovScaled 72 0.006 0.023 -0.000 0.186 0.000
MMF/Liabilities 73 0.035 0.041 0.000 0.176 0.023
Loans 67 0.944 5.848 -1.000 47.375 0.054
exogenous shock to banks that leads to a decrease in their dollar funding that did not
simultaneously cause them to contract their supply of loans for other reasons, such as
current business cycle conditions or sentiment, and/or affect their borrowers’ demand for
loans.
I approach this by exploiting the heterogeneity across banks in exposure to US money
market funds. Under the assumption that the reform was exogenous to the lending period
in question in the sense that it was not motivated by contemporaneous events, a plausible
notion given that it was agreed upon well in advance in 2014, examining the differences
across banks contingent on their relative reliances on dollar funding from US prime funds
provides a more convincing estimate of what I call the “US dollar funding channel.” The
general idea is that examining the cross-section of bank lending should shed light upon how
international bank lending is affected by dry-ups in dollar liquidity.
I employ two approaches to identification. The first comprises of cross-sectional regres-
sions that exploit the heterogeneity of banks’ exposures to money market funds by utilizing
a Bartik instrument, namely I construct an instrument using the exogenous variation in pre-
reform exposure to money market funds that isolates the decline in money market dollar
funding due solely to the reform itself. I use this instrument as my treatment variable and
examine its effects at both the cross-sectional and time series dimensions on international
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bank lending around the US money market fund reform and the period from 2011 to 2017.
The second approach should be familiar to consumers of the empirical bank liquidity
literature as I employ the Khwaja and Mian (2008) within firm estimator. This identification
strategy is built upon the availability of bank-firm matched loan level data where one can
observe borrowers who have multiple bank lenders. The idea is that with bank-firm pairs,
one can control for firm-borrower fixed effects in order to control for credit demand, and
effectively estimate the change in loans extended to a given firm contingent on their lenders’
exposures to the shock. This exercise more clearly isolates the effects of credit supply on
firm-specific lending, but the first approach serves to elucidate how the reform affected the
composition of lending with regards to currency choice.
Cross-sectional Regressions with Bartik Instrument
The Bartik instrument is constructed under the assumption that the cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in banks’ reliance on US money market funds is uncorrelated to both the reform
and any other phenomena that may affect bank lending during the period in question. As is
required by any instrumental variables approach, I require a strong first stage, namely that
banks have heterogeneous exposures to US money market funds and thus to the reform itself
contingent on their pre-exposure, banks’ pre-reform exposures significantly correlate with
their relative losses in prime funding, and the exclusion restriction must be satisfied. The
exclusion restriction requires that the money market reform does not affect international
bank lending aside from its effect on banks’ dollar funding from US prime funds.
I construct my instrument as follows. I compute each bank’s scaled money market fund
exposure, b, as the average fraction of total US money market funding to total deposits and
short-term liabilities in 2015 between January and September. I exclude the latter months
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of the year as the treatment period begins in October 2015. Note that this will understate
bank exposure to money market funds as the denominator contains liabilities denominated






For the first stage, I regress each bank’s change in money market funding, MMFb,
between October 2015 to October 2016 on b. Note that I do not multiply by the aggregate
change in money market funding as it would be equivalent to multiplying the exposure by
a constant, given that there is only cross-sectional heterogeneity in the pre-reform shares,
not the aggregate shock. All this changes is the sign of coefficient as the interpretation has
changed, but results are consistent in either specification.
MMFb = b + b (3.2)
For the second stage, I regress the percentage change in dollar-denominated loans ex-
tended by bank b, %Lb, or other dependent variables of interest such as loans in all
currencies, fraction of dollar-denominated loans, and other forms of dollar funding, in the
quarter before and after the shock period, which I define as November 2015 to October
2016, on the fitted first stage,  ^MMF b:
%Lb =  ^MMF b + b (3.3)
If the first stage is strong, namely the heterogeneity of each bank’s change in money
market funding is correlated with their pre-reform exposures, and we assume that the
126
money market fund reform only affected bank lending through the change in each bank’s
supply of dollars from money market funds,  identifies the relevance of the “US dollar
funding channel,” or the effect of changes in dollar funding from US money market funds
on international dollar bank lending.
The intuition behind the Bartik instrument is that in the first stage I am isolating
variation in the change in money market funding for a given bank due to their exogenous
exposure before the shock occurred. We are fixing the size of the treatment of the decline in
money market funding for a given bank due to the reform and examining how much of the
measured decline is predicted by its pre-reform exposure. Given that I am utilizing the fitted
value of the change in a bank’s money market funding in the second stage, I am effectively
examining the effect of the change of money market funding on bank lending due solely to
exposure to the aggregate shock, or treatment. If we believe the exclusion restriction, then
I have identified an instrument that allows us to identify the causal relationship between a
bank’s US money market dollar funding and its syndicated lending.
Time Series Regressions with Bartik Instrument
The previous exercise by construction is limited by the number of banks in the sample and
estimates thus may be subject to low power. I maneuver around this by exploiting the time
dimension of my panel, looking instead at quarterly changes in both money market funding
and lending across my entire sample from 2011-2017.
Similar to the cross-sectional regressions, I rely on the exogeneity of each bank’s scaled
exposure to dollar funding from US money market funds. The difference is that I construct
the Bartik instrument by multiplying this exogenous share, b, taken as the mean of scaled
money market funding from 2011 to 2015, with the aggregate quarterly change in money
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market funding, MMFt. Formally the first stage is now:
MMFb;t = b + b MMFt + b;t (3.4)
where I have now included bank fixed effects, b, and my instrument now includes the
aggregate change in money market funding. The Bartik instrument works to isolate the
change in bank-specific money market funding attributed to the aggregate decline holding
fixed the exposure.
The second stage is now:
Lb;t = b +  ^MMF b;t 1 + b;t (3.5)
The coefficient  then measures the effect of a quarterly decline in money market fund-
ing on quarterly loan growth in the following quarter, controlling for unobservable bank
characteristics via the bank fixed effects. The time series dimension in effect utilizes in-
formation both from periods in which money market funding did not change by much and
treatment periods in order to estimate whether loan growth was statistically different in the
latter. Finding a significant  would then suggest that loan growth is affected by changes
in dollar money market funding.
However, it could also be the case that there are other shocks occurring in quarters where
money market funding is falling that are unrelated to US money markets funds specifically,
such as a decline in sentiments. In this case we may mistakenly attribute the effect of the
sentiments on lending growth to money market funds when we in fact just have an omitted
variables problem.
One specification that may alleviate this potential issue introduces time fixed effects
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into the first and second stages:
MMFb;t = b + t + b MMFt + b;t (3.6)
Lb;t = b + t +  ^MMF b;t 1 + b;t (3.7)
We now control for unobservable shocks that occur in quarter t, thus isolating shocks
to money market funding. However note that we potentially could have a collinearity issue
in the sense that because the money market fund reform was an aggregate shock from 2015
Q4 to 2016 Q3, any variation induced by the reform could be absorbed or dampened by
the time fixed effects. Formally this is not an issue because the Bartik instrument is bank-
quarter specific, but because the bank-specific part of the instrument is unchanging over
time, the only source of variation is the aggregate change in money market funding, which
could remove some statistical significance by “splitting” the effect between the fixed effects
and coefficient of interest.
In addition to the inclusion of time fixed effects, for robustness I also construct the
Bartik instrument and the first stage using changes in prime money market funding rather
than total US money market funding. Because prime funds were specifically affected by the
reform, these specifications should more cleanly identify the effect of the reform, as well as
capture any potential relationship between foreign bank lending and dollar money market
funding. Furthermore in these specifications I can control for alternate sources of dollar
funding such as US government money market funds and dollar bond issuance without
concern for collinearity due to the decomposition of money market funding, allowing for a
more careful treatment of omitted variable bias.
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Within-Firm Estimator
The within-firm estimator looks to control for credit demand shocks and isolate the effect
of credit supply shocks on bank lending. It accomplishes this by controlling for borrower
fixed effects, which removes the average in loan demand for a given borrower across all
lenders. The remaining regressor is then the lender exposure to the shock, which yields
the within-firm estimator, or the effect of the shock on the outcome variable in question
contingent on a lender’s exposure to the shock.
I examine the following specification:
Lb;f = f + MMFb + b;f (3.8)
where Lb;f is the change in loans extended by bank b to firm f , f is a firm fixed
effect, and MMFb is the lender’s change in money market funding. Differences are taken
as the first loan extended by bank b to firm f after October 2016 and the last loan extended
before November 2015.
The main identifying assumption is that firms demand the same types of loans from
all banks, namely there are not bank-firm specific interactions that would otherwise not be
captured in the regression. If this were the case, we may still have an unobserved variable
in the residual that could be correlated with the change in lender money market funding
that would confound our estimates.
I also explore a specification that looks at bank-industry pairs, similar to Correa,
Sapriza, and Zlate (2012), in order to exploit a larger portion of my loan data. I apply
this approach because it may be unlikely that a firm will have obtained a new loan after
October 2016 if it obtained one between 2012-2016 given the average loan maturity of 5
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years. Without a pre- and post bank-firm loan observation, I cannot employ the within-firm
estimator, which significantly reduces my sample. However under the assumption that firms
in the same industry demand the same types of loans across banks and their loan demand
responds homogeneously to shocks, examining the difference between loans extended by a
bank to an industry before and after the shock may also identify the effect of a decline in
money market funding on bank lending.
Specifically I take the difference between the mean of loans extended by bank b to a
given industry s before and after the shock, Lb;s, and again regress it on the bank-specific
change in money market funding, controlling now for industry fixed effects, s. Formally:
Lb;s = s + MMFb + b;s (3.9)
The coefficient  thus informs the change in total loans extended to a given sector
contingent on a bank-lender’s change in money market funding.
I have presented a variety of specifications that I employ to explore the relevance of
US money market funding for foreign bank lending. I approach the problem in a number
of ways using a Bartik instrument and the within-firm estimator in order to thoroughly
examine this relationship. I proceed now to discuss the results.
3.6 Results
This section presents the empirical results from the specifications described in the previous
section. The results are split into the cross-sectional and time-series Bartik regressions, and
within-firm and industry estimates.
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Table 3.3: Cross-Sectional Bartik Instrument
MMFPrimeb Lb MMFGovb BondIssuanceb
First Stage Second Stage





MMFPrimeb 0.877 3.346  8.090
(2.737) (3.500) (51.775)
Constant 0.001 0.132 0.000  3.610
(0.001) (2.633) (3.376) (49.945)
Observations 72 67 72 72
R2 0.930 0.002 0.013 0.0003
F Statistic 924.759 0.103 0.914 0.024
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: In column (1), the dependent variable is the change in average prime money market funding for bank
b between in the quarter before November 2015 and quarter after October 2015, while the instrument is
the average fraction of money market funding to short-term liabilities and deposits for bank b in the first 9
months of 2015. Columns (2)-(4) show the second stage estimates of change in the sum of dollar-denominated
loans, average government funding, and sum of dollar-denominated bond issuance in the quarters before and
after November 2015 - October 2016 on the instrumented change in prime money market funding.
Cross-Section Bartik
The first set of results pertains to the cross-sectional regressions with the Bartik instrument
as discussed in Section 3.5. In column (1) of Table 3.3, I obtain a strong first stage,
namely the bank’s pre-reform ratio of money market funding to total deposits and short-
term liabilities strongly predicts its loss in prime funding. My estimates indicate that a
10% larger ratio indicates a decline of $65.6 million in funding from prime money market
funds with an F-statistic well above the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10. Intuitively this
suggests that banks with larger reliance on dollar funding from US money market funds as
a percentage of short-term liabilities experienced larger drops in the level of dollar funding
due to the reform.
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For the second stage, I regress the percentage change in loans in the quarter before and
after the shock period on the fitted value of the change in prime funding from the first
stage. Results are displayed in column (2), which do not yield a significant effect from the
loss in prime funding on loans. I find that despite the large decline in dollar funding to
foreign banks, they did not reduce their dollar lending, contrary to what one would expect
if dollar funding from US money market funds mattered.
The lack of a statistically significant effect on lending leads to the question of what
may have prevented the transmission of decreased dollar funding to dollar lending. One
potential avenue, outlined by the BIS (2017), is that foreign banks may have accessed other
sources of dollar funding to substitute for the decline in funding from US money market
funds. For example, according to the BIS (2017), Canadian banks increased their dollar
bond issuance, while Japanese banks saw an increase in offshore dollar deposits. If banks
could easily substitute for dollar funding from these alternate sources, it becomes easier to
reconcile the lack of an effect on dollar lending.
To test for this effect, I utilize the same first stage and change my outcome variable
to observable potential sources of alternate dollar funding, namely US government money
market funds and dollar bond issuance. The former reflects the fact that some of the dollars
that left prime funds flowed into government funds, some of which engaged in repo trans-
actions with foreign banks, providing one source of substitute short-term dollar funding.
The latter draws upon the anecdotal evidence about Canadian banks, which could have
also occurred at other foreign banks.
Columns (3) and (4) display the second stage of the regressions with the change in
government fund funding and bond issuance in the quarter prior and following the shock
period. I again obtain no significant estimates, suggesting that either there was not a uni-
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form response to the reform, unobservable sources of dollar funding such as offshore deposits
were more important for supporting lending, or another unobservable factor supported bank
lending.
The previous results on loan growth only pertained to the total amount of dollar-
denominated credit extended by foreign banks. I also look at how the reform may have
impacted the composition of bank lending with regards to the fraction of dollar-denominated
loans to all loans. Table 3.4 displays the second stage results from these analogue regressions,
examining the potential effects on total loan growth and fraction of dollar-denominated
loans in both number of loans and loan amounts.
As before, I do not obtain significant estimates of an effect of a decline in dollar funding
from prime funds on loan growth or composition. Column (2) examines the effect on loans
denominated in all currencies, including the dollar, finding a negative albeit insignificant
coefficient. One could interpret this as an increase in loan supply in other currencies which
may be larger than the contraction in dollar-denominated loans, thus expanding the total
loan supply, but the coefficient is insignificant. Columns (4) and (5) display estimates of
the effects on the change in number of dollar-denominated and total loans, finding positive
coefficients that are in line with priors, but highly insignificant. Columns (3) and (6) display
the effects on the change in fraction of dollar-denominated loans to all loans in both amount
and number, which again yields insignificant estimates.
Time Series Bartik
Given that the cross-sectional sample has only 72 observations at most, namely the number
of banks with finite loan growth, the lack of significant estimates could be attributed to low
power. One way to get around this is to exploit the time series dimension of the data and
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Table 3.4: Cross-Sectional Regressions on Lending Composition
%Loans$ %Loansall DollarLoansLoans #Loans$ #Loansall 
#Loans$
#Loansall
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MMFPrimeb 0.877  0.606 0.202 4.815 1.854 0.149
(2.737) (0.403) (0.132) (8.280) (20.973) (0.115)
Constant 0.132 0.687  0.209 0.200 7.400  0.174
(2.633) (0.389) (0.127) (7.987) (20.232) (0.110)
Observations 67 72 72 72 72 72
R2 0.002 0.031 0.033 0.005 0.0001 0.024
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: This table displays the second stage regressions of the percentage change in dollar-denominated loans,
all currency denominated, change in fraction of amount of dollar-denominated loans to all loans, change in
number of dollar-denominated loans, change in total number of loans, and change in fraction of number of
loans where the changes are taken as the percentage changes or differences of the sum of loans in the quarter
before and after the treatment period.
instead look at quarterly changes in lending. Because the drop in money market funding
occurred over the course of a year rather than sharply in one instance, one could argue that
looking for persistent quarterly changes during the shock period provides a better estimate
of any effects.
I alter the previous regression by adding the time dimension, namely in the first stage
I regress the quarterly change in prime money market funding to bank b on its pre-shock
ratio of money market funding times the aggregate change in money market funding in the
same quarter. The second stage then regresses the quarterly change in lending for bank b
on the lagged fitted value of the change in funding from prime money market funds from
the first stage.
The first stage results are displayed in Table 3.5. By exploiting the time dimension, I
drastically increase the sample size. By including more time periods, including quarters that
were not the shock period, I can better estimate whether the changes in lending differed
from normal periods, contingent on the actual changes in money market funding during
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Table 3.5: First Stage of Time Series Bartik Instrument
No Euro Crisis All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
b MMFt 0.260 0.229 0.245 0.206
(0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041)
b MMFPrimet 0.076 0.047 0.068 0.037
(0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.028)
MMFGovb;t+1  0.329  0.230  0.226  0.139
(0.134) (0.118) (0.108) (0.092)
Bondb;t+1  0.073  0.052  0.069  0.047
(0.042) (0.049) (0.041) (0.049)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722
R2 0.087 0.044 0.060 0.024 0.060 0.027 0.029 0.009
F Statistic 128.753 61.262 28.463 10.616 104.300 45.160 16.512 4.720
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the quarterly change in prime money market funding for
bank b. The first four columns reflect the sample from January 2011 Q1 - 2017 Q1, excluding May 2011
- June 2012, while columns (5)-(8) contain the entire sample. Columns (3), (4), (7), (8) control for next
quarter’s change in government money market funding and bond issuance as the dependent variables in the
second stage will be in the quarter ahead, e.g. regressions are on previous quarter change in money market
funding. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
each period. I estimate on two samples, one excluding the Euro crisis between May 2011 -
June 2012, and one including it, with the goal of observing whether including an additional
treatment period provides similar and robust results. In the baseline first stage regressions
with no controls, I observe a significant and strong first stage in both samples, robust to
the inclusion of time fixed effects as displayed in columns (1), (2), (6), and (7).
Controlling now for contemporaneous sources of substitute funding, namely the change
in funding from government funds and bond issuances in the current quarter, I again find
a significant first stage as indicated in columns (3) and (7). Furthermore I observe the
significance of government and bond funding, suggesting a negative correlation between
substitute sources of funding and prime funding. Intuitively, an increase in government
or bond funding is associated with a decline in prime funding in the previous quarter,
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Table 3.6: Quarterly Change in Lending in Dollars
No Euro Crisis All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MMFb;t 1 0.101  0.116 0.125  0.143
(0.035) (0.125) (0.048) (0.132)
MMFPrimeb;t 1  0.048 0.690  0.135 0.636
(0.089) (0.512) (0.132) (0.663)
MMFGovb;t  0.021 0.178  0.050 0.092
(0.035) (0.142) (0.047) (0.112)
Bondb;t  0.012 0.042  0.017 0.039
(0.012) (0.037) (0.017) (0.040)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722
R2 0.0001 0.00001 0.0001 0.00000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the quarterly change in dollar-denominated loans for bank
b regressed on the instrumented previous quarter change in total money market funding in columns (1), (2),
(5), (6), and only prime money market funding in columns (3), (4), (7), (8). The first four columns reflect
the sample from January 2011 Q1 - 2017 Q1, excluding May 2011 - June 2012, while columns (5)-(8) contain
the entire sample. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
suggestive of substitution effects. Note however that this is merely correlational and will be
explicitly examined shortly. Furthermore in the full specification with time fixed effects and
controls in columns (4) and (8), I lose significance of the Bartik instrument. This however
could be due to collinearity as was described in Section 3.5.
Moving now to the second stage, I first examine the quarterly change in dollar-
denominated lending in Table 3.6. In the baseline regressions with no controls or time
fixed effects, I obtain a positive and significant effect of money market funding on dollar
loan growth, namely a $100 million decline in money market funding in the previous quarter
lead to a 1% reduction in dollar-denominated loans in the current quarter. The magnitude
slightly increases to 1.25% when including the Eurozone crisis as displayed in column (5).
Note however that this estimate is not robust to including time fixed effects or controls.
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In the purest interpretation, the time fixed effects remove any common time series variation,
attributed to common global shocks or conditions in a given quarter. It is important to keep
in mind that the money market fund reform could be considered an aggregate shock in the
sense that all banks lost funding for the same reason, so the fixed effects may actually be
slightly collinear with the change in funding, absorbing some of the statistical significance.
On the other hand, the fact that the effects dissipate upon inclusion of other substitute
sources of dollar funding as displayed in columns (3) and (7) provides further evidence
against a significant effect of the reform on lending. By controlling for dollar funding from
government funds and increased dollar bond issuance, the specification isolates the effect
of a loss of dollar funding specifically from prime money market funds, whereas the prior
specifications may have been subject to omitted variables bias. Given that including time
fixed effects and/or alternate sources of dollar funding eliminates the statistical significance
of the effect of dollar money market funding on loan growth, this suggests that substitute
sources of dollar funding temper the effects of declines in money market funding.
Expanding our dependent variable now to lending in all currencies, I search for a dif-
ferential effect contingent on currency denomination. Table 3.7 displays the second stage
regressions of quarterly changes in loans of all currencies on changes in money market
funding to examine whether a decline in dollar funding could have lead to contractions or
expansions of lending in currencies not limited to the dollar. Surprisingly I find a signifi-
cantly positive effect in the baseline regressions in columns (1) and (5), with a declines of
1.11% and 1.16% of all loans for a $100 million decline in money market funding for the
sample excluding and including the Euro crisis, respectively. This is robust to the inclusion
of time fixed effects as shown in columns (2) and (6), which shrinks the magnitude of the
effect in half to .68% and .74% per $100 million decline, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Quarterly Change in Lending in All Currencies
No Euro Crisis All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MMFb;t 1 0.111 0.068 0.116 0.074
(0.020) (0.037) (0.029) (0.035)
MMFPrimeb;t 1 0.126 0.473 0.145 0.604
(0.153) (0.452) (0.218) (0.838)
MMFGovb;t 0.020  0.023  0.0004  0.116
(0.017) (0.055) (0.022) (0.199)
Bondb;t 0.012 0.026 0.011 0.026
(0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.034)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722
R2 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0002
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the quarterly change in all loans for bank b regressed on
the instrumented previous quarter change in total money market funding in columns (1), (2), (5), (6), and
only prime money market funding in columns (3), (4), (7), (8). The first four columns reflect the sample
from January 2011 Q1 - 2017 Q1, excluding May 2011 - June 2012, while columns (5)-(8) contain the entire
sample. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
These results however are not robust to the inclusion of controls as indicated in columns
(3), (4), (7), and (8), further supporting the notion that any effects on lending are mitigated
by other dollar funding sources. The results here thus show that alternate sources of dollar
funding can also insulate spillovers to lending in all currencies, not just dollars.
Next I examine the effect on the currency composition of each bank’s loan portfolio by
looking at the change in the fraction of the total amount and number of dollar-denominated
loans to all loans for a given bank in each quarter. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 display my results,
which suggest marginally significant negative relationships between money market funding
and the currency composition banks’ loan portfolios, although the magnitudes are quite
small and not robust to the inclusion of controls. We obtain similar results with loan
amounts and loan counts, namely an increase of .05% in dollar-denominated loans relative
139
Table 3.8: Quarterly Change in Fraction of Dollar-Denominated Loans
No Euro Crisis All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MMFb;t 1  0.005  0.015  0.006  0.019
(0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
MMFPrimeb;t 1  0.005 0.020  0.005 0.033
(0.005) (0.016) (0.012) (0.031)
MMFGovb;t  0.003 0.003  0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Bondb;t  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722
R2 0.00003 0.00000 0.0001 0.00002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.00000
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the quarterly change in the fraction of dollar-denominated
loans in amount for bank b regressed on the instrumented previous quarter change in total money market
funding in columns (1), (2), (5), (6), and only prime money market funding in columns (3), (4), (7), (8).
The first four columns reflect the sample from January 2011 Q1 - 2017 Q1, excluding May 2011 - June 2012,
while columns (5)-(8) contain the entire sample. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
to all loans in the baseline that increases to .15% upon inclusion of time fixed effects for a
$100 million quarterly decline in money market funding.
Prior work by Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein (2015) shows that banks shift the currency
composition away from dollar-denominated lending towards other currencies. The money
market fund reform period may have been associated with an increase in fraction of dollar-
denominated lending, contrary to the decline I would expect given that a decline in dollar
funding should lead to a decline in lending in that same currency, as was observed in the
Eurozone crisis. The results here thus mildly support Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein’s
(2015) findings as the positive effect is nullified by the negative effect observed in the
Eurozone crisis period.
Lastly I examine whether lagged quarterly declines in prime money market funding
lead to substitute increases in dollar funding from other sources. Table 3.10 shows that in
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Table 3.9: Quarterly Change in Fraction of Number of Dollar-Denominated Loans
No Euro Crisis All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MMFb;t 1  0.003  0.016  0.003  0.019
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
MMFPrimeb;t 1 0.002 0.028  0.001 0.026
(0.004) (0.014) (0.008) (0.023)
MMFGovb;t  0.0001 0.006  0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005)
Bondb;t  0.002 0.001  0.002 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,722 1,722 1,722 1,722
R2 0.00001 0.00005 0.00001 0.0005 0.0001 0.000 0.001 0.0002
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is the quarterly change in the fraction of dollar-denominated
loans by number of loans for bank b regressed on the instrumented previous quarter change in total money
market funding in columns (1), (2), (5), (6), and only prime money market funding in columns (3), (4), (7),
(8). The first four columns reflect the sample from January 2011 Q1 - 2017 Q1, excluding May 2011 - June
2012, while columns (5)-(8) contain the entire sample. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
the baseline regressions with no time fixed effects, a $100 million decline in prime funding
leads to a $20.6 million increase in dollar funding from government money market funds in
the following quarter, while dollar bond financing surprisingly decreases by $11.6 million,
with the magnitude of these effects increasing in the full sample with the Euro crisis. Note
however that these effects are not robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects.
In contrast to the cross-sectional regressions, I do now find a significant effect of money
market funding on foreign banks’ dollar and total loan growth at the quarterly frequency
in the baseline regressions with no controls or time fixed effects. The composition of banks’
loan portfolios slightly change, tilting more towards dollar-denominated lending with de-
clines in money market funding, contrary to conventional wisdom. However it is important
to note that these effects largely dissipate upon the inclusion of time fixed effects, which
control for contemporaneous aggregate shocks, and controls for other sources of dollar
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Table 3.10: Quarterly Change in Government and Bond Funding
No Euro Crisis All
MMFGovb;t Bondb;t MMFGovb;t Bondb;t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MMFb;t 1  0.206  0.025 0.116  0.001  0.209  0.028 0.121 0.0003
(0.041) (0.067) (0.048) (0.063) (0.079) (0.104) (0.053) (0.068)
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,429 1,806 1,806 1,806 1,806
R2 0.001 0.002 0.00002 0.001 0.002 0.013 0.00001 0.001
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the quarterly change in the sum of government fund funding in columns
(1), (2), (5), (6) and quarterly change in the sum of dollar bond issuance in columns (3),(4), (7), (8). The
first four columns reflect the sample from January 2011 Q1 - 2017 Q1, excluding May 2011 - June 2012,
while columns (5)-(8) contain the entire sample. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
funding. Furthermore looking at the response of these alternate sources of dollar fund-
ing, I find significant responses of government funding and bond financing, albeit with the
bond financing in the opposite direction as expected. As before, time fixed effects remove
any statistical significance, leading one to question whether these responses are truly due to
changes in money market funding or contemporaneous shocks perhaps unrelated to changes
in funding.
Within Estimator
The final set of results pertains to the within-firm and within-sector specifications. As will
be shown, I find mixed results of an effect on lending and expand my analysis to include the
European sovereign debt crisis to compare to the money market fund reform. I do not find
evidence of effects on loan quantity in the within-firm estimates, but do find a significant
effect on loan spreads following the money market fund reform, suggestive of pricing rather
than quantity changes. On the other hand the within-sector estimates suggest a significant
effect on lending during the Eurozone crisis. The lack of robustly estimated effects leads me
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to underweight these findings and lean towards viewing money market funds as not causing
significantly large contractions in lending, at least in the two episodes that I study.
Table 3.11 displays the results of the within-firm estimates for the Euro crisis sample
that runs from 2009 to 2015, and the MMF sample that covers 2013 to 2017. Recall that
each bank-firm observation takes the difference between the last loan extended before the
shock period and the first loan extended after the shock for a given bank-firm pair, which I
regress on the change in money market funding to bank b from the beginning to the end of
the shock period. As shown in columns (1) and (3), I do not obtain a significant effect from
the change in money market funding on lending. For a given firm, I cannot reject the null
that the change in lending is the same across all lenders, regardless of their loss in money
market funding. This stands in contrast to the findings of Ivashina, Scharfstein, and Stein
(2015) as they find a decrease in the probability of a firm obtaining a dollar-denominated
loan if it was previously reliant on credit from Eurozone banks. My findings show that in
the case that a firm was able to obtain a dollar-denominated loan after either the Euro
crisis or the money market reform, the change in the amount of the loan was negligible and
insignificant.
Given that banks may also adjust lending through interest rates offered on loans, I exam-
ine whether the change in lender dollar funding affected the spread on dollar-denominated
loans in columns (2) and (4). For the money market fund reform in column (4), I find that a
$1 billion decline in funding increased spreads over LIBOR by 54.7 basis points. Intuitively
this says that for a given firm, lenders that experienced larger declines in money market
funding passed on higher dollar rates to borrowers. This is similar to the results found
by Acharya, Afonso, and Kovner (2017) who find that foreign banks increased the interest
rates on loans during the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007. I surprisingly do
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Table 3.11: Within Firm Estimator
Euro Crisis MMF Reform
Loan Spread Loan Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MMFb  0.239 10.792 0.070  54.731
(0.311) (21.405) (0.289) (29.642)
Observations 4,552 3,161 2,264 1,534
R2 0.0002 0.0001 0.00002 0.002
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in the amount and spread over LIBOR of the last and first
dollar-denominated loan extended from bank b to firm f before November 2015 and after October 2016.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
not find any effect for the Euro crisis despite the expectation of a larger pass-through due
to both declines in money market funding and an increase in credit risk. One potential
explanation is that banks simply stopped lending, while the banks that maintained credit
insulated their borrowers from tighter financial conditions.
I next examine the within-sector estimates, namely for a given sector, the change in the
total loans extended by its lenders, contingent on their change in money market funding.
Table 3.12 displays the results. For the money market fund reform, I observe no significant
change in lending to a given sector across lenders in column (3), while I estimate a significant
effect from the Euro crisis in column (1). Looking now at spreads in columns (2) and (4),
I observe no significant effect. My results from the within-sector estimates thus show that
while there were no discernible effects on loan supply for both the amount and rate charged
on loans following the October 2016 money market fund reform, there were some effects
during the Euro crisis after applying sectoral aggregation.
The evidence here is thus mixed. For the within sector specifications, I find evidence of
price effects and increased spreads from the US money market fund reform on syndicated
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Table 3.12: Within Sector Estimator
Euro Crisis MMF Reform
Loan Spread Loan Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MMFb 0.830  90.203  0.375 26.303
(0.408) (68.208) (0.425) (64.364)
Observations 3,748 2,970 2,327 1,695
R2 0.001 0.001 0.0003 0.0001
p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
Notes: The dependent variables are the change in the average amount and spread over LIBOR over all loans
extended by bank b to sector s between January 2012 - November 2015 and October 2016 - March 2017.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
dollar bank lending, but do not find quantity effects as there was no significant change in
loan amounts. For the Euro crisis, the within firm results show no evidence of an effect at
all. In contrast, looking within sector, I find evidence of an effect on loan amounts during
the Euro crisis, but no effects on spreads, and no overall effect on the US money market
fund reform. The lack of consistency across my results in this section makes it difficult to
assert and conclusively state that US money market funds matter for international bank
lending.
3.7 Discussion of Results
From the results in the previous sections, the evidence appears mixed but leans more heavily
towards the lack of a significant effect of declines in US money market funding on dollar-
denominated lending by foreign banks. Although I do obtain some significant estimates,
namely in the time series estimates, these effects were not robust to the inclusion of time
fixed effects and other sources of dollar funding. Furthermore given the lack of significance
in the more carefully identified specifications, namely the within-firm and sector estimators,
145
I lean my conclusion towards a lack of an effect.
To summarize, I obtained a strong first stage in both the cross-sectional and time-series
regressions, finding that the fixed scaled exposure to money market funding correlated
highly with the size of the decline in prime money market funding as banks with higher
exposure observed larger declines following the aggregate drop in prime funding. Looking
at the second stage effect on dollar-denominated loans however yielded mixed results that
were mostly insignificant in the sense that nothing was detected in the cross-section, and in
the time series, any significant effects disappeared upon controlling for other time-varying
shocks via time fixed effects and other sources of contemporaneous dollar funding. I also
tried controlling for lagged substitute dollar funding as one could argue that contemporane-
ous measures reflect contemporaneous shocks akin to time fixed effects, however my results
remain robust, invariant to the timing of the control variables.
The lack of estimated effects on lending are supported by the within estimators. In
the firm- and sector-specific specifications, I fail to find a significant effect of the change
in money market funding on the loan supply extended to a given firm or sector for both
the Eurozone crisis and the money market fund reform. I do find a marginally significant
effect of the money market fund reform on the loan spreads extended to a given firm as
they experience an increase in the interest rate on their post reform loans from banks that
had larger declines in money market funding. This suggests that although there are not
quantity effects from the reform, there may have been price effects as banks simply passed
on higher dollar funding costs to their borrowers consistent with evidence found by Acharya
et al. (2017) in their study on the ABCP freeze of 2007. Furthermore I find evidence of
the decline in money market funding during the Eurozone crisis having a contractionary
effect on lending, but given the lack of an effect in the within-firm estimates, I interpret
146
this result with caution.
I obtain similar results for lending in all currencies, namely no significant effects after
controlling for substitute sources of dollar funding. Without the controls, I do find a positive
relationship between money market funding and lending in all currencies, namely a decline
in money market funding leads to a quarterly decline of lending in all currencies that
remains significant, although marginally, upon inclusion of time fixed effects in contrast to
the results focusing solely on dollar-denominated loans. This is suggestive of the notion
that the dollar is the funding currency relevant for lending in all currencies, not just the
dollar, given that I find marginally significant effects for lending in all currencies as opposed
to no effects when looking at only dollar-denominated lending.
This notion is extended when looking at the quarterly change in the fraction of dollar-
denominated loans in response to a change in money market funding. The cross-sectional re-
sults again display a lack of an effect, both on the number and fraction of dollar-denominated
loans relative to all loans, while I obtain significantly negative estimates for the effect of
money market funding on the fraction of dollar-denominated loans. In other words the re-
sults without controls suggest that a decline in money market funding leads to an increase
in the fraction of dollar-denominated, contrary to conventional wisdom. However given
that this result is not robust to the inclusion of controls, the magnitude of the effect is
quite small and arguably insignificant, and statistical significance appears haphazardly, I
argue the evidence points towards another lack of an effect.
One explanation for the results is the existence of substitute dollar funding from other
sources. Although I do not estimate a significant effect from an increase in government
fund funding or bond issuance once controlling for time fixed effects, it could be the case
that dollar funding substitution is widely heterogeneous across banks in the sense that a few
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may have issued bonds, some others may obtained repo dollar funding from the government
funds, and perhaps others found offshore dollar deposits, as expressed by the BIS (2017).
Thus because the responses are so heterogeneous across banks, it may be hard to detect
systematic responses with respect to specific sources of dollar funding. Furthermore it could
be the case that there are time-varying unobserved characteristics of banks not captured
by the bank and time fixed effects that contribute to their resilience to funding shocks.
Another possible explanation stems from relationship based banking. It could be the
case that although banks saw a decline in dollar funding, they do not cut back on lending
to firms with which they have previously established relationships, choosing instead to
either pass on the higher costs or absorb the costs themselves. In this sense, bank-firm
relationships may serve as insurance mechanisms, with banks absorbing costs when negative
funding shocks hit, and profiting when dollar funding costs decrease, maintaining a constant
loan supply to their borrowers in either case.
This is somewhat supported if we combine the results of Ivashina, Scharfstein, and
Stein (2015) with those found in this paper. They find that firms face a lower probability
of obtaining a dollar-denominated loan contingent on having a Eurozone bank in their last
loan syndicate. Thus while they examine the extensive margin, this paper looks at the
intensive margin, namely what happens to loan terms if they are extended again. One
interpretation of my lack of significant effects is that banks choose to continue lending only
to firms with which they have established relationships, and thus choose to insulate the
loan terms from funding shocks to preserve the relationship. On the other hand, for firms
with which they do not have such a long-standing relationship, banks may choose to either
increase the spreads, decrease loan amounts, or just not lend altogether. If we assume that
the majority of loans extended were to firms with good relationships with their borrowers,
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then this notion of loan term insulation to preserve relationships may help justify some of
the results.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper has examined the effects of the US money market fund reform of October
2016 in search of effects on international bank lending in both currency denomination and
composition. The results were somewhat inconclusive and skew more heavily towards the
lack of a significant effect. I find that despite the large drop in dollar funding from US money
markets from November 2015 to October 2016, foreign banks did not significantly cut back
on their dollar-denominated loans, nor fraction of dollar-denominated loans relative to other
currency denominated loans once controlling for time fixed effects and substitute sources of
alternate dollar funding.
Furthermore, although increased dollar funding from government money market funds
provided substitute funding, it was not sufficient enough to offset the loss in funding from
prime funds and cannot be solely attributed as the source of substitute funding to insulate
all banks. While I do find an increase in government funding associated with a decline in
prime funding, suggestive of some substitution, I find the opposite for dollar bond issuance
in the sense that I observe a decrease in bond issuance following a decline in prime funding.
Note however that both of these results are not robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects.
I also examine the Eurozone crisis to compare to the money market fund reform and
again find mixed results depending on the specification. For specifications with borrower-
firm fixed effects, I find that there was no significant effect on loan amounts, but there was
an increase in spreads associated with the money market fund reform. In contrast for the
specifications that look at the borrower-sector level and include the associated borrower
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fixed effects, I find a significant effect for the Eurozone crisis, but not the money market
fund reform. The lack of consistency between the two specifications and robustness leads
me to question and discount the results when assessed in context with the other exercises
that did not yield significant effects overall.
The results from this paper suggest that the dollar funding mechanism is quite complex
as foreign banks appear to have a multitude of options with which to substitute for dollar
funding, each of which are heterogeneously utilized depending on the individual bank. As
a result, this paper has shown that focusing solely on money market funding and bond
issuance may be insufficient to capture alternate sources and thus I cannot definitively
identify whether there is an effect on bank lending from declines in dollar funding from
money markets. One important source may be off-shore dollar deposits as well as interbank
loans, both of which are difficult to account for in the data. Future work may hopefully
find and incorporate this data in the study of bank financing decisions and how they affect
loan supply.
In addition, following upon the notion of bank-firm relationships as an insurance mech-
anism, one can examine whether funding costs counter-cyclically affect bank profits. This
paper was one example of a dollar funding shock due to a decline in liquidity from money
market funds, but we can extend this notion to other shocks to funding costs as well. I
reserve this project for future work.
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Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Taming the FX Factor Zoo
One aspect missing from the exchange rate asset pricing literature is a consensus on the
set of baseline control factors to consider when testing the existence and relevance of a new
pricing factor. Papers have generally followed the equity pricing literature primarily using
the market return or consumption growth as baseline factors, but there is no guarantee that
the hallmark asset pricing factors are relevant or correct for exchange rates. This may be
due to the difficulty of identifying risk factors for exchange rates, but the literature could
nonetheless benefit from a common baseline as studies are otherwise difficult to compare.
I attempt to fill this void by applying the double selection procedure of Feng et al.
(2017) in order to uncover the existence of baseline factors with which I can compare
the intermediary capital shocks. I closely follow their paper, compiling a series of readily
available risk factors previously identified in the literature, in search of baseline factors that
survive regularization to determine the most relevant factors that we may use as benchmarks
in future studies. My set of control factors are AQR’s factors: Devil’s HML (Asness and
Frazzini 2013), Betting Against Beta (Frazzini and Pedersen 2014), Quality Minus Junk
(Asness, Frazzini, and Pedersen 2017), Value, and Momentum (Asness, Moskowitz, and
Pedersen 2013) and the Fama French factors: market excess return, size, value, profitability,
and investment, and their global equivalents, and the S&P 500 excluding financials return.
The procedure involves the application of machine learning techniques, namely regular-
ization through the use of the LASSO (least absolute shrinkage and selection operator), that
tests a wide number of factors simultaneously and yields a parsimonious set of factors that
158
best describe the cross-section of returns. The usage of LASSO may be substituted with
other feature selection methods from the machine learning toolbox including but not limited
to other regularization operators (elastic net, ridge regression), random forests, boosting,
and neural networks.
Suppose we have a set of new factors to test, fgtg, a set of factors that we want to use
as controls, fhtg, and a cross-section of returns, Ri;t. The goal is to find the parsimonious
set of factors in fhtg such that our estimates of risk prices from the factors in fgtg are not
or less susceptible to omitted variable bias.
The first step involves running a cross-sectional LASSO regression of average returns




n 1jjr   ^Cov(rt; ht)jj2 + 1n 1jjjj1

This step is analogous to directly estimating the second step of the Fama MacBeth
procedure as our regressors, ^Cov(rt; ht) are the ’s from the first stage of Fama MacBeth and
we are thus estimating the risk prices of each factor. The main difference is the inclusion of
the penalty term that increases with the number of non-zero estimates of regressors, biasing
estimates towards zero which isolates only the most relevant factors. The 1 coefficient is a
tuning parameter that controls the relative size of the penalty, with 1 = 0 reverting back
to ordinary least squares, and 1 !1 shrinking all estimates to zero. Let fI1g denote the
set of factors selected in the first step.
The second step employs a second pass of LASSO aimed at capturing any factors in
fhtg that may have been missed in the first step. Some factors may have been shrunken
to zero because they do not hold large relative importance as priced risk factors for the
cross-section of returns, but one may nonetheless need them as controls if they covary with
the covariance of our set of new candidate factors in fgtg and returns. Omission of these
factors would then leave the estimates of risk prices for the candidate factors susceptible to
omitted variable bias that may confound our final estimates as the error term would contain






n 1jj ^Cov(rt; jt)  ^Cov(rt; ht)j jj2 + 2n 1jjj jj1

The previous specification yields a set of estimates, j , for each factor jt 2 fgtg. The
2 parameter again controls for how stringent the penalty term is. Our final set of control
factors F is thus the union of the selected factors in the first step, fI1g, and those in the
second step fI2g, which includes selected factors in any of our second stage regressions. We
are then equipped with a set of baseline factors F that we control for in any future asset
pricing exercises.
Parameter Selection
One of the most important tasks for the researcher in machine learning is the selection of the
algorithm’s tuning parameters. Model performance and thus selection is quite dependent
on the values of these parameters, so I discuss my approach to the selection of (1; 2), the
shrinkage parameters in each phase of the two-step procedure.
Recall that as ! 0, LASSO estimates tend towards OLS, whereas !1 increasingly
shrinks all estimates towards zero. I must tune the  parameter to avoid overfitting and
parameter estimation instability issues with low values of  as ! 0, while simultaneously
ensuring that  is not too high such that all estimates are shrunk towards zero and the
LASSO estimates are less informative for feature selection. Furthermore given that there
are a relatively low number of test assets due to the limited number of exchange rates and
cross-sections in comparison to the thousands of equities, one must more carefully select
the shrinkage parameters as estimates are quickly shrunk to zero as  increases.
I tune the parameters using k-fold cross validation to limit over-fitting. I first construct a
grid of (1; 2) values and perform the two-step procedure for each respective pair on 2 folds,
fitting the model on each fold and testing it on the other. For each pair, I compute the mean-
squared error on each fold and take the means to determine the respective combination’s
loss.
Figure A.1 displays the heat-map for parameter combinations and the mean-squared
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Figure A.1: Heatmap of Parameter Combinations
error in each step of the procedure. I show estimates for 1 2 [10 8; 10 7] and 2 2
[10 8; 10 7] as larger values of  quickly shrink all estimates to zero, whereas smaller
values are subject to over-fitting and parameter estimation issues as  ! 0. The optimal
combination,  = 4 10 8 and 2 = 4 10 8, yields the lowest mean-squared errors.
Upon finding the optimal parameters, I then re-estimate the model using the entire sam-
ple and find that the Fama French Global Market and S&P 500 excluding Finance returns
robustly survive the procedure. The main paper contains the specifications controlling for
the Fama French Global Market return and I include the specifications with the S&P 500
excluding Finance returns here in the appendix in Tables A.1 and A.2. Note that results
are qualitatively the same, with weaker results for the joint cross-section in specifications
including intermediary capital, dollar, and global dollar factors.
A.2 Eroded Profitability of FX Strategies
As was hinted in the cumulative return plots of Section 1.3 of the paper, nearly all of the
currency strategies other than value do not appear to be profitable after 2010, as cumulative
returns very marginally increase, stagnate, or fall altogether. I examine the decomposed
returns of each cross-section to identify the key drivers of excess returns and how they
change after 2010. I find that exchange rate strategies decline in profitability due to a






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3 displays the high-minus-low returns for each of the currency strategies, de-
composed into the attribution from the forward discount, or equivalently interest rate dif-
ferential, and exchange rate movements. It is evident that mean excess returns are higher
before 2010, with some strategies such as the dollar, momentum, and volatility providing
mean losses providing dismal performance from 2010 onwards.
The intermediary capital strategy initially generates excess returns through a combi-
nation of carry at 3.6% and relative exchange rate appreciation of 1%. Note that these
returns are attributed to the differences in forward discounts and exchange rate movements
between the top and bottom portfolios, namely the high intermediary capital shock beta
currencies on average had a 3.6% spread in the forward discount over the bottom, and
on average appreciated relative to the bottom currencies, yielding a pre-2010 mean excess
return of 4.6%.
In panel B, observe that both the forward discount/carry spread has declined to 1% and
that the high currencies now depreciate relative to the bottom currencies, eroding returns
by .5%. It is thus apparent that the intermediary capital shock strategy has experienced
decreased mean excess returns due to a combination of interest rate differential compression
and unfavorable spot exchange rate movements.
The carry exhibits the same decline in mean excess returns due to a compression of
interest rate spreads. Before 2010, the bulk of the profitability of the carry trade stemmed
from outsize interest rate differentials as indicated by a difference in average forward dis-
counts of 15.2%. This was offset by 6.1% of exchange rate depreciation of the top carry
currencies relative to the bottom, yielding a mean excess return of 9.1% per annum. As with
the intermediary capital strategy, the excess return attributed to the difference in forward
discounts, or equivalently the carry component, declined from 2010 onwards, decreasing by
over half to 7.2% per annum. Relative spot exchange rate movements remained relatively
similar, and thus it appears that the carry trade has declined primarily due to a compression
of interest rate differentials, which may be attributed to broad central bank easing follow-




Capital Carry Dollar Momentum Volatility Value
st+1
Mean -0.99 6.06 -3.62 -4.80 -0.29 -8.15
SD 9.54 10.16 10.80 11.16 9.91 11.40
ft   st
Mean 3.62 15.15 1.43 3.66 3.76 -1.78
SD 0.99 5.37 0.91 5.20 0.84 1.18
RXt+1
Mean 4.61 9.09 5.05 8.46 4.05 6.37
SD 9.52 11.07 10.83 12.66 9.99 11.50
Sharpe 0.48 0.82 0.47 0.67 0.41 0.55
Panel B: 2010 - 2017
Capital Carry Dollar Momentum Volatility Value
st+1
Mean -0.99 6.06 -3.62 -4.80 -0.29 -8.15
SD 9.54 10.16 10.80 11.16 9.91 11.40
ft   st
Mean 3.62 15.15 1.43 3.66 3.76 -1.78
SD 0.99 5.37 0.91 5.20 0.84 1.18
RXt+1
Mean 4.61 9.09 5.05 8.46 4.05 6.37
SD 9.52 11.07 10.83 12.66 9.99 11.50
Sharpe 0.48 0.82 0.47 0.67 0.41 0.55
Panel C: Full Sample
Capital Carry Dollar Momentum Volatility Value
st+1
Mean -0.60 6.13 -2.18 -3.24 0.54 -7.58
SD 9.32 9.52 10.52 10.33 9.67 11.27
ft   st
Mean 2.93 13.27 1.41 2.86 3.53 -1.88
SD 0.95 4.80 0.82 4.58 0.77 1.04
RXt+1
Mean 3.54 7.14 3.59 6.11 2.99 5.69
SD 9.31 10.33 10.54 11.63 9.73 11.37
Sharpe 0.38 0.69 0.34 0.52 0.31 0.50
Table A.3: Portfolios Decomposed
Notes: Each column represents the decomposition of the high-minus-low for each respective cross-section
of foreign exchange. Changes are computed as the mean differences in the averages of spot exchange rate
depreciation, forward discounts, and excess returns of currencies between the high and low portfolios.
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The dollar strategy attributes most of its excess returns to favorable exchange rate
movements. The bulk of profits stem from the appreciation of high relative to low dollar
beta currencies, at 3.6% before 2010, which in combination with a 1.4% carry yielded a
5.1% mean excess return. However from 2010 onwards, the high dollar beta currencies on
average depreciated by more than their low equivalents, eroding returns by 1.9% rather
than contributing to them, leaving a mean loss of .5%. Given the relative stability of
the difference in average forward discounts, it is apparent that the dollar strategy suffered
mainly due to broad based currency depreciation that affected high dollar beta currencies
by more than their low counterparts.
Before 2010, the momentum strategy benefits from a combination of exchange rate
movements and carry, with the former generating 4.8% and the latter adding 3.7% to
yield mean excess returns of 8.5% per annum. Following 2010, both components decline
as the strategy faces compressed relative interest rate differentials at .3%, and exchange
rate depreciation at 1.8% as opposed to the previous appreciation that generated over half
of mean excess returns, resulting in very poor post-2010 mean excess returns at -1.6%
per annum. This strategy thus suffers due to a combination of lower carry and relative
depreciation.
The volatility strategy erodes primarily due to relative exchange rate depreciation.
While relative carry decreased from 3.8% to 2.9%, the decline in mean excess returns is
mainly due to the shift of low volatility beta currencies from appreciating relative to the
high beta currencies, to depreciating by 2.9%.8 The carry and spot rate components thus
nullify each other and yield a mean excess return of 0% in the post-2010 period.
Value is the only strategy that retains some semblance of profitability following 2010.
The strategy mainly derives its profits from favorable exchange rate appreciation, consis-
tent with intuition as high value currencies are precisely those that are undervalued and
expected to appreciate over time. Before 2010, the high value currency portfolio on average
appreciates by 8.2% relative to the low value portfolio, and while this does decline to 6.2%
in the post 2010, relative appreciation remains a positive contributor to the value strategy’s
8Recall that for the volatility strategy, the “high” currencies, namely those that outperform, are actually
those with lower betas.
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mean excess returns.
The carry component detracts from value strategy returns in both partitions of the
sample. Consistent with previous findings relative forward discounts decreased from -1.8%
to -2.1% in the pre- and post-2010 periods, both of which dampened returns. Value prof-
itability however remained robust due to the outsize contribution of favorable exchange rate
movements, yielding mean excess returns of 6.4% and 4.1% in the pre- and post- periods,
respectively.
It is thus apparent that all currency strategies have declined in profitability from the
recent period following the Global Financial Crisis. Strategies whose returns relied heavily
on the carry component, namely the intermediary capital shock, carry, and momentum
strategies, suffered due to compressed relative interest rate differentials as proxied by for-
ward discounts, whereas all strategies faced decreased profitability due to unfavorable spot
exchange rate movements. In particular, the dollar, momentum, and volatility strategies
faced relative portfolio depreciation in contrast to previously beneficial mean portfolio ap-
preciation, resulting in poor returns in the past decade. The value strategy is unique in
remaining profitable in the recent period, deriving the bulk of its returns from relative
currency appreciation and containing negative carry throughout.
My results suggest that global low interest rate monetary policies may have been respon-
sible for the steep declines in systematic exchange rate strategies in combination with broad
based dollar appreciation that yielded unfavorable relative currency depreciation. Given the
eroded profitability of exchange rate strategies, I reiterate that the lack of identification of
significant risk prices may be due to compressed returns in the recent period.
Decomposition By Portfolio
Table A.4 displays the decomposition of the excess returns of each of the carry trade port-
folios as well as the high-minus-low into realized exchange rate depreciation and forward
discount. The latter captures the interest rate differential, or the carry, while the former
reflects exchange rate movements that generally erode the return on the carry of interest.
The failure of the uncovered interest parity is the empirical fact that exchange rates do not
depreciate enough to offset the gains of carry, leading to positive excess returns.
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Pre-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean -1.82 -0.87 -2.41 -1.16 1.01 4.24 6.06
SD 9.04 8.41 8.21 8.82 9.63 10.64 10.16
ft   st
Mean -3.88 -1.00 0.50 2.00 4.00 11.27 15.15
SD 4.78 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.60 2.54 5.37
RXt+1
Mean -2.06 -0.13 2.91 3.16 2.99 7.03 9.09
SD 10.48 8.42 8.30 8.88 9.62 10.76 11.07
Sharpe -0.20 -0.02 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.65 0.82
Post-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 0.07 1.78 2.29 -0.10 2.72 6.43 6.37
SD 6.85 7.09 7.61 7.92 9.24 9.65 7.14
ft   st
Mean -0.97 -0.20 0.56 1.56 2.66 6.21 7.18
SD 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.34
RXt+1
Mean -1.04 -1.99 -1.73 1.65 -0.06 -0.23 0.81
SD 6.84 7.08 7.60 7.91 9.25 9.68 7.18
Sharpe -0.15 -0.28 -0.23 0.21 -0.01 -0.02 0.11
Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean -1.37 -0.25 -1.30 -0.91 1.41 4.76 6.13
SD 8.57 8.12 8.09 8.61 9.53 10.41 9.52
ft   st
Mean -3.19 -0.82 0.52 1.90 3.69 10.08 13.27
SD 4.20 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.56 2.31 4.80
RXt+1
Mean -1.82 -0.57 1.82 2.80 2.27 5.32 7.14
SD 9.74 8.12 8.15 8.65 9.53 10.54 10.33
Sharpe -0.19 -0.07 0.22 0.32 0.24 0.50 0.69
Table A.4: Carry
Notes: Each column represents a portfolio of the carry trade, with portfolio 1 containing the currencies
with the lowest forward discounts and portfolio 6 containing the highest. HML is the difference between
the two. Excess returns for each portfolio are decomposed into exchange rate depreciation, st+1 and
forward discount or interest differential, ft   st, with RXt representing final excess returns. Periods are
split between the beginning of the sample until December 2009 and January 2010 until March 2018.
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Prior to 2010, we observe a forward discount of 11.3% per annum on the top portfolio
and a forward premium of 3.9% on the bottom portfolio, leading to a carry of 15.2% for the
HML portfolio. This is eroded by an average of 6.1% of exchange rate depreciation, leading
to a mean excess return of 9.1% for the HML carry and an impressive Sharpe ratio of .82.
In contrast, forward discounts and premiums have been compressed from 2010 onwards,
as on average the top and bottom portfolios yield only 6.2% and -1% respectively, leading
to a much lower HML carry of 7.2%. Currencies also appear to have broadly depreciated
against the dollar, with the top portfolio depreciating 6.4% on average per month annu-
alized, whereas the bottom portfolio has also depreciated .1% on average, leading to a
high-minus-low average depreciation of 6.4%, not too dissimilar from the pre-2010 period.
Thus while we do have additional depreciation, the largely compressed forward discounts
appear to be responsible for the steep decline in excess returns in the post-2010 period.
It thus apparent that the carry trade became less profitable due to a combination of
decreased forward discounts, or lower interest rate differentials, and increased exchange
rate depreciation. The former can be attributed to central banks’ zero and low interest rate
policies since the Global Financial Crisis, while the latter implies an improved, although
imperfect resurgence of the uncovered interest parity, the source of which is outside the
scope of this paper and open to future research.
The decomposition of dollar portfolio returns in Table A.5 show that the majority of
excess returns are attributed to currency movements rather than carry. The pre-2010 period
displays a meager 1.4% carry per annum, whereas spot rate changes were as large as 3.6%.
The HML has a mean excess return of 5.1% per annum, largely due to the appreciation
of the high dollar exposure basket, with a reasonable Sharpe ratio of .47. However in the
post-2010 period, while forward discounts mildly compress, the major difference is the shift
from broad currency appreciation to depreciation in all portfolios. Instead of exchange rate
movements serving as the primary driver of excess returns, they now erode excess returns,
leading to negative mean returns of -.5% and an abysmal Sharpe ratio of -.06.
The intermediary capital portfolios display similar patterns as the carry portfolios,
namely the decline in excess returns primarily due to smaller forward discounts, and thus
carry, that is slightly amplified by increased currency depreciation as displayed in Table
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Panel A: Pre-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean -0.48 -2.00 -1.83 -2.61 -4.94 -4.28 -3.62
SD 5.76 5.87 8.44 10.36 10.37 10.85 10.80
ft   st
Mean 1.00 0.66 1.83 2.19 2.06 2.40 1.43
SD 0.75 0.78 0.95 0.90 0.77 0.86 0.91
RXt+1
Mean 1.48 2.66 3.67 4.80 6.99 6.67 5.05
SD 5.75 5.81 8.39 10.30 10.38 10.94 10.83
Sharpe 0.26 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.67 0.61 0.47
Panel B: Post-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 2.84 1.45 3.31 4.65 3.19 4.71 1.86
SD 3.95 5.55 7.97 8.64 9.93 11.36 9.65
ft   st
Mean 0.47 0.98 1.14 1.66 1.34 1.79 1.33
SD 0.40 0.45 0.53 0.63 0.43 0.64 0.47
RXt+1
Mean -2.38 -0.47 -2.17 -3.00 -1.85 -2.91 -0.54
SD 3.89 5.63 7.96 8.62 9.88 11.37 9.64
Sharpe -0.61 -0.08 -0.27 -0.35 -0.19 -0.26 -0.06
Panel C: Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 0.39 -1.10 -0.49 -0.70 -2.81 -1.93 -2.18
SD 5.36 5.79 8.34 9.97 10.30 11.03 10.52
ft   st
Mean 0.86 0.74 1.65 2.05 1.87 2.24 1.41
SD 0.68 0.71 0.87 0.84 0.71 0.81 0.82
RXt+1
Mean 0.46 1.84 2.14 2.75 4.68 4.16 3.59
SD 5.34 5.77 8.31 9.93 10.30 11.11 10.54
Sharpe 0.09 0.32 0.26 0.28 0.45 0.37 0.34
Table A.5: Dollar
Notes: Each column represents portfolios sorted by dollar betas, with portfolio 1 containing the currencies
with the lowest betas and portfolio 6 containing the highest. HML is the difference between the two. Excess
returns for each portfolio are decomposed into exchange rate depreciation, st+1 and forward discount
or interest differential, ft   st, with RXt representing final excess returns. Periods are split between the
beginning of the sample until December 2009 and January 2010 until March 2018.
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Panel A: Pre-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 0.97 -0.41 1.25 1.17 0.99 -0.23 -0.99
SD 8.95 9.39 8.46 8.68 8.83 8.76 9.54
ft   st
Mean -0.32 0.44 1.19 2.11 2.16 3.29 3.62
SD 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.99
RXt+1
Mean -1.29 0.85 -0.06 0.94 1.17 3.52 4.61
SD 9.07 9.46 8.55 8.72 8.82 8.82 9.52
Sharpe -0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.40 0.48
Panel B: Post-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 2.45 0.60 3.03 4.75 2.68 2.93 0.48
SD 4.72 6.04 7.75 9.25 10.08 10.38 8.74
ft   st
Mean 1.07 0.92 2.47 2.59 1.90 2.06 0.99
SD 0.27 0.27 0.45 0.28 0.55 0.44 0.56
RXt+1
Mean -1.38 0.31 -0.56 -2.16 -0.79 -0.87 0.51
SD 4.68 6.02 7.76 9.22 10.08 10.40 8.70
Sharpe -0.29 0.05 -0.07 -0.23 -0.08 -0.08 0.06
Panel C: Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 1.36 -0.14 1.71 2.11 1.43 0.60 -0.60
SD 8.06 8.63 8.27 8.83 9.16 9.21 9.32
ft   st
Mean 0.05 0.56 1.52 2.24 2.09 2.97 2.93
SD 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.95
RXt+1
Mean -1.31 0.71 -0.19 0.12 0.66 2.37 3.54
SD 8.15 8.68 8.34 8.85 9.16 9.26 9.31
Sharpe -0.16 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.07 0.26 0.38
Table A.6: Intermediary Capital
Notes: Each column represents portfolios sorted by intermediary capital betas, with portfolio 1 containing
the currencies with the lowest betas and portfolio 6 containing the highest. HML is the difference between
the two. Excess returns for each portfolio are decomposed into exchange rate depreciation, st+1 and
forward discount or interest differential, ft st, with RXt representing final excess returns. Periods are split
between the beginning of the sample until December 2009 and January 2010 until March 2018.
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A.6. While there was previously a significant spread in forward discounts between the top
and bottom portfolios prior to 2010, forward discounts become relatively flat across port-
folios following 2010 leading to the low excess returns for the HML. Currencies depreciate
by more on average, leading to mean excess returns of .5%.
Volatility exhibits similar performance to intermediary and carry but in smaller magni-
tude as we observe excess returns driven by carry, and less so by exchange rate movements
prior to 2010. After 2010, we see that returns are mainly eroded due to exchange rate
depreciation, with the bottom portfolio depreciating the most out of all portfolios, putting
a sharp dent in excess returns.
The momentum strategy prior to 2010 derives its profitability from a balance of carry
and exchange rate appreciation, attributing slightly more towards the former as displayed
in Table A.7. The pre-2010 mean excess return was 8.5% per annum yielding a decent
Sharpe ratio of .67 that came from 3.7% of carry and 4.8% of exchange rate appreciation.
After 2010, momentum performs poorly, as the highest portfolio currencies have the largest
depreciations and the forward discount halves, while the lowest portfolio sees increased an
improved forward discount. Thus the mean excess return of -1.6% after 2010 primarily
comes from the poor performance of the top portfolio that both substantially depreciates
and loses carry.
As expected, value operates primarily through exchange rate movements as high value
currencies are precisely those that will appreciate over time as shown in Table A.9. Prior
to 2010, the HML appreciated 8.2% while carry was actually negative, removing 1.8% of
excess returns, for a final mean excess return of 6.4%. However after 2010, currencies overall
appear to have depreciated against the dollar. While higher valued currencies depreciated
by significantly less than low value currencies, the lack of currency appreciation for the high
portfolio shed a little under 2% of excess returns compared to the pre-2010 period. The carry
component has also slightly eroded as the highest portfolio now provides slightly negative
carry, while the low portfolio has a larger forward discount, both of which detriment mean
excess returns. However in contrast to the other strategies, value remains profitable in the
post 2010 period at 4.1% per annum with a Sharpe ratio of .37.
The evidence in this section clearly points towards a decline in the profitability in
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Panel A: Pre-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 3.58 0.69 0.25 -1.84 -0.44 -1.23 -4.80
SD 11.40 9.15 9.06 9.09 9.22 9.07 11.16
ft   st
Mean 1.23 1.21 2.12 2.19 2.85 4.89 3.66
SD 4.96 0.92 1.69 1.01 1.17 1.73 5.20
RXt+1
Mean -2.34 0.52 1.88 4.03 3.29 6.12 8.46
SD 12.70 9.13 9.10 9.15 9.24 9.19 12.66
Sharpe -0.18 0.06 0.21 0.44 0.36 0.67 0.67
Panel B: Post-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 3.19 1.36 1.44 2.80 -0.26 5.02 1.83
SD 9.78 9.21 7.73 7.80 6.86 7.32 6.87
ft   st
Mean 2.10 1.51 1.54 1.59 1.64 2.38 0.28
SD 0.51 0.39 0.34 0.43 0.42 0.46 0.85
RXt+1
Mean -1.09 0.15 0.09 -1.21 1.91 -2.64 -1.55
SD 9.80 9.19 7.72 7.82 6.88 7.29 6.93
Sharpe -0.11 0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.28 -0.36 -0.22
Panel C: Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 3.48 0.85 0.53 -0.75 -0.40 0.24 -3.24
SD 11.03 9.16 8.76 8.81 8.71 8.71 10.33
ft   st
Mean 1.44 1.28 1.98 2.05 2.57 4.30 2.86
SD 4.34 0.83 1.49 0.91 1.05 1.56 4.58
RXt+1
Mean -2.05 0.43 1.46 2.80 2.96 4.06 6.11
SD 12.07 9.14 8.79 8.87 8.73 8.84 11.63
Sharpe -0.17 0.05 0.17 0.32 0.34 0.46 0.52
Table A.7: Momentum
Notes: Each column represents portfolios sorted by the previous month’s excess returns, with portfolio 1
containing the currencies with the lowest returns and portfolio 6 containing the highest. HML is the difference
between the two. Excess returns for each portfolio are decomposed into exchange rate depreciation, st+1
and forward discount or interest differential, ft  st, with RXt representing final excess returns. Periods are
split between the beginning of the sample until December 2009 and January 2010 until March 2018.
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Panel A: Pre-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean -0.43 2.41 1.28 1.02 -0.77 -0.17 -0.29
SD 10.47 9.40 8.54 8.53 7.77 8.22 9.91
ft   st
Mean 3.46 2.56 2.37 1.17 0.54 -0.28 3.76
SD 0.98 0.84 0.80 0.90 1.01 0.71 0.84
RXt+1
Mean 3.89 0.15 1.09 0.15 1.31 -0.11 4.05
SD 10.63 9.40 8.53 8.60 7.93 8.29 9.99
Sharpe 0.37 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.17 -0.01 0.41
Panel B: Post-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 4.70 4.22 2.06 2.83 1.08 1.82 2.88
SD 11.28 9.81 8.77 7.67 6.66 4.73 8.95
ft   st
Mean 3.31 2.57 1.87 1.67 1.57 0.42 2.89
SD 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.22 0.46
RXt+1
Mean -1.39 -1.65 -0.19 -1.17 0.49 -1.40 0.01
SD 11.31 9.81 8.72 7.68 6.69 4.71 8.96
Sharpe -0.12 -0.17 -0.02 -0.15 0.07 -0.30 0.00
Panel C: Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 0.92 2.88 1.49 1.49 -0.29 0.35 0.54
SD 10.70 9.50 8.59 8.30 7.49 7.46 9.67
ft   st
Mean 3.42 2.56 2.24 1.30 0.81 -0.10 3.53
SD 0.86 0.75 0.72 0.80 0.89 0.63 0.77
RXt+1
Mean 2.50 -0.32 0.75 -0.19 1.09 -0.45 2.99
SD 10.82 9.49 8.57 8.36 7.62 7.51 9.73
Sharpe 0.23 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.14 -0.06 0.31
Table A.8: Volatility
Notes: Each column represents portfolios sorted by volatility betas, with portfolio 1 containing the currencies
with the lowest betas and portfolio 6 containing the highest. HML is the difference between the two. Excess
returns for each portfolio are decomposed into exchange rate depreciation, st+1 and forward discount
or interest differential, ft   st, with RXt representing final excess returns. Periods are split between the
beginning of the sample until December 2009 and January 2010 until March 2018.
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Panel A: Pre-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 3.55 -0.47 0.62 0.25 -2.77 -5.22 -8.15
SD 12.16 10.39 10.13 10.20 11.14 8.69 11.40
ft   st
Mean 1.79 0.64 0.56 0.62 0.42 0.28 -1.78
SD 0.98 0.79 0.97 0.86 0.79 0.78 1.18
RXt+1
Mean -1.76 1.11 -0.06 0.36 3.19 5.50 6.37
SD 12.17 10.41 10.12 10.10 11.20 8.84 11.50
Sharpe -0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.28 0.62 0.55
Panel B: Post-2010
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 7.64 -0.05 0.60 3.89 -2.50 1.45 -6.19
SD 11.86 9.19 10.93 9.39 10.94 8.64 11.00
ft   st
Mean 2.05 0.34 0.57 0.73 0.62 -0.08 -2.13
SD 0.62 0.31 0.47 0.21 0.26 0.16 0.54
RXt+1
Mean -5.59 0.39 -0.03 -3.16 3.11 -1.53 4.06
SD 11.90 9.21 10.92 9.40 10.94 8.63 11.08
Sharpe -0.47 0.04 -0.00 -0.34 0.28 -0.18 0.37
Panel C: Full Sample
1 2 3 4 5 6 HML
st+1
Mean 4.74 -0.35 0.62 1.27 -2.69 -3.35 -7.58
SD 12.07 10.05 10.36 9.97 11.07 8.71 11.27
ft   st
Mean 1.87 0.56 0.56 0.65 0.48 0.18 -1.88
SD 0.89 0.69 0.86 0.74 0.68 0.67 1.04
RXt+1
Mean -2.88 0.91 -0.05 -0.63 3.17 3.53 5.69
SD 12.08 10.08 10.34 9.91 11.10 8.82 11.37
Sharpe -0.24 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 0.29 0.40 0.50
Table A.9: Value
Notes: Each column represents portfolios sorted by value as measured by five year changes in PPP, with
portfolio 1 containing the currencies with the lowest value and portfolio 6 containing the highest. HML
is the difference between the two. Excess returns for each portfolio are decomposed into exchange rate
depreciation, st+1 and forward discount or interest differential, ft  st, with RXt representing final excess
returns. Periods are split between the beginning of the sample until December 2009 and January 2010 until
March 2018.
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portfolio based currency strategies in the past decade. For strategies reliant on carry,
forward discounts have compressed, potentially due to ultra loose global monetary policy,
removing the previously dominant source of excess returns. For the remaining strategies,
currency movements were largely unfavorable as most currencies and portfolios depreciated
against the dollar, commonly in the top portfolios, causing mean excess returns to go from
positive to low or even negative between the two periods. The source for this broad based
depreciation is reserved to future research, but anecdotally may be related to the China
devaluation and EM sell-off in 2015-2016 as well as the dollar appreciation immediately
following the 2016 election. I use this evidence to emphasize that the previously identified
cross-sections of foreign exchange may no longer be valid given the poor performance in the
past decade, and thus the asset pricing tests in the following sections will have difficulty
picking up significant prices of risk given the lack of dispersion in returns.
A.3 Capital Flows and Intermediary Risk
I explore whether we can relate capital flows to various currencies’ exposures to the dollar
and HML carry factors in search of an economic interpretation behind these loadings.
Recall that these are precisely the dollar betas from the bilateral regressions in Tables 1.4
and 1.5 for the dollar factor, and the average forward discounts that proxy for interest rate
differentials for the HML carry factor. Verdelhan (2018) linked the systematic variation, or
R2, of the bilateral exchange rate movements to the R2 of a country’s capital outflows with
respect to aggregate capital flows.
I explore this notion by examining whether the elasticities of capital flows elucidate the
mechanism either behind the source of systematic variation or dependence on global risk
and provide an economic explanation for the heterogeneity in dollar betas and interest rate
differentials. The intuition is that countries with capital flows that are more sensitive to
aggregate capital flows or intermediary capital shocks are precisely the ones that are the
most exposed to the risk factors. When a bad intermediary capital shock hits, if aggregate
capital flows retrench, we expect that countries that experience larger capital outflows to
have depreciating currencies, in line with a portfolio balance approach.
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I test this mechanism through a two-step process. In the first step I estimate the
elasticity of a country’s bilateral capital flows vis-à-vis the US to aggregate capital flows
and intermediary capital shocks.9 Formally I estimate:
Yit
Yit 1
= i + iZt + it (A.10)
where Yit is the stock of foreign holdings of US securities or US holdings of foreign
securities and the regressor is either the percentage change in total capital flows from the
US or the intermediary shock, Zt = f YtYt 1 ; CShocktg. The set of i’s capture the elasticities
of capital flows between country i and the US to total US capital flows and the intermediary
capital shock.
In the second stage, I examine the correlation between estimated capital flow elasticities
and the average dollar betas or forward discounts of each country. If capital flows provide
an economic interpretation behind the cross-sectional heterogeneity in loadings on any of
the exchange rate factors, we would expect monotonic relationships between the elasticities
and loadings.
Table A.10 displays the first stage results, namely the capital flow elasticities. The
first two columns display the elasticities of bilateral capital flows to aggregate US capital
flows and the third and fourth columns display elasticities with respect to intermediary
capital shocks. The US columns (1) and (3) reflect the elasticities of foreign holdings of
US securities, while columns (2) and (4) display the elasticities of US holdings of foreign
securities. I do not perform significance tests for the elasticities of aggregate capital flows,
as they mechanically should all be non-zero and co-move with aggregate capital flows,
given that aggregate flows are the sum of all bilateral flows. However for the elasticities to
intermediary capital shocks, we observe that most estimates are insignificant, contrary to
our priors as we would expect the fluctuations in the capital ratio of financial intermediaries
to lead to readjustments of cross-border holdings, leading to capital flow movements.
9I obtain capital flow data from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Treasury International Capital
monthly reports on cross-border transactions (S1) and holdings of long-term securities (SLT). I combine
the two series to construct percent changes in US holdings of foreign securities and foreign holdings of US
securities, from September 2011 - December 2017.
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Aggregate Intermediary
US Foreign US Foreign
Country (1) (2) (3) (4)
Australia 0.561732 0.407000 0.015 8.60e-03
Austria -0.168590 -0.111995 0.011 1.45e-02
Belgium 0.139965 -0.662080 -0.005 -1.27e-02
Canada 0.816440 1.159179 -0.006 6.92e-03
Czech Republic 0.507321 1.411286 -0.013 -2.73e-02
Denmark -0.213865 -0.930597 -0.010 1.01e-02
Europe 0.591023 0.358775 0.000 4.90e-03
Finland -0.411674 -0.077929 0.046* -1.53e-02
France 5.972431 0.956297 -0.019 2.32e-02
Germany 0.222892 0.256582 0.032*** 1.51e-03
Greece -0.199668 1.685592 0.013 -3.29e-02
Hungary -0.757481 0.007804 0.193*** -1.44e-01**
India 1.250955 0.464913 -0.074 -1.26e-02
Indonesia 1.209023 -0.451205 0.010 2.34e-02
Ireland -0.504120 0.085577 0.005 -1.28e-02
Italy 0.092151 0.497940 -0.048*** 5.33e-02*
Japan 1.164754 1.209108 0.013 3.00e-02***
Kuwait 0.058945 11.394841 0.010 -1.27e+00**
Malaysia 0.545921 3.436849 0.020 1.48e-01**
Mexico 1.116823 1.707253 0.051 -3.90e-03
Netherlands 0.098945 -0.269754 -0.003 1.53e-02
New Zealand 0.428238 -0.690802 0.004 -1.10e-01
Norway 0.170633 1.526813 -0.006 -4.69e-03
Philippines 1.914606 -1.787952 0.068** 7.99e-02
Poland 1.271581 2.448223 0.008 -8.13e-03
Singapore 0.491213 -0.929658 0.014 9.66e-03
South Africa -0.365768 -0.218440 0.050 2.18e-02**
South Korea 0.852502 1.176868 0.042 3.28e-02
Spain -0.140088 0.514217 -0.041** 4.45e-02
Sweden -0.496272 0.183090 -0.001 1.47e-02
Switzerland 0.817910 -0.027211 0.001 -3.92e-03
Taiwan -0.310020 -0.236327 0.020* 2.26e-02**
Thailand 0.736721 0.172318 0.161** 3.03e-02**
Turkey -1.975374 -0.403001 0.112 2.80e-04
United Kingdom 3.550686 3.987050 0.005 1.32e-02
Table A.10: Capital Flow Elasticities
Notes: This tables displays the capital flow elasticities estimated via Equation A.10. Columns (1) and
(2) display the elasticities of bilateral capital flows of countries with the US with respect to aggregate
capital flows with the US. Columns (3) and (4) display the elasticities of capital flows with respect to the
intermediary capital shock. Columns (1) and (3) contain the elasticities of foreign holdings of US securities,
while Columns (2) and (4) contain the elasticities of US holdings of foreign securities.
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Figure A.2: Dollar Betas vs. Capital Flow Elasticities
All is not lost however, as we can still examine the correlation between these estimated,
but insignificant elasticities and the dollar betas and average forward discounts, which proxy
for exposure to the dollar factor and the HML carry factor, respectively. Figure A.2 displays
scatter plots of the elasticities and dollar betas. Although most of the plots do not display
any striking pattern, note that we do observe a distinct negative correlation between the
elasticity of US holdings of foreign assets to intermediary capital shocks and dollar betas in
the bottom left corner.10 On the other hand, we do not observe any relationship between
the capital flow elasticities and forward discounts as displayed in Figure A.3.
I test this with a simple regression of each country’s average dollar beta or forward
10Note that the negative correlation is robust to excluding Hungary, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the
Philippines, which look like outliers. The negative correlation remains significant and in fact increases in
magnitude.
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Figure A.3: Average Forward Discount vs. Capital Flow Elasticities
discount on its elasticities. Table A.11 displays my results for dollar betas, which confirms
the scatter plots as we estimate a significant and negative correlation between US holdings
of foreign assets and dollar betas as shown in Column (3). The interpretation is then that
currencies with high dollar betas, such as the Hungarian forint and New Zealand dollar,
have negative or smaller capital flow elasticities with the intermediary shock. When bad
intermediary shocks hit, namely a decline in intermediaries’ capital ratios, we observe an
increase in US holdings of foreign securities in these high dollar beta countries. This may
appear counterintuitive as this implies that there is an increase in demand for foreign
securities during bad times, and thus presumably capital flows into foreign currencies that
would cause them to appreciate, opposite our prior. One way to reconcile this finding is to
remember that for every buyer there must be a seller, and thus the increase in US holdings
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of foreign securities symmetrically implies that there must be a decrease in foreign holdings
of foreign securities, at least vis-a-vis US agents. Hence if we interpret US agents as similar
to a global market maker or dealer, the increase in their holdings of foreign securities during
negative intermediary capital shocks may just be the opposite end of a foreign sell-off of
foreign currency assets. This of course leads to the question of whether this observed pattern
is due to the portfolio decisions of foreign or US agents, and the relative importance of each
with regards to currency movements, a question outside the scope of this paper due to data
limitations.
The remaining columns of Table A.11 and all of Table A.12 display insignificant corre-
lations between dollar betas and average forward discounts with capital flow elasticities. At
face value, this implies that the dispersion, if we ignore the insignificance of the estimates,
in these specific capital flow elasticities do not help explain the dispersion in dollar betas
and average forward discounts, and by extension interest rate differentials. This of course
could be due to biases in the capital flow data that may be suppressing both the actual
magnitude and significance of the elasticities.11 However, without higher quality capital
flow data, I am unable to verify this claim.
11It is well known that the TICs data is subject to transactions and custodial bias. The transactions
bias reflects the fact that the TIC S data only records the country of the first cross-border counter-party,
so if for example a Chinese investor purchases a US security through a broker in the United Kingdom, this
transaction is listed as a sale to the UK rather than Chinese counter-party. The custodial bias is similar
in the sense that if for example a Chinese investor chooses to purchase a US security but keep it with a
custodian in the UK, the liability is recorded against the UK, rather than China. Both biases thus tend to
suppress actual changes in capital flows in a majority of countries that are not financial centers. See Bertaut
and Judson (2014) for a more detailed discussion.
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Table A.11: Correlation Between Capital Flow Elasticities and Dollar Betas
Aggregate Intermediary
Foreign US Foreign US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.996*** 1.043*** 1.042*** 0.985***
(0.097) (0.102) (0.075) (0.102)
Beta 0.033 -0.106 -4.432*** -0.042
(0.066) (0.089) (1.409) (1.663)
R2 0.01 0.06 0.31 0.00
N 24 25 24 25
Table A.12: Correlation Between Capital Flow Elasticities and Average Forward Discounts
Aggregate Intermediary
Foreign US Foreign US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Beta -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008)
R2 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03
N 24 25 24 25
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